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ABSTRACT 
This research analyses transnational tobacco companies' (TTCs) 
broader strategies for market access and demand creation through 
understanding market liberalisation in South Korea's tobacco industry from the 
late 1980s in order to inform the strengthening of tobacco control policies 
within the country and other emerging markets. 
The research is mainly based on internal tobacco industry documents, 
made publicly available through litigation. Detailed analysis of industry 
documents related to South Korea has not been undertaken to date. Semi- 
structured interviews and additional primary and secondary sources served as 
important supplementary data sources. 
The key finding of this research is that the market access strategies of 
TTCs, including direct and indirect lobbying on trade policies, were a response 
to South Korea's export-oriented economic development model and its 
negative attitude towards foreign investment. This was undertaken within the 
context of the transformation of the world trading system from the 1980s which 
created pressure on the country to open its market. After liberalisation, various 
aggressive marketing tactics to create demand for foreign brands were used by 
TTCs. The competition this engendered played a key role in the 
transformation of the Korean tobacco monopoly into a private, competitive 
business which emulated and refined the tactics used by TTCs. This, in turn, 
increased the extent and intensity of the aggressive marketing of tobacco 
products in Korea overall. Total volume of cigarette sales increased 25% as a 
result, making Korea the 8th largest tobacco market in the world by 1992, 
whilst smoking prevalence increased among young adults and females. 
The research concludes that a fuller understanding of TTCs' strategies 
for global expansion can be derived by locating them within the economic 
development models of specific countries or regions. Such analysis, in turn, 
offers important lessons for strengthening global tobacco control. Of 
foremost importance is the need for emerging markets to appropriately balance 
economic and public health policies when considering liberalisation. The 
111 
South Korean experience also demonstrates that comprehensive tobacco 
control policies, as set out by the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, 
must be implemented prior to any market liberalisation and strictly enforced 
within a competitive market environment. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Rationale 
The World Health Organisation (WHO) estimates that tobacco use 
killed 100 million people worldwide during the 20`h century, and currently 
causes 5.4 million deaths annually. (1) WHO warns that, unless urgent action 
in all countries is taken, this will rise to 8 million deaths annually by 2030, 
with more than 80 percent of these deaths occurring in developing countries. (1) 
In response to the significant public health risks posed by tobacco, WHO 
member states adopted the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
(FCTC) in May 2003, which came into force in February 2005. This historic 
treaty has created global impetus for strengthening tobacco control measures. 
However, while there have been increased tobacco control efforts worldwide, 
in many countries tobacco control policies remain insufficient and the disease 
burden from tobacco use continues to be substantial and increasing. 
An important factor in the upward trend in tobacco use has been the 
global restructuring and expansion of transnational tobacco companies 
(TTCs). (2,3) This has included the aggressive pursuit of new markets, 
especially in developing countries. The beginning of this expansion was the 
significant growth of tobacco control efforts in the US from the 1960s onwards, 
leading mainly US-based TTCs to seek new business in "emerging 
markets". (4) A review of the existing literature shows that, during the global 
expansion of the tobacco industry from the 1960s onwards, broadly Latin 
America, Asia, and the former Communist countries including the Former 
Soviet Union (FSU), were particular targets because of their large populations 
and/or rapid economic growth. (5) However, limited analysis to date has been 
undertaken of specific TTC strategies and activities to expand worldwide, or of 
the effects of such efforts on the domestic tobacco industries within individual 
countries. A fuller understanding of TTC activities remains a crucial task in 
the challenge to strengthen tobacco control worldwide. 
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The release of millions of pages of internal tobacco industry 
documents through litigation in the US since the 1990s offers significant 
opportunities to analyse TTC strategies for market access and expansion. The 
documents to date have enabled a wide range of analyses of TTC efforts to 
gain access to, and expand activities within, emerging markets. As will be 
described in Chapter 2, evidence to date suggests that TTCs have pursued 
market entry through a variety of strategies, supported at times by intensive 
political and economic pressure. (6,7) Analysis of internal documents has 
provided evidence of, for example, the importance of trade liberalisation, the 
legal and illegal trade, corporate restructuring, and foreign investment 
strategies. 
This research seeks to analyse the tobacco industry in South Korea 
before and after market liberalisation in 1988, and especially to understand 
TTCs' detailed strategies to gain access to the Korean market. Of particular 
note during the 1980s was the opening of the cigarette markets in South Korea, 
Japan, Taiwan, and Thailand through the assertion of trade pressures, initiated 
by TTCs and supported by the US government. (8) Were there communalities 
across these four countries that influenced the adoption of similar market 
access strategies by TTCs at this time? Why did TTCs assert pressure on 
these countries and not other Asian countries? While focusing on South 
Korea, this research begins by asking whether the countries patterns of 
industrialisation, focused on the adoption of the so-called "Asian economic 
development model", which mainly focused attention on exports, was a factor 
in how TTCs behaved during this period. In this sense, the research explores 
whether there may be links between TTCs' market access strategies and 
economic development models adopted by their targeted countries. To date, 
however, there has been no detailed analysis of the global expansion of TTCs 
into emerging markets from this perspective. 
Importantly, in addition, this research will analyse how market entry 
by TTCs subsequently influenced Korea's domestic tobacco industry. The 
existing literature argues that TTCs' market access led a more competitive 
market environment, given the ensuing intensification of competition between 
2 
existing domestic companies and new entrants, to maintain and expand their 
respective market shares. (9) A report from the US General Accounting 
Office (GAO), regarding the impacts of market access by US-based TTCs on 
the targeted Asian countries, suggests that more competition led by market 
liberalisation caused an increase in tobacco use and, hence, adverse effects on 
public health. (10) This research will undertake detailed analysis of what this 
increased competition meant within South Korea, in terms of marketing, 
product development and other activities by foreign and domestic tobacco 
companies, such as corporate social responsibility initiatives, to gain market 
share. The implications for public health from market liberalisation, and 
TTCs activities to effectively compete within South Korea and other emerging 
markets, will, in turn, be discussed in this context. 
A fuller understanding of how TTCs gained access to the South 
Korean market, and the adaptation by the domestic tobacco industry to market 
opening, in turn offers lessons for developing appropriate tobacco control 
measures in the country and other emerging markets to mitigate their public 
health impacts. Amid the rapid growth of the tobacco pandemic, predicted to 
be particularly notable in Asian countries over the next two decades (11), this 
research will analyse what prior preparation by governments are needed before 
permitting market access to TTCs, or whether other emerging markets should 
prohibit, delay or restrict TTC expansion. Where market liberalisation is 
adopted, what tobacco control policies and measures are needed to mitigate the 
public health impact of TTC activities, notably to encourage new smokers? 
In short, fuller understanding of TTC strategies in the South Korean market, 
and their public health impacts, offers potentially valuable lessons for helping 
to strengthen the responses of other emerging markets. As will be described 
more fully in Chapter 8, such lessons are especially important in the context of 
contemporary efforts to implement the FCTC across the world. 
3 
1.2 South Korea's relevance as a case study 
1.2.1 Public health impact of tobacco use in South Korea 
One key reason why South Korea has been selected as a case study for 
this research is because tobacco use has been a major public health problem 
since the 1950s. As described in Chapter 2, there has been limited analysis of 
tobacco use in South Korea, and thus a resultant lack of detailed data over time 
of smoking behaviours among specific population groups. Nevertheless, 
available data show that from the end of the Korean War in 1953, cigarette 
consumption among adult males rose dramatically to 75 percent by 1992, the 
world's highest rate of smoking prevalence. By 2000, smoking prevalence 
remained relatively high at 68 percent among adult males. (12,13) 
Meanwhile, despite strong social stigma against female smoking in Korea and 
regulations to restrict tobacco marketing to females, smoking prevalence 
among young Korean females (aged 17 to 19 years) increased from 1.6 percent 
in 1988 to 13 percent in 1998. (14) Although total smoking prevalence 
among Korean females have fluctuated over time (15), the smoking prevalence 
among young females (aged 20 to 29 years) recorded a rapid increase from 
market liberalisation until the mid 1990s (1.5 percent in 1990 to 7.2 percent in 
1996). (15) 
Thereafter, in 2008 the male smoking rate significantly decreased to 40 
percent. This is largely attributed to increased tobacco control measures and 
policies by the government and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) led 
by the Korean Association of Smoking and Health (KASH). (16) Despite this 
decline, however, there is growing concerns about the rising rates of smoking 
among youth. According to Youth Health Behaviour On-line Survey, 
conducted by the Korea Centres for Diseases Control and Prevention in 2008, 
the smoking prevalence among male youth aged 13 to 18 years shows an 
upward trend from 14.3 percent in 2005 to 17.4 percent in 2008. The 
smoking prevalence among female youth in the same age groups shows no 
decrease during the same period (8.9 percent in 2005 to 8.8 percent in 
2008. (17) More young females in their twenties are smoking with 4.9 percent 
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in 2008, the highest rate among Korean females, whilst 2.3 percent of females 
in their 30s smoke. (16) The smoking prevalence among Korean females has 
been a controversial issue. Health advocates argue that the actual number of 
smokers among females is much higher than the official data reports, as 
released by the government and public health communities. Given that most 
surveys of smoking prevalence in Korea use self-administered questionnaires 
for data collection, and there remains a strong social stigma against female 
smoking in the country, it is believed that this results in an artificially low rate 
of self-reporting among female smokers. The lack of accurate data remains 
an obstacle to understanding the true rate of female smoking in South Korea. 
Given the above, it is predicted that the disease burden from tobacco 
use in South Korea will remain significant for decades to come. At present, 
approximately 40,000 people die prematurely every year from tobacco-related 
diseases. (18) It is estimated that tobacco caused a total of one million 
premature deaths in the country from 1981 to 2008. (19,20) Cancer has been 
South Korea's number one cause of death over the past three decades and, 
among the major cancers, deaths from lung cancer (due mainly to smoking) has 
rapidly increased. Tobacco remains the number one cause of cancer deaths in 
Korea. (21) 
1.2.2 Linking the South Korean economic development model and 
tobacco control 
A second reason for selecting South Korea as a case study is that it 
offers potentially new and valuable insights regarding the links between the 
economic development models pursued by emerging markets and tobacco 
control. South Korea, one of the world's poorest countries after the Second 
World War, experienced rapid economic development from the early 1960s. 
The infrastructure of the capital city, Seoul, was totally destroyed by the 
Korean War in 1953, resulting in millions of people living in poverty. 
Subsequently, the country achieved an incredible and dramatic economic 
transformation, known as the `Miracle on the Han River', becoming the 
world's 13th largest economy within four decades. (22-25) This included the 
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"hopeless" city of Seoul which was transformed into a key Asian centre of 
business and commerce, and a highly advanced world city. (22) Korea's 
remarkable transformation, from a developing to a wealthy advanced 
industrialised country, led to it being described as one of the "Asian Tigers" 
within the international community. In 1996 the country became a member of 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
South Korea's economic development model emphasised exports as 
the engine of growth. As a country without substantial natural resources, the 
Korean government adopted a state-led and export-oriented development 
strategy which required radical economic transformation. During the early 
stage of industrialisation, given the weakness of the private sector, the 
government selected key industries to lead this economic strategy, harnessing 
them to drive the country's export-led expansion. As part of this approach, 
the Ministry of Finance (MOF) set national export targets for light industry, 
such as clothes, shoes, furniture, consumer electronics, and home appliances. 
When a company reached its target, the government compensated its efforts 
financially, such as providing tax reductions. (26) Within this context of state- 
provided incentives, many Korean industries rapidly developed on the basis of 
export-led policies. Under this state-supported and export-driven economic 
development strategy, the Korean economy saw incredible growth during the 
second half of the twentieth century. Gross domestic product (GDP) 
increased from US$2.3 billion in 1962 to US$969.9 billion in 2007, with per 
capita gross national income (GNI) soaring from US$87 to US$20,045 during 
this period. (22)1 The success of this development model, in turn, has been 
influential in other developing countries seeking to emulate the success of 
South Korea and other Asian Tigers. More detailed analysis of the South 
Korean development model will be provided in Chapter 3. 
In relation to this research, what implications does South Korea's 
economic development model have for analysing tobacco control in the 
country? What lessons might be learned for protecting and promoting public 
health within the country, and in other emerging economies? First, analysis 
1 Figures are unadjusted in real terms. 
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of South Korea offers important opportunities for understanding how the 
government's economic development model shaped its foreign policy. A key 
part of Korea's strategy for industrialisation was the building and maintaining 
of strong diplomatic ties with the US, the most important foreign market for 
Korean exports. Similar to other Asian countries, including Japan, Taiwan, 
and Thailand, Korea's emphasis on economic development through state-led 
industrialisation and export-led economic policies was strongly dependent on a 
close political and economic relationship with the US government. Moreover, 
the US has also been the country's most important geopolitical ally spanning 
the Korean War, the Cold War, and the ongoing military tensions with North 
Korea to the present day. The country's national security, to a large extent, 
has remained strongly dependent on a substantial and visible military presence 
by the US Forces Korea (USFK) to maintain the border region between the two 
Koreas. As of 2008, it was reported that US military personnel in South 
Korea numbered 28,500. (27) The US government, in short, is arguably the 
country's most important strategic ally. In this context, the Korean 
government has been highly depended on the US economically and 
geopolitically. This research analyses how this dependence on the US shaped 
negotiations to liberalise the tobacco market in South Korea, and subsequent 
Korean policies to regulate the industry after liberalisation. 
Second, to what extent did the government's strong emphasis on rapid 
economic development lead to a lesser priority being given to social 
protections including public health. It can be argued that the threat to public 
health from tobacco use in South Korea has rapidly grown during the country's 
rapid industrialisation process beginning in the 1960s. To what extent did 
government policies prioritise economic development to address widespread 
poverty in the country in the aftermath of the civil war? The economic 
development strategy from the 1960s onwards began with the establishing of a 
new government unit, the Economic Planning Board in 1961, and 
commencement of state-led Five-Year Economic Development Plans from 
1962. (28) During the first, second, and third plans from 1962 to 1976, the 
common key target was rapid industrialisation through an externally oriented 
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strategy, development of light industry and infrastructure, and expansion of 
domestic savings and foreign capital accumulation. (26) Thereafter, although 
social policies including the protection of public health, was introduced during 
the fourth, fifth, and sixth Five-Year Plans from 1977 to 1991, to what extent 
were these given emphasis in relation to economic development priorities. (26) 
Third, this research will examine what treatment the tobacco industry 
has received under South Korea's economic development strategies. Under 
its export-driven economic model, the Korean government protected core 
domestic industries until they were believed capable of competing in the world 
market. For example, during the 1980s the automobile was supported as a 
leading export among Korea's heavy industry to earn foreign currency. Thus, 
until the domestic automobile industry became competitive in the international 
market, the government protected the industry by using various import 
restrictions. (29) In 1962, the first year of the first Five-Year Economic 
Development Plan, the Korean government enacted the Automobile Industry 
Protection Law. The three key provisions of the Law were that: the import of 
completed vehicles was prohibited; assembly plants were given tax 
exemptions; and parts and components were exempt from import duties. In 
the 1970s when the government focused more attention on heavy and chemical 
industries for the growth of exports, the automobile industry was developed 
under the government's protectionist policy. In the late 1980s, despite the 
limited liberalisation of automobile imports due to trade pressure from the US 
government, the biggest export market for Korean vehicles, imported vehicles 
were still hard to find on the streets of South Korea. This was because of the 
remained market barriers, such as high import tariffs and anti-import feelings 
among Korean people based on strong nationalism. (29) This protectionist 
policy, however, finally led to serious opposition from trading partners. The 
limited access by US car manufacturers into the Korean market remained a 
sensitive issue during the negotiation of the Free Trade Agreement between 
South Korea and the US from 2006 onwards. It is within this context that this 
research analyses the liberalisation of the tobacco industry in South Korea 
during this same period. As will be described in Chapter 5, the national 
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tobacco industry was treated as a core business, important for the employment 
and tax revenues it generated. Therefore, the tobacco industry, including leaf 
farmers and retail outlets, were not only supported by subsidies, but also by 
strict protection from foreign competition through import restrictions, such as 
high trade tariffs. 
Fourth, the research will analyse how the above influenced tobacco 
control policies in South Korea over time. This research will explore whether 
high dependence by the Korean government on the economic contributions of 
the tobacco industry, in the form of tax revenues and employment, have 
contributed to weak tobacco control policies and measures. It is known that 
tobacco control was given low priority from the 1960s to late 1980s. (30) Was 
this because the government remained strongly focused on economic 
development and, thus, supportive of the domestic tobacco industry? Trade 
liberalisation in the late 1980s appears to have coincided with ineffective 
tobacco control measures to deal with greater market competition. In this 
context, it might be argued that tobacco control measures were an oversight, 
and remained weak as the impact of the industry on public health was little 
considered. This may explain the rising levels of tobacco-related disease and 
death from the early 1980s onwards. (18) The research will examine the 
public health consequences of this situation in terms of the efforts by TTCs and 
the domestic industry to expand their markets. It may be argued that this 
explains the slow decrease of smoking prevalence among adult males from 
1992 to 2000. Moreover, the research will consider whether market 
liberalisation in 1988 can be an important factor of the rapid increase of 
smoking rate in the early 1990s, and remained high smoking prevalence by 
2000. 
Fifth, the research will seek to understand the position of TTCs, in 
relation to market liberalisation, and how market access was achieved. The 
response by the domestic tobacco industry and the consequent impacts on 
tobacco use will also be analysed. The research will examine the extent to 
which Korea's economic development model, like other Asian countries, made 
it especially vulnerable to pressures by TTCs seeking market access. To what 
9 
extent did this in turn influence TTCs' market entry strategies? Focused on 
economic development policy, to what extent did the government prioritise the 
protection and strengthening of the domestic tobacco industry against 
international competition? How does this explain monopoly ownership and 
trade protections, such as the ban on leaf tobacco imports, high tariffs of 100 
percent on imported cigarettes, import quotas, and prohibition on Korean 
citizens possessing foreign cigarettes? How did the domestic industry adapt, 
in turn, to market liberalisation and the entry of TTCs into the Korean market? 
Sixth, the limited existing literature on TTC activities in South Korea, 
as reviewed in Chapter 2, indicates that their entry into the market and 
subsequent marketing activities, have sought to build a substantial share of the 
market including the targeting of females and young people. (9,31) A more 
substantial literature exists that describes how trade liberalisation, followed by 
TTC market entry, has been accompanied by greater competition; lower 
cigarette prices, but higher quality, brands to markets; and a significant 
increase of tobacco advertising and promotion activities. (9) Therefore, a key 
concern of this research is to understand how TTC strategies and activities 
impact on public health, although relevant data would be limited. Importantly, 
the research will analyse whether the entrance of TTCs into the Korean market 
influenced the activities of industry. To what extent did it adopt accordingly, 
leading to the market becoming a more competitive environment. As 
elsewhere (6,9,10), this would suggest that market liberalisation contributed 
to new smokers and its related public health risks. 
Overall, this research seeks a fuller understanding of the links between 
economic development, trade liberalisation, and tobacco control. The 
experience of South Korea, in turn, offers lessons for balancing economic 
development and public health policies. The country is seen as a successful 
model of economic development by other countries. However, lessons for 
low and middle-income countries can be drawn. Furthermore, the analysis 
will contribute to understanding the continued globalisation of the tobacco 
industry. Hitherto focused on the growth and spread of TTCs, this research 
offers detailed analysis of the adaptation and restructuring of domestic 
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monopolies, namely South Korea's KT&G (Korea Tomorrow & Global). As 
well as having implications for the domestic tobacco market, KT&G's 
transformation has relevance for the global market given its aspirations as a 
future global player. The analysis will have direct relevance as countries 
move forward to implement the FCTC, and related protocols. 
1.3 Theoretical insights into the strategies of TTCs seeking 
global expansion 
As will be described in Chapter 2, previous analyses of TTC strategies, 
in seeking market access and expansion into developing countries, have 
focused on individual countries or regions. There have been limited attempts 
to theorise the behaviour of tobacco companies more generally amid economic 
globalisation. TTCs' expansion into developing countries began from the 
1960s onwards (32) and the targeted countries have been broadly grouped into 
three regions, which broadly correspond to three phases of expansion (although 
there is some overlap between these in terms of time period): Latin America, 
Asia, and the former Communist countries, such as the FSU. 
The review of the literature in Chapter 2 will show that TTCs 
attempted to gain access the Latin American countries mainly by acquisition of 
domestic companies or through local production and licensing 
arrangements. (4) In the FSU and Eastern Europe, TTCs' market entry 
strategies similarly focused on acquisition of domestic companies, in the 
context of the collapse of Communism, often facilitated by the intervention of 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. (33,34) 
However, TTCs' strategies to enter Asian markets were primarily via pressure 
on governments to liberalise trade, utilising the power of the US Trade 
Representative (USTR) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) disputes settlement mechanism. (35) While the FSU might be 
regarded as a special case, given the unique nature of the historical 
circumstances and the role of the IMF and World Bank, what explains the 
differences in TTCs' market entry strategies between Latin America and Asia, 
two regions at similar levels of economic development? 
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This research seeks to offer theoretical insights into the way TTCs 
expand into developing countries by examining how TTCs behaved in relation 
to different economic development models. The literature review in Chapter 
2 thus attempts to identify general patterns of behaviour by TTCs in seeking 
market entry and expansion in emerging markets, and to relate these to the 
economic development models pursued by governments in each of the three 
regions identified above. Chapter 5 and 6 will then apply these ideas to South 
Korea. A fuller understanding of TTC strategies would, in turn, offer insights 
into the strengthening of tobacco control policies in specific countries and 
regions including the implementation of the FCTC in developing countries. 
1.4 Purpose and objectives 
The purpose of the research is to analyse the activities of the tobacco 
industry in South Korea during and since market liberalisation in the late 1980s 
in order to draw lessons for strengthening tobacco control policies, particularly 
in relation to the implementation of the FCTC. 
The specific objectives of this research are: 
a) to review the historical events leading to the opening of the Korean 
tobacco market in the late 1980s; 
b) to understand the market entry strategies and activities used by 
TTCs, focusing on Philip Morris (PM), R. J. Reynolds (RJR), 
Brown & Williamson (B&W), and British American Tobacco 
(BAT), to gain access and expand their market shares within the 
Korean tobacco market; 
c) to draw theoretical conclusions about the behaviour of TTCs in 
seeking market access and expansion; 
d) to describe the impact of market opening on the domestic tobacco 
industry; and 
e) to draw lessons for strengthening tobacco control in South Korea 
and other emerging markets in the context of the FCTC. 
12 
1.5 Research questions 
In fulfilling the above objectives, the following key research questions 
will be addressed: 
a) Which historical events led South Korea to liberalise its tobacco 
market? 
b) What kinds of activities and strategies have TTCs used to enter the 
Korean tobacco market and create demand for their brands? 
c) How did Korea's economic development model influence its 
tobacco control policies? 
d) How has market liberalisation impacted upon the nature of the 
domestic tobacco industry in South Korea? 
e) What generalisations can be drawn about how TTCs behave in 
relation to Korea's development model? 
f) What can the public health community do to strengthen tobacco 
control in South Korea, and other emerging markets, in the context 
of the FCTC? 
1.6 Outline of thesis 
Chapter 2 will review the existing literature focusing on strategies by 
TTCs to gain market access to, and market share expansion within, a range of 
developing countries and regions. By focusing on TTC expansion over time, 
from the 1960s onwards, the research will examine how market access and 
expansion was achieved, and whether there are differences in strategies and 
activities across countries and regions. Based on this review of the literature, 
the thesis will put forth a conceptual framework in Chapter 3 for analysing 
TTC activities in South Korea. In Chapter 4, the methodology and data 
sources used will be described in detail, including how data were obtained and 
organised. The chapter also explains how data sources were triangulated, to 
13 
strengthen the validity and reliability of the research. The limitations of the 
research are also outlined in Chapter 4. 
In presenting the findings of the research, Chapter 5 will fulfil the first 
objective described above, to analyse the events leading to the opening of the 
Korean tobacco market in the late 1980s. Chapter 6 will then analyse TTC 
strategies to gain access to the South Korean market and to establish market 
share. Chapter 7 will analyse how market liberalisation, and subsequent 
activities by TTCs, have impacted upon the Korean tobacco market and the 
domestic tobacco company. This chapter will also examine the marketing 
tactics that the domestic company carried out in order to preserve its market 
share following market liberalisation. The current practices of the domestic 
company to compete with TTCs and the role of the company in the world 
tobacco market will also be reviewed. 
The findings presented in Chapters 5,6, and 7, will be drawn together 
in Chapter 8 in relation to the first four objectives of the research. The final 
objective, to draw lessons for strengthening tobacco control in South Korea and 
other emerging markets in the context of WHO's FCTC, will be addressed in 
Chapter 9. 
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CHAPTER 2 REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the existing literature on transnational tobacco 
companies' (TTCs) activities to gain access to, and expand their presence, 
within emerging markets. To date, this literature has largely focused on TTC 
activity within individual countries and, to a much lesser extent, in specific 
regions. The globalisation of the tobacco industry, however, suggests the 
need for fuller understanding how TTCs have behaved across different national 
and regional contexts as a precursor to developing more effective global 
tobacco control policies. 
The chapter begins by reviewing the limited literature on TTC efforts 
to expand globally. It finds that this expansion occurred in three phases from 
the 1960s onwards. How market access and expansion was achieved is then 
examined based on a review of published literature on industry activities since 
the 1990s. The strategies pursued are described as either political or 
economic in focus. 
2.2 Three phases of TTCs' overseas expansion 
There has been very limited analysis to date of the changing structure 
of the tobacco industry on a worldwide scale. (4,36) Since the late 1990s, and 
largely as a result of the release of internal documents of the tobacco industry, 
there has been growing analysis of TTC expansion into selected emerging 
markets. However, these have been focused on individual countries or, to a 
far lesser extent, specific regions, notably the Former Soviet Union (FSU). 
The existing literature on Asian countries has tended to focus on a single 
country, including Japan, Taiwan, Thailand, China, Vietnam, and Indonesia. 
There has been no attempt in this literature to locate these country-specific 
analyses within an understanding of the global patterns of TTC behaviour so 
far. Study of the FSU, for example, locates the region within the structural 
transformation of the world tobacco industry. However, the analysis is 
15 
largely descriptive in terms of TTCs' shifting activities over time, and does not 
offer comparative insights regarding commonalities and differences of TTC 
strategies in each of the targeted countries within the region. (33,34) 
Reviewing these literatures as a whole, this research argues that TTC 
strategies can be seen to have changed over time, and have varied across 
regions, depending on the economic development model pursued by specific 
countries. Historically, as early as the 16th century, when tobacco began to be 
grown commercially in the US, Europe, and then further afield, international 
trade in tobacco leaf and products was a key driver of the early tobacco 
industry. The industry's history also overlaps with European colonisation, the 
Slave Trade and the Industrialisation Revolution. By the late 19th century, the 
cigarette market began to outpace smokeless tobacco, with markets in the Far 
East representing a major proportion of sales. (37) In this sense, the history of 
the tobacco industry is embedded within the history of international political 
economy. 
In relation to the contemporary globalisation of the tobacco industry, 
there have been three broad phases of industry expansion. The first, dating 
from the 1960s to 1980s, saw US-based TTCs begin an initial exploration of 
new overseas markets prompted by a decline in domestic sales. Following the 
first US Surgeon General's Report in 1964 on tobacco and health, which 
officially concluded that smoking was hazardous to health, the US government 
began to discourage smoking by increasing cigarette prices, restricting smoking 
in public places, using health warnings and raising taxes. (4,38-41) In 
addition, the growth of an anti-smoking movement was accompanied by an 
increased social unacceptability of smoking. As a result, per capita cigarette 
consumption among adults has dropped annually since 1973. Between 1980 
and 1990, the domestic consumption of cigarettes had fallen by 17 percent. (38) 
Overall, prevalence of cigarette smoking in the U. S. had fallen from 52.6 
percent to 31.7 percent among males and 34.1 percent to 26.8 percent among 
females. (42,43) In order to compensate for this decline in the US domestic 
market and other traditional markets, TTCs looked to expand into Latin 
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American countries from the mid 1960s. (44) This can be described as the 
first phase of the tobacco industry's global expansion. 
The second phase dates from the early 1980s spurred by the 
remarkable growth of the world trading system. This process, enabled by 
trade liberalisation policies in industrialised countries, and resulting in the 
growth in the size and number of transnational companies (TNCs) across many 
sectors, included further TTC restructuring. (5) This period saw a flurry of 
mergers and acquisitions as corporations sought to "go large" to compete more 
effectively in the global economy. This resulted in a greater concentration of 
ownership within many industries including the tobacco sector. Increased 
efforts by TNCs to gain greater access to new markets were a major feature of 
the world trading system. Within this rapidly changing global economy, 
Asian countries in particular experienced significant economic growth from the 
1980s to the 1990s. Consequently, TTCs' second phase of global expansion 
focused on gaining access to these increasingly lucrative but relatively closed 
Asian markets where state monopolies prevailed. The regional population 
growth, alongside rising incomes, held much promise for a globalising tobacco 
industry. (5,36) 
The third phase of TTC expansion occurred from the early 1990s 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union. This extended the attention of 
TTCs to the former Communist bloc countries where governments have 
subsequently sought to adopt market-based economic policies including 
increased foreign investment, trade liberalisation, and privatisation. (36,45) 
Each of these three phases is described in further detail below. 
2.3 TTC market entry and expansion strategies across three 
regions 
2.3.1 Latin America 
The economies of Latin American countries depended on exporting 
raw materials such as oil, minerals, and agricultural commodities to the 
industrialised world until the 1930s, in order to earn foreign currencies to 
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import manufactured products. Following the Great Depression during the 
1930s, this economic policy could not be sustained. (46) Most Latin 
American countries lost their key export markets, particularly the US resulting 
in widespread impoverishment, trade deficits, poverty, economic stagnation 
and increased foreign debt. As emergency actions, most countries in Latin 
America began producing manufactured goods domestically that could no 
longer be bought abroad. Governments closely intervened in economic 
development and strongly encouraged national industries. This was the initial 
step for Latin America countries towards an `import substitution' growth 
model adopted from the 1930s to 1980s. (46) Import substitution is a policy 
whereby a country attempts to reduce dependency on foreign goods by 
supporting local production of industrialised. (47) Through import 
substitution, Latin American countries redirected their economies away from 
dependence on primary exports, and towards an industrialisation policy 
focused on self-sufficiency, internal markets, and employment creation. In 
order to achieve this new economic policy, governments invested in 
infrastructure, such as roads, water, and energy supplies required by industry; 
protected local industries against foreign competition by imposing tariffs and 
non-tariff barriers, such as import quotas; nationalised key industries such as 
oil, iron, and steel; and supported an overvalued exchange rate, making Latin 
America's exports expensive and imports cheap. (46) The policy was most 
successful in countries with large populations and relatively high income levels 
which represented a large internal market. Smaller countries, with 
insufficiently sized internal markets, saw lower economic growth. (48,49) 
The existing literature shows that the tobacco industry appears to have 
been given a key role in the process of industrialisation in Latin America. 
Given that tobacco products were a luxury to import, and the high contribution 
of the tobacco industry to national tax revenues, governments in Latin America 
believed that cigarette production was a prime candidate for import substitution. 
It was also believed that domestic tobacco manufacturing met enough local 
needs and conditions. Tobacco products in Latin America were produced 
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using locally grown dark tobacco leaf, air-cured tobacco, which was also used 
for cigars, snuff, and chewing tobacco. (4) 
A small number of previous analyses have shown how TTCs accessed 
new markets and created demand for their brands in Latin American 
countries. (4,36,50) TTCs' initial behaviour in the region accommodated and 
supported local production by supporting leaf development and providing 
manufacturing technology. Within the context of Latin American 
governments adopting economic policies to reduce imports, this led to an 
uncritical attitude towards foreign investment, to achieve improvements in 
domestic cigarette production and increase tax revenue from tobacco products. 
This attitude, and the subsequent policy measures adopted by governments on 
the tobacco industry in the region, offered TTCs ready access to these markets 
via acquisitions. (4,5) For example, British American Tobacco (BAT) gained 
access fairly early to the largest markets of this region, such as Argentina, 
Brazil, and Mexico, by the takeover of local companies. (4,50) However, in 
some countries such as Colombia, the company experienced difficulties in 
acquiring local companies due to opposition based on nationalist sentiments, 
national companies, and other domestic groups that feared foreign control of 
the local economy. Faced with this situation, licensing agreements between 
local tobacco companies and TTCs, or their local subsidiaries, were often used 
by TTCs to achieve market access in the Latin American countries. These 
strategies were often welcomed by governments in the region in an attempt to 
address the rapid growth of trafficking in contraband cigarettes in the region. 
However, the literature suggests that, with legal imports restricted, contraband 
trade was used by TTCs as a market softening technique in Latin American 
countries. (4,50) The smuggled products created local demand for foreign 
brands and also threatened the sales of local tobacco companies. This 
situation supported TTC efforts to convince governments to accept licensing or 
joint venture QV) agreements. (5) For example, the Colombian government, 
which initially rejected foreign investment by TTCs in domestic tobacco 
companies, observed that the proportion of total cigarette consumption 
attributable to contraband rose from less than 4 percent before 1970 to nearly 
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18 percent in 1976. (4) In an effort to reduce contraband trade, the 
government encouraged local tobacco companies to sign licensing 
arrangements to manufacture popular TTC brands. Similarly, the Argentinian 
government also worried about the increase of contraband in the country which 
rose from 2 percent to 12 percent of total consumption in the early 1960s. (50) 
Argentina temporarily reduced legal import tariffs on foreign cigarettes in an 
attempt to control the demand for smuggled cigarettes, and this was followed 
by a decline in the contraband trade. By the time high tariffs were applied 
once again, the importers of TTC brands in the country had agreed licensing 
arrangements for local manufacturing. (50) Contraband sales remained at a 
lower level afterwards although, based on evidence subsequently published on 
the region and elsewhere (51-54) on TTC complicity in the contraband trade, it 
was the TTCs control the flow of contraband cigarettes in response to gaining 
favourable policy treatment, rather than tariff rates, which "solved" the illicit 
trade problem. Overall, control over the contraband trade, used to leverage 
licensing agreements with local companies, JVs of various forms (e. g. 
provision of manufacturing technology), and acquisition of local tobacco 
companies, were the main strategies deployed by TTCs to access Latin 
American markets. 
Once TTCs were allowed access to sell their brands in the region, they 
then focused attention on creating greater demand for their products. Latin 
American countries traditionally smoke "dark" cigarettes and cigars, 
manufactured using locally grown, dark tobacco leaf. However, after TTCs' 
gained market access, sales of dark cigarettes steadily began to be replaced by 
"white" cigarettes, especially TTCs' international blends, such as Marlboro. 
Shepherd argues that this shift was partly the result of TTCs' efforts at demand 
creation, and partly the result of the diffusion of contemporary `life-styles' 
following economic development. (4) TTCs carried out various advertising 
and promotional activities to generate demand for their brands, resulting in 
rapid growth of cigarette consumption in the 1960s and 1970s in Latin America, 
although this declined somewhat in the 1980s during the economic crises 
experience by some countries. (4,50) Patterns of tobacco use overall in Latin 
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America thus changed, from many types of tobacco products to cigarettes; 
from "dark" to "white" cigarettes; from unfiltered to filtered cigarettes; and 
from short to longer cigarettes. 
2.3.2 Asia 
2.3.2.1 Japan 
Japan was the first Asian country to adopt what is now described as the 
`Asian development model' of industrialisation. In 1945, policies for 
reconstruction and economic growth were immediately needed given the 
devastated condition of post-war Japan. (55-59) These policies were largely 
spurred by foreign investment from the US and partly by state-led economic 
policies. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), 
responsible for trade liberalisation, played a key role in encouraging export-led 
economic development (58), focusing on automobiles, the chemical industry, 
and electronics to serve as the engine for growth. As a result of the 
government's export-led policies, from the 1960s and throughout the 1970s, 
the `Japanese economic miracle'2 was achieved, with Japan having the world's 
second highest gross national product (GNP) after the US. (55,57,58) This 
remarkable success also reflected close collaboration between government and 
industry. (55,58) During the 1980s, the Japanese economic development 
shifted its focus, from primary and secondary industries, such as agriculture 
and manufacturing, to highly sophisticated technology and information-based 
industries including finance, insurance, and communications. (57) 
As part of this post-war reconstruction effort, Japan Tobacco and Salt 
Public Corporation, a state monopoly, was established in 1949. The 
monopoly controlled all tobacco production, advertising, sales, and distribution 
channels, and quickly became a major contribution to national tax revenue. (60) 
Due to the government's emphasis on selective trade liberalisation, and 
2 The Japanese economic miracle is the name given to the historical phenomenon of Japan's 
record period of economic growth following the Second World War, spurred mainly by US 
investment but partly by the Japanese government's economic interventionism, in particular, 
through the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. 
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gradually increasing pressures to liberalise the tobacco industry from the US 
government from 1978 (41), the Japanese government began policy discussions 
on the privatisation of the state monopoly despite strong opposition by the 
monopoly union, tobacco retailers' association, and anti-smoking groups. As 
a result, the Japanese tobacco monopoly was converted to a corporation, Japan 
Tobacco Incorporated (JTI) in 1985. (41) The company remained two-thirds 
owned by the Ministry of Finance until June 2004, reducing to a 50 percent 
share thereafter. (61) 
Analyses of TTCs strategies to aim market access to Japan to date 
reveal that the companies mainly employed political channels to gain a 
foothold. (41,62,63) Before market liberalisation in 1987, due to a 90 
percent tariff on foreign cigarettes and restrictions in tobacco advertising in the 
Japanese market (41), TTCs commanded only 3.9 percent of the overall 
domestic market in 1986 (64,65). Within this context, mainly US-based 
TTCs lobbied high-level contacts in the US government, including Senators 
and Congressmen, to gain support for market liberalisation. Subsequently, on 
behalf of the US Cigarette Export Association (UCSF)3 the US government 
and politicians threatened the Japanese government with trade sanctions if it 
did not remove impediments to US tobacco exports. (41,66) By the mid 
1990s, Japan's trade surplus with the US was around US$50 billion 
annually. (67) In addition to its economic importance as an export market, the 
US played a vital geopolitical role in the region. Since the Second World 
War, the two countries remained close strategic allies which, for Japan, was 
highly valued given the lukewarm, and sometimes tense, relations with the 
People's Republic of China. Within this broad context of US-Japan relations 
the US Trade Representative (USTR) intensively pressured the Japanese 
government to open the tobacco market, under Section 301 of the US Trade 
Act4. In response, as part of a range of measures to address US concerns 
3 Three major US-based TTCs, Philip Morris, R. J. Reynolds, and Brown &Williamson formed 
the US Cigarette Export Association in 1981 in order to improve the competitive position of 
US-produced cigarettes in international markets. 
4 Section 301 of the U. S Trade Act allows the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to 
initiate an investigation of the trade practices of another country. The U. S. government 
describes Section 301 as follows: "the principal statutory authority under which the United 
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about market access and a ballooning trade deficit, Japan liberalised its tobacco 
market in 1987 by abolishing the excise tax on imported cigarettes, providing 
price equity between imported and domestic cigarettes, and privatising its 
monopoly into Japan Tobacco, Incorporated. (41,62) 
Previous analyses have shown how TTCs behaved in seeking to create 
greater demand for their brands in the Japanese market. During trade 
negotiations from 1982 to 1987, between Japan and the US, the USTR 
convinced the Japanese government to allow TTCs to advertise their brands, 
for example, on television and radio, in print (i. e. magazines), and on 
billboards. (68) This was underpinned by extensive market research focused 
on targeted population groups, such as young adults and females. In contrast 
to other Asian countries targeted by TTCs, Japan agreed to permit television 
advertising of cigarettes, thus enabling foreign brands to be introduced to 
established smokers, as well appealing to potential new smokers. (69) 
Consequently, in 1988, just a year after market liberalisation, cigarettes rose 
from fortieth to second place in total television advertising expenditure. (70) 
Tobacco control remained relatively weak over the next two decades. As well 
as limited restrictions on tobacco marketing, advertising, and promotion, for 
example, warning labels remained weakly worded, there was widespread use of 
cigarette vending machines, and few restrictions on smoking in public places. 
Despite eventually signing and ratifying the Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control (FCTC) in 2004, the Japanese government was seen as one of 
the spoilers during the negotiations, weakening its final measures by pressing 
extensively for qualifying language. (7 1) 
2.3.2.2 Taiwan 
After gaining independence in 1945, following fifty years of Japanese 
colonial rule, Taiwan adopted a series of Four-Year Economic Development 
States may impose trade sanctions against foreign countries that maintain acts, policies and 
practices that violate, or deny U. S rights or benefits under trade agreements, or are unjustifiable, 
unreasonable or discriminatory and burden or restrict U. S. commerce. " 
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Programmes. Before the mid 1960s, the first three Four-Year Plans 
considered the adoption of an import substitution for economic development by 
focusing on agriculture. Since 1965, given the economic incentives offered 
under the US geopolitical strategy in Asia, the government redirected its 
economic policy towards state-led and export-oriented industrialisation. At 
this point, Taiwan invested in shipbuilding, chemicals, and petrochemicals. 
Due to the worldwide recession during the mid 1970s, the pace of economic 
development slowed. Between 1976 and 1981, the government focused on 
expansion of basic industry and infrastructural projects, including railroads, 
highways, and nuclear energy facilities. From 1980 to 1989, a longer-range 
economic development plan was designed which targeted trade liberalisation to 
boost the country's exports. (72,73) 
The monopoly on tobacco was established in Taiwan during the period 
of Japanese occupation. Following the establishment of the Monopoly 
Bureau of the Taiwan Governor's Office in 1901 to control salt, liquor, opium, 
and camphor, tobacco was also formally monopolised from 1905. After the 
independence of Taiwan in 1945, the tobacco industry came under the control 
of a state monopoly, the Taiwan Tobacco and Wine Bureau in 1947. The 
industry remained under monopoly control for the next forty years, providing 
the government with substantial and reliable revenues. The market share of 
foreign manufactured cigarettes was less than 2 percent of the domestic market 
before liberalisation. (8) However, in January 1987, as a result of threats of 
trade sanctions under Section 301 by the US government, the Taiwanese 
government gave up monopoly control of the cigarette market, reduced the 
excise tax on imported cigarettes, and allowed foreign competitors to market 
their brands in the country. Analyses of TTCs' activities in Taiwan to date 
describe how TTCs heavily lobbied the US government and the USTR to take 
up their case as the key strategy for market access. (8,38,74) Similar to Japan, 
Taiwan was economic dependent on the US, receiving substantial aid since 
independence from Japanese colonial rule, and reliant on the US as its largest 
export market. In addition, like Japan, the US played a critical geopolitical 
role as a key ally in simmering tensions between Taiwan and the People's 
24 
Republic of China, which has continues to claim sovereignty over Taiwan. 
Within this context, TTCs were once again able to use wider pressures of trade 
liberalisation to obtain a foothold to the Taiwanese tobacco market. 
Once market access was achieved, the existing literature describes how 
TTCs subsequently carried out aggressive advertising and promotional 
activities (e. g. magazines, point of sale) to generate greater demand for their 
brands. Young adults and youths were mainly targeted by TTCs focused on 
so-called "light" and "mild" cigarette brands. TTCs' emphasised the 
allegedly mild and smooth nature of these brands, particularly appealing to 
younger and new smokers, and to potential quitters concerned with tobacco and 
health issues. (75) Importantly, the existing literature suggests that, like in 
Latin America, TTCs were complicit in the contraband trade in Taiwan as a 
means of fuelling demand for these imported brands. On distribution, given 
that cigarettes in Taiwan were legally sold only through licensed retailers, 
where they were controlled by the Monopoly Bureau, both before and after 
market liberalisation TTCs used betel quids stalls as alternative outlets to sell 
their brands. Although it was illegal to sell cigarettes in betel quid stalls 
before market liberalisation, due to the sudden and sharp expansion of the use 
of betel quid street vendors by TTCs after the market was opened, the stalls 
subsequently became common outlets for both imported and domestic 
cigarettes. (76) This strategy of TTCs initially attracted domestic cigarette 
smokers to convert to imported brands, but later, betel quid users also became 
smokers of imported cigarette. The above efforts combined successfully 
established strong demand among Taiwanese smokers for imported cigarettes, 
resulting in a sharp increase in the consumption of foreign cigarettes. (75) 
Due to the fact that Taiwan is not recognised as a member state of the WHO, 
the country has not been permitted to become a signatory of the FCTC. (71) 
5 The most basic form of betel quid is a combination of betel leaf, areca nut (the fourth most 
common psychoactive substance in the world after caffeine, alcohol and nicotine) and slaked 
lime. Tobacco is commonly used in conjunction with betel quid. 
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2.3.2.3 Thailand 
While Thailand has never experienced foreign colonisation, the 
country has grappled with ongoing challenges of political stability and 
economic development similar to other countries in the region. The Thai 
government carried out a series of Five-Year Economic Development Plans for 
industrialisation, and promoted the economy through a state-led and export- 
oriented growth model. (77) During the first three Five-Year Plans, covering 
the period 1961-1972, the Thai government aimed to achieve economic 
development to improve the country's standard of living through agricultural 
and industrial development. The early economic development model of 
Thailand encouraged import substitution. Since the fourth Five-Year Plan 
from 1977 to 1981, and observing the success of other Asian economies such 
as South Korea and Taiwan, the government shifted its development model to 
export-oriented industries notably electronic equipment and chemicals. The 
sixth development plan, between 1986 and 1991, stressed heavy industry, such 
as construction, and successfully achieved the early part of Thailand's ten-year 
economic boom with 10.5 percent growth of gross domestic product (GDP), 
which was more than twice the targeted growth rate of 5 percent at that time. 
(77,78) Like Japan and Taiwan, the relationship between Thailand and the 
US was also a significant factor in Thailand's economic development. (79) 
Moreover, within the context of the Cold War which, in Southeast Asia 
manifested in, for example, the Vietnam War and ongoing instability in 
Cambodia, Laos and Burma, Thailand maintained close geopolitical relations 
with the US. 
Under the Tobacco Monopoly Act enacted in 1943, the Thailand 
Tobacco Monopoly (TTM) became the sole legal manufacturer and importer of 
cigarettes. (80) The tobacco industry in Thailand, like in other Asian countries, 
was treated as an important source of national tax revenue and a positive 
contributor to economic development plans. Unlike other Asian countries, 
however, Thailand Since the establishment of the Thai Anti-Smoking 
Campaign Project (known as ASH Thailand) in 1986, however, an anti- 
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smoking movement quickly spread and turned into a form of social 
mobilisation which had a lasting impact on the consciousness of the whole 
society concerning tobacco use. (81) Asa result of this movement, the cabinet 
first issued an executive decree banning TTM from advertising, and a total ban 
was imposed on all forms of foreign cigarette advertising, both direct and 
indirect. Furthermore, in 1989, tobacco products were placed under the 
category of "harmful products" and, with establishing of the National 
Committee for Control of Tobacco Use in the same year, the Thai government 
focused attention more concertedly on tobacco control. (81) This earlier 
emergence of a tobacco control movement in Thailand might explain the 
different outcome from other Asian countries against the trade pressure by 
TTCs and the USTR, and fuller research is warranted 
Analysis of TTC behaviour, in seeking market access and expansion in 
Thailand, shows that attempts by TTCs to access the Thai market began in 
1985. In the early stage of seeking market access, TTCs tried to negotiate JV 
agreements and licensing arrangements with the TTM, but that this failed due 
to the Thai government's refusal. (82) Similar to Taiwan and Japan, the 
USTR was then prompted by industry lobbying to act on behalf of TTCs to 
press for liberalisation of the tobacco sector. The Thai government, however, 
rejected a trade agreement with the USTR in 1989 unlike Taiwan and Japan, 
and at the same time even banned all forms of cigarette advertising by 
amending the Consumer Protection Act, as described above. (82) The USTR 
responded by referring the Thai case to the General Agreement on Trade and 
Tariffs (GATT), the forerunner of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), for 
dispute settlement. Although the GATT dispute panel accepted that smoking 
posed a serious risk to human health, its decision was that the Thai ban on 
foreign cigarette imports only, on the grounds of public health concerns, was 
discriminatory and thus unjustified. Tobacco use, it was concluded, could be 
controlled through other measures, such as advertising bans, but that such 
measures should be applied to all tobacco companies, both domestic and 
foreign. Following this decision, in 1990 the Thai government lifted its 
import ban. (80,81) 
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Since this decision and the subsequent liberalisation of the Thai 
tobacco market, TTCs have continually sought opportunities for JV agreements 
with the TTM to effectively expand market share. This was discussed often 
particularly following the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998. BAT, for 
example, expected that the Thai government would welcome foreign 
investment in the domestic tobacco industry during this difficult economic 
period. However, the government declined to sign any agreement with TTCs, 
on the grounds of the public health impact of the tobacco industry. (80) In 
1999, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) pushed the Thai government to 
privatise the TTM, as part of the rebuilding of the country's economy. Again, 
the government announced that there were no plans to privatise the TTM due 
to public health considerations. (80) 
Faced with this stance, in order to boost demand for imported 
cigarettes in the Thai market, the existing literature describes how TTCs 
deployed wide-ranging marketing strategies, such as sports sponsorship and 
low-priced cigarettes, and providing higher margins to cigarette retailers than 
the TTM. This retailer incentive programme was successfully utilised to 
expand the distribution network for TTC brands. (80) With these marketing 
tactics, TTCs were able to circumvent some of the world's strongest tobacco 
control legislation in Thailand, and transform it from a "dark" (difficult to 
penetrate) to "light" market. (82) Thailand played an active and leading role 
in the negotiation of the FCTC, ratifying the treaty in 2004. (71) 
2.3.2.4 China 
China's economic development model, beginning with the 
announcement of the "open door policy" by Deng Xiaoping in 1979 (54), has 
contrasted with other Asian countries. The Chinese Communist government 
initially focused on improving economic productivity, which had proven 
problematic under the centrally planned socialist economy, through the 
selective and strategic use of market forces. Since the 1980s, while trade has 
been the major driver of economic growth, and foreign investment has been 
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encouraged, China has not adopted large-scale privatisation and liberalisation 
policies. (83) The economy remains a combination of central planning and 
market-oriented reforms that has led to remarkable economic growth, with 
average growth rates 10 percent for the past 30 years. (83) Today, China 
overtakes Japan and has achieved the world's second largest economy after the 
US. (84) 
Within this context, the tobacco industry has been under state 
ownership in China since the ejection of foreign tobacco companies in the early 
1950s. Previously, TTCs dominated the Chinese market from the early 20th 
century to the 1950s. BAT heavily targeted this large market and, indeed, 
treated it as the company's key overseas market. From exporting the first 
BAT cigarette to China in 1890, the market share of BAT dramatically 
increased and achieved more than 80 percent of the Chinese market in the mid 
1920s. (54) However, once the Communist Party took power in 1948, and the 
People's Republic of China was established, the Chinese market was firmly 
closed by the government to foreign investors by the early 1950s. As a result, 
BAT lost its largest source of overseas profits. (54) 
This situation remained in place until the early 1980s with the adoption 
of the Open Door Policy. In 1982, the Chinese government established the 
China National Tobacco Corporation (CNTC), under the auspices of the State 
Tobacco Monopoly Administration (STMA). The CNTC has been 
responsible, under the close supervision of the STMA, for production, 
distribution, and sales of all tobacco products throughout the country. 
Analyses to date of TTC strategy to gain market access to China have shown 
that the Chinese government contacted TTCs in the late 1970s, to discuss 
potential JV agreements with local tobacco companies. Under its economic 
reform plan after announcement of "open door policy", the government quickly 
sought foreign investment to improve technological capacity and leaf growing. 
Importantly, cooperation was highly selective and controlled, with the Chinese 
government negotiating hard with TTCs to gain technical knowhow. (54,85) 
TTCs, for their part, saw China as the "ultimate prize" given its population and 
number of smokers. (86) The companies experienced ongoing difficulties 
29 
accessing the Chinese market in large part because of the complex bureaucracy 
of the tobacco industry between the central and provincial governments, but 
mainly because of a continued ban on foreign ownership in any kind of 
domestic business including tobacco. (86) Thus, TTCs were limited to leaf 
development, supplying new cigarette manufacturing machinery, and licensed 
manufacturing. (85,86) TTCs also aimed unsuccessfully to reduce the excise 
tax on imported cigarettes, in order to cut the price of their products, and to 
increase the import quota. Faced with these obstacles, TTCs largely pursued 
unsuccessful political channels, notably through the USTR, to convince the 
Chinese government to liberalise the sector. (85) In addition, efforts were 
made to influence trade negotiations over a long period leading up to Chinese 
accession to the WTO. (7) However, because of the failure of these efforts to 
gain a foothold in the market, the Chinese market has remained largely closed 
to foreign cigarette manufacturers in contrast to other Asian countries. In 
order to circumvent such restrictions, the existing literature describes how the 
smuggling trade has been strategically used by TTCs to penetrate the Chinese 
market. (54,85,86) For example, it is alleged that BAT intensively increased 
illegal imports from the early 1980s while the CNTC kept all legal imports of 
foreign cigarettes restricted to a limited amount of sticks (1,400 million sticks 
in 1982). (54) Due to a rapid growth of contraband trading in foreign 
cigarettes from the 1980s to the first half of 1990s, the CNTC estimated that 99 
percent of foreign brands sold in China were smuggled cigarettes in 1996. (87) 
Despite a relatively closed market, O'Sullivan and Chapman describe 
how TTCs have sought to build brand awareness and positive images of their 
brands in the Chinese market perhaps to support contraband sales and, in the 
longer term, in anticipation of market access. The companies are described as 
having undertaken various promotional activities focusing on youth, young 
adults, and females, and have created images that smoking imported cigarettes 
gives smokers an experience of a western lifestyle and a young and active 
lifestyle. (85) Since the adoption of a ban on direct cigarette advertising in 
1992, TTCs have changed their marketing strategies from direct to indirect 
tactics, for example, by using trademark advertising without cigarettes (e. g. 
30 
brand stretching) to maintain brand awareness. In addition, TTCs have 
employed seemingly independent scientists to influence scientific research on 
second-hand smoke in order to undermine efforts to strengthen tobacco control 
regulations such as restrictions on smoking in public places. (85) The country 
ratified the FCTC in October 2005 but the government's commitment to 
meaningful implementation, and its weak interpretation of the FCTC's 
measures to date, has raised serious doubts about the future of tobacco control 
in China. (71) 
2.3.2.5 Vietnam 
With the end of civil war in 1975, Vietnam faced the task of rebuilding 
its economy. From 1976 to 1985, the Communist government adopted three 
five-year economic development plans, concentrating on agriculture and 
product manufacturing. For the fourth five-year plan, from 1986 to 1990, and 
with economic aid from the Soviet Union, like other Asian countries, the 
Vietnamese government attempted to facilitate economic development by 
expanding exports. In 1986 the government's doi moi (renovation) process 
for economic development was implemented in earnest. Like China, the 
reforms included the selective use of market-based mechanisms to expand the 
private sector, new foreign investment laws, while retaining a Communist 
system of govemment. (88,89) However, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1991 brought an end to major aid and trade links, and encouraged further 
reforms. 
The tobacco industry in Vietnam has been dominated by the state 
monopoly, Vietnam National Tobacco Corporation (Vinataba), and provincial 
tobacco companies. (88) Lee et al. write that since the mid 1980s when the 
government began the economic reform process, the tobacco market, which 
was among the world's 10 fastest growing market (90), has been targeted by 
TTCs. (88,91) Under new foreign investment laws, TTCs sought to access 
the Vietnamese market by seeking JV agreements covering leaf development, 
licensed manufacturing with local tobacco companies and co-ownership of 
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production facilities. As a result, Vinataba and local tobacco companies 
signed licensed manufacturing with TTCs to manufacture foreign brands, such 
as Marlboro and State Express 555 since the mid 1990s. TTCs achieved 
limited success (20 percent of market share), with Vinataba remaining in 
monopoly control of the sector. (88,92) 
In 1990 tobacco control measures in the form of a ban on cigarette 
imports, high tariffs on imported leaf, and restrictions on foreign investment 
were adopted, ostensibly in order to protect the domestic industry. (88) 
Within this context, the existing literature describes how BAT, for example, 
focused on illegal imports as a market access strategy and a demand creation 
tactic. Through building brand awareness and presence prior market 
liberalisation with smuggled products, the company expected to be placed in 
better position against other competitors. In addition, with a rapid increase in 
the use of smuggled products among Vietnamese people, the company 
attempted to convince the government to allow them to sign a licensing 
agreement or local production with domestic tobacco companies. This was 
eventually successful to a limited extent with the signing of a joint venture 
agreement in 1991. However, the partnership has not proven a commercial 
success, with the country continuing to strictly limit imports and the 
availability of foreign brands. (88) In this sense, the country demonstrates 
similarities with China which, like Vietnam, has experienced a substantial 
problem with the illicit trade. Contraband cigarettes remain a major problem 
in Vietnam despite efforts by the government to control its availability. The 
Vietnamese government ratified the FCTC in 2004. (71) 
2.3.2.6 Indonesia 
Following the political and economic instability of the 1960s, the 
"New Order" administration adopted strict economic policies aimed at 
reducing inflation, stabilising the currency, rescheduling foreign debt, and 
attracting foreign aid and investment. The country benefited from rising oil 
prices in the 1970s that contributed to sustained economic growth. In the late 
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1980s, further economic reforms led to substantial foreign investment flowing 
into Indonesia. The country was particularly hard hit by the Asian financial 
crisis of 1997-1998, but has since experienced gradual economic recovery, 
slowed by ongoing political uncertainty. (93) 
TTCs entered the Indonesian market in the early twentieth century. 
BAT gained initial market access via the acquisition of a factory on Java in 
1908. In contrast, Philip Morris (PM) did not establish a JV with a local 
company until 1971. With the fourth largest population in the world, and 
strong growth in domestic cigarette consumption, Indonesia was seen as an 
important potential market by foreign companies. (94) Following the military 
coup of 1965-66, however, BAT's local manufacturing facilities were seized 
by the Indonesian government whose attitude towards foreign investment 
turned critical. (95) In addition, enriched by revenues from the oil boom from 
the early 1970s, the government attempted to protect the domestic industry 
from foreign investment. Given this unfavourable economic climate, PM 
decided to sell its production facilities in 1980. (96,97) The situation changed 
again by the late 1980s when TTCs attempted to re-access the market within 
the context of the Indonesian government's renewed welcome of foreign aid 
and investment to spur industrialisation. 
As the existing literature describes, the unique nature of the Indonesian 
tobacco industry has led TTCs to experience some difficulty in gaining a 
greater market share. In 2002, only 10 percent of total tobacco use took the 
form of "white" cigarettes (Western styled cigarettes), while kreteks, a kind of 
cigarette based on a blend of tobacco with cloves and clove oil (96), and a key 
cultural signifier and powerful symbol of Indonesia, represented 88 percent of 
the market. (94) According to previous analyses of TTCs' marketing activities 
in Indonesia, in order to convert kretek smokers to Western brands, TTCs 
associated their brands with prosperous western lifestyles, which successfully 
appealed to people to smoke international brands. TTCs also promoted 
cigarette smoking among females, although female smoking was a cultural 
taboo in Indonesia. (94,98) Moreover, new types of cigarettes, including 
"mild" and "light" cigarettes, were introduced to the Indonesian market. (94) 
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The Indonesian government has been consistently supportive and protective of 
the kretek industry because of the 10 million people economically dependent 
on the industry. Thus, the Indonesian Minister of Industry and Trade 
announced that the country delayed signing the World Health Organisation's 
(WHO) FCTC which would have negative influence on the kretek industry. (94, 
99) 
2.3.3 The Former Soviet Union and eastern bloc countries 
As a Communist country, the economy of the Soviet Union was based 
on state ownership and central planning. During the post-war period, massive 
industrialisation programmes, such as investments in machine manufacture and 
the chemical industry, were conducted, but development fell far behind that of 
the Western countries. Following Mikhail Gorbachev's appointment as 
General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the country 
began a transition towards a market-oriented development model for economic 
growth. Gorbachev's economic reforms aimed to introduce "openness" and 
"restructuring". (45) However, the efforts of Gorbachev for industrialisation 
via partial liberalisation and decentralisation failed, and led to accept more 
fundamental reform with international institutions, namely IMF, the World 
Bank, the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
and European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). (100,101) 
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, all 15 former Soviet 
republics have attempted to reform their economies including the 
encouragement of foreign direct investment (FDI), privatisation of state-owned 
companies, and liberalisation under supervision of the above institutions. (45, 
102) As a result, hundreds of thousands of firms were privatised across the 
FSU during one decade (103), and private sectors in some states, including 
Russia, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan, covered more than half of GDPs in their 
own states(104). This policy led to a flood of FDI, in particular, to the energy 
rich countries, including Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. (105) The 
outcomes of this economic development policy in FSU were far less 
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positive. (106) GDP of the FSU during the first 10 years declined by up to 60 
percent and individual states also experienced declines of their GDP. (106) 
The 15 independent states inherited individual state-owned tobacco 
monopolies when the Soviet Union collapsed. However, due to the decline of 
the previously operational central system of tobacco distribution, production, 
and import, the industry in all 15 states lapsed into a chaotic situation. (5) 
TTCs saw this as a "golden opportunity" because of the region's large 
population, shortage of cigarette supplies, and the states' embrace of market 
reforms. (33,45) Analyses to date suggest that given that TTCs' main strategy 
to gain access to FSU markets has been through FDI, most of the states sought 
foreign investors to stimulate economic growth. (45) Through FDI, TTCs 
established local production, licensing arrangements, or leaf development with 
local tobacco companies. While TTCs attempted to gain market access by 
pursuing legal agreements to facilitate FDI within these countries, the existing 
literature suggests they also deployed the contraband trade in selected countries 
in order to gain market share and build brand awareness of imported cigarette 
brands. (33) TTCs' investments and market access strategies in the FSU had 
an impact on the capacity of cigarette production and changed the types of 
cigarettes produced. Whilst during the Soviet period most cigarettes were 
filter-less or low-priced filter brands, after TTCs' entrance to the markets, 
western-styled and luxury filter brands became mainly produced in the 
region. (45) 
Russia and Ukraine have been the most popular countries for TTC 
investment, with the three smaller Baltic States, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania 
also receiving foreign tobacco investment. TTCs have also targeted the three 
central Asian republics of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. In 
contrast, TTC investment in the Caucasus, which used to be a region of major 
leaf tobacco production during the Soviet period, has been delayed due to 
political instability within the three countries in the region - Georgia, Armenia, 
and Azerbaijan. There are still five remaining states in the FSU which have 
yet to see any investment by TTCs. Georgia, Belarus, Turkmenistan, 
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Moldova, and Tajikistan have no investment due to resistance to privatising the 
economy, instability of their governments, or civil unrest. (45) 
TTCs also targeted Eastern Europe in the 1990s. (45) Based on 
market research undertaken by TTCs, it was believed that the best strategies to 
enter Eastern European countries were exporting international brands, as the 
short-term prospects and manufacturing investment as the main opportunity for 
the medium prospects. (107) The main countries for investment included 
Poland, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. (107) 
Although there was a wide range of regulation to discourage smoking 
in the Soviet period including bans on advertising, smoking in public places, 
and health warnings on cigarette packages, these anti-smoking policies were 
not effective. Thus, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, TTCs' efforts to 
advertise and promote their brands have been enormous. As a result, in 
Russia, half of all billboards in the capital city and three quarters of plastic 
bags in the nation were used for tobacco advertising by the mid 1990s. (45) 
TTCs also sought to use political channels through lobbying high-level 
contacts in order to weaken or delay implementation of tobacco control 
regulations, such as banning tobacco advertising and smoking in public places, 
requiring retail outlets to be licensed, and introducing health warnings on 
cigarette packages. (108) 
2.4 Summary 
To date, analyses of TTCs' strategies for market access and demand 
creation have tended to focus on analysing specific countries or regions as 
individual case studies. There have been limited attempts to compare and 
integrate these analyses. The specific market access strategies and tactics for 
expanding market share in each of the countries and regions reviewed above is 
summarised in Table 2.1-2.8. 
The above review of the literature supports the need for further 
theorising about TTCs' activities across countries and regions to explain, not 
only how TTCs accessed emerging markets under different contexts and 
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conditions, but also whether there are identifiable patterns in TTC behaviour. 
Comparative analysis across emerging markets, in relation to the economic 
development models adopted by these countries, forms the basis of the 
conceptual framework set out in Chapter 3. 
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CHAPTER 3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1 Introduction 
Based on the review of the existing literature in Chapter 2, this chapter 
puts forth the conceptual framework that will frame analysis of tobacco 
industry activities in South Korea from the 1980s onwards. It is argued that, 
while analysis of individual countries and regions to date, largely based on 
internal tobacco industry documents, have provided valuable insights into the 
strategies and activities of TTCs worldwide, fuller understanding of the global 
expansion of TTCs can be derived from linking these strategies and activities 
to the type of economic development models adopted by emerging markets. 
Drawing together existing understanding of TTC strategies within 
Latin America, Asia, and the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and eastern bloc 
countries, this chapter proposes a conceptual framework that will provide a 
fuller understanding of the market access and expansion strategies of TTCs in 
South Korea. The application of this conceptual framework to the South 
Korean context is provided in Chapters 5-7. 
3.2 Economic development models by region 
This section more fully describes the economic development models 
that were adopted in Latin America, Asia, and Eastern Europe. 
3.2.1 Industrialisation of Latin America, Asia, and the Former 
Soviet Union 
As described in Chapter 2, governments in the Latin American 
countries adopted import substitution economic development model for their 
industrialisation. Following the transformation of global political economy 
(GPE), led by the Great Depression in the 1930s, the countries focused on self- 
sufficiency by developing domestic industries. Given this, key industries in 
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the region were intensively protected against foreign competition by adopting 
high import tariffs, import quotas, and so on. However, foreign direct 
investment and ownership for developing domestic industries, resulting in 
improvement of productivity and quality of domestic goods, were often 
welcomed by governments. (4,5) 
Similar to the Latin American countries, following various 
international and internal conflicts and gaining independence from colonial 
rule, many Asian countries also initially opted for an import substitution model 
in the early stages of industrialisation. (46) However, most Asian countries 
soon switched their economic and trade policies to a state-led and export- 
oriented industrialisation in the 1950s onwards. (46,109) Export-oriented 
industrialisation is a trade and economic policy aimed at achieving the 
industrialisation of a country through exports. (47,110) As the background of 
this change of Asian countries, the US took place an important role. Most 
Asian countries aligned themselves with the US geopolitical strategy of 
building a "containment belt" of capitalist countries around China and other 
Communist countries, thus receiving specific incentives from the US most 
notably access to a large export market. (46,111) These incentives were a 
significant factor in the different economic development models adopted by 
Latin America and Asia, while providing the US with considerable influence in 
many Asian countries. An outward oriented economic development strategy 
in the Asian countries, which used exports as the engine of growth, contributed 
greatly to the region's economic transformation. 
The process of economic development in the FSU and former 
Communist countries from the late 1980s, took place under specific historical 
conditions. Prior to this period, industrialisation in the Soviet Union and its 
satellite states of Eastern Europe was accomplished via state planning under 
the Communist system. Following the collapse of the Communist system, the 
newly independent states experienced considerable political and economic 
turmoil. They faced the challenge of reconstructing their economies which 
were considerably less developed compared to Western countries. Most of 
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these states opted for mass privatisation and liberalisation of foreign 
investment, often acting on the advice of foreign donors or international 
institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank. (45) 
3.2.2 Attitudes towards foreign direct investment 
A key distinguishing feature of the different economic development 
models described above lies in their approaches to foreign direct investment 
(FDI). Under their export-led economic policies, Asian countries used 
selective protection for key industries until they were competitive in the world 
market, and strictly controlled FDI. In contrast, despite Latin American 
countries opting for blanket protection against imports across most industries 
under the import substitution model, foreign investments were allowed almost 
unchecked. Moreover, governments even encouraged transnational 
companies (TNCs) to play a leading role in many economies, allowing them to 
acquire local industries, because foreign companies were seen as a vital source 
of technology and capital. As a result of that, from the 1960s, TNCs extended 
their grip on the most dynamic sectors of Latin American economies. (46) 
Similarly, countries of the FSU and Eastern Europe also believed they needed 
FDI to rebuild their broken economies. From the 1990s, therefore, FDI 
flowed into the region over time. For example, FDI towards Russia, the 
largest state of the FSU, increased from US$5.5 billion in 1995 to US$98.4 
billion in 2004, and Kazakhstan's FDI also rose from US$2.9 billion to 
US$22.4 billion during the same period. (l 12) 
The degree of openness to foreign investment therefore played a 
crucial role in each of the three development models. Under import 
substitution in Latin America, whilst imports were discouraged through high 
tariffs and import quotas, foreign investment was generally permitted and often 
welcomed. In the FSU and Eastern European countries in the 1990s, foreign 
investment was actively facilitated by governments and international 
institutions, alongside broad policies of privatisation and liberalisation. In 
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East Asia, by contrast, state-led and export-oriented development relied on 
strategically protecting key industries from imports until they were able to 
compete effectively in the world market, and this was combined with 
widespread hostility to foreign ownership; even where trade barriers were 
removed or reduced in any given sector, there was a strong preference for 
maintaining majority ownership by nationals. 
3.3 Regional comparison of TTC strategies 
3.3.1 A comparative analysis on TTCs' market access strategies 
under economic development models 
Chapter 2 reviews the existing literature on the strategies used by 
TTCs in seeking market access to individual countries or regions during each 
of the three phases of market expansion. Looking across these studies with an 
understanding of different economic development models, it appears that 
TTCs' strategies to obtain a foothold in new markets were clearly different in 
accordance with the economic development models, which the targeted 
countries or regions adopted. 
Literature review on TTCs' market access to Latin America confirms 
that the main tactics of companies to gain access to the region from the 1960s 
to 1970s was acquisition of local tobacco companies through the establishment 
of subsidiaries, licensing agreements, and joint venture (3V) agreements of 
various forms. (4,5,36) The form that TTC entry to Latin American markets 
took was largely determined by the import substitution policies pursued by 
governments there, which combined high trade barriers with an uncritical 
attitude towards foreign investment. The industrialisation model of import 
substitution encouraged governments to locally manufacture tobacco products 
given that the industry was ideally suited to import substitution, and was a 
substantial contributor to governments' tax revenues. Thus, the local 
production of tobacco products was given high priority. The suitability of 
tobacco manufacturing to import substitution, together with governments' 
uncritical attitude to foreign investment, allowed TTCs to gain access to Latin 
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American markets after 1960. (4) Initially, TTCs supported local tobacco 
companies and supplied manufacturing technology and skills, as well as capital 
for local production of cigarettes, but subsequently TTCs attempted to acquire 
the local companies by exploiting their high dependence on TTC support. 
How did TTCs' detailed strategies for market entry to Latin America 
generally work within emerging markets? When TTCs successfully signed 
production agreements with local tobacco companies, the benefits were certain, 
thus the strategy was usually deployed by TTCs in the early phase of access to 
new markets. By producing locally, TTCs were able, not only to avoid high 
tariffs and expensive transport costs, but also to take advantage of lower-priced 
local tobacco leaf and labour. With reduced production costs, TTCs could 
invest more in advertising and promotion activities for their brands, and supply 
cheaper priced products to markets. (5,113) Through a licensing arrangement, 
local companies produced and sold TTCs' brands under agreement which was 
seen to offer high quality and fuller flavours compared to local brands. 
Similarly JV agreements between TTCs and local tobacco companies offered 
improvements in efficiency and quality of local tobacco production by 
adopting TTCs' manufacturing technology and knowhow. (88) As a result of 
licensing and JV agreements, the dependence of local tobacco companies on 
TTCs significantly increased and, subsequently, the local companies were 
more easily and cheaply acquired by TTCs. (33) These tobacco industry's 
strategies were generally welcomed by many Latin American governments 
because they boosted tax revenues by increasing cigarette sales and appeared to 
solve the contraband problem which was causing a loss of tax revenue. Since 
government opposition to TTC market entry was limited, TTCs' appear not to 
have needed to engage in extensive political activity in order to gain entry, 
although they have subsequently acted politically to advance their interests. 
There is little analysis so far on TTC activities in Latin America, so the 
evidence on the region comes mainly from Shepherd's analysis of barriers to 
entry in the tobacco industry using economic theory rather than a public health 
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perspective. (4) There remains much to understand about TTCs' market 
expansion strategies in Latin American countries. 
In contrast to Latin America, as described in Chapter 2, during TTCs' 
second phase of overseas market expansion focused on selected Asian 
countries from the 1980s until the early 1990s, TTCs' market access strategies 
concentrated on political activities6 including lobbying, since these markets 
were largely closed to foreign tobacco manufacturers. The review of 
literature found that Japan, Taiwan, and Thailand, as well as South Korea were 
subjected to intense pressure from the US Trade Representative (USTR) as a 
result of TTC lobbying. These countries opted for a model of state-led and 
export-oriented industrialisation, and also received economic support from the 
US as part of its geopolitical strategy. (114,115) This close economic and 
strategic relationship with the US created a degree of dependence on the US 
which proved significant in relation to the tobacco industry. 
Within this context, TTCs' behaviour in seeking market access to Asia 
really focused on political activities to influence governments. The general 
hostility to foreign ownership in these countries, as described in Section 3.2.2, 
and the potential for TTCs to influence the USTR to exert pressure or refer 
cases to the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), meant that this 
political activity was primarily focused on trade liberalisation rather than 
acquisition of domestic companies. 
The forms of political tactics used by TTCs can be characterised as 
direct and indirect. TTCs' direct tactics to assert political influence has 
included the use of contracted political lobbyists to influence state 
legislation. (116,117) These lobbying efforts have provided the tobacco 
industry with support from legislators. For this reason, TTCs spent huge 
amounts on professional lobbying firms, and also donated millions of dollars to 
federal candidates, national parties and non-party political action committees in 
attempts to gain political engagement. (118) The indirect form of TTCs' 
political activities has focused on tobacco control policies by undermining the 
6 Political activities in this research are defined as formal political processes rather than a 
broader definition of political. 
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scientific evidence on tobacco and health. This activity has often been 
coordinated through front organisations and paid consultants, such as the 
Council for Tobacco Research (formed in 1954 to fund scientific research on 
the link between smoking and lung cancer)(119), and the International 
Committee on Smoking Issues (formed in 1977 and changed its name to 
1NFOTAB in order to coordinate anti-tobacco control strategies). (120) TTCs 
also worked indirectly in advance of tobacco control policy's enactment to 
delay its implementation by hiring local experts and other third parties. (121- 
124) 
TTCs' political activities in Asia included the use of contracted 
lobbyists and front groups to influence governments' legislation. The 
lobbying efforts provided TTCs with support from governments and legislators, 
who were prepared to support trade liberalisation, in these countries. At the 
domestic level, US-based TTCs worked through the US Cigarette Export 
Association (USCEA) to raise the issue of discriminatory trade by the Asian 
countries against their products. In order to remove bans on imported 
cigarettes in the Asian countries, TTCs recruited special political lobbyists and 
attempted to lobby and convince government officials of the targeted countries, 
US's Senators and Congressmen, the USTR, as well as the US President. (38, 
82,125,126) This pressure eventually led to the removal of bans on imported 
cigarettes in Japan and Taiwan. In the case of Thailand, as described above, 
when TTCs failed to liberalise the market due to greater resistance by the 
government, the USTR alternatively resorted to pressures the government to 
lodge a complaint under the GATT. The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) 
found in favour and Thailand was required to lift its restrictions on imported 
cigarettes. (38,82,125,126) 
Meanwhile, TTC entry into the markets of the FSU was historically 
specific, taking place after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Given their less 
developed economies compared to the industrialised western capitalist 
countries, following the collapse of the Communist bloc, these governments 
invited foreign investment in order to attract capital for economic development. 
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This process was also facilitated by international institutions, such as the IMF 
and the World Bank. TTCs were quick to take advantage of this situation, 
and usually acquired domestic companies in their entirety, as they had often 
done in Latin America in an earlier period. The literature also documents the 
use of political activity by TTCs at this time in order to secure their 
investments on the best terms possible to them. (127) 
There is a slight difference in foreign investment by TTCs towards the 
regions of Latin America and the FSU. As described in the previous section, 
the Latin American countries had strict trade barriers to reduce imports and 
protect domestic industries from foreign competition. Foreign investment, as 
part of market access strategies, thus, was used by TTCs to mitigate the 
existing trade barriers. Given this, the investment focused on supporting leaf 
development and providing manufacturing technology to local companies. 
However, governments in the FSU highly depended on foreign aid and 
investment for reconstruction of economies, given the lack of resources to 
recover broken economies in the region. Within this context, TTCs' 
investment in the FSU was relatively less controlled by governments. 
Although China, Vietnam, and Indonesia belong to the region of Asia, 
given the different economic development model and political contexts, TTCs' 
market access to these three countries were different from the tactics TTCs 
used in Japan, Twain, and Thailand. TTC strategies to gain access to China 
were more similar to other East Asian countries although the country was 
under a Communist system, because the Communist system in China has not 
collapsed in the way it did in the FSU and Eastern Europe. Given the 
difference of Chinese government policy for economic development, TTCs 
were not able to access the Chinese market as easily as they gained access in 
the FSU and Eastern Europe. As described, TTCs attempted the agreements 
of JV with the monopolised company, but due to the ban on foreign ownership 
in any kind of domestic companies in the country, these tactics did not succeed. 
TTCs also continued to attempt gaining a foothold to the Chinese market by 
using the power of the USTR, but the government has been able to resist the 
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pressure to liberalise trade in tobacco products. Furthermore, TTCs attempted 
to use China's accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) to gain 
access to the Chinese market, however, the efforts were also largely 
unsuccessful. (7) TTCs tactics to access Vietnam were also different from 
other Asian countries and Latin America. Under the Communist system, the 
Vietnamese government sought economic development by increasing exports 
to the Soviet Union rather than the US. Unlike the geopolitical contexts of 
Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and Thailand, Vietnam's export-oriented 
economic development model created a greater dependence on the Soviet 
Union. However, with the collapse the Soviet Union, government policies for 
industrialisation had to be transformed. Within this context, TTCs attempted 
to invest in local companies in the form of leaf development and licensing 
agreements with the monopolised tobacco company and have also adopted 
contraband trade as market access tactics. TTCs' specific tactics to gain 
market access to Indonesia also seems to have been different to other Asian 
countries. It appears that, because the Indonesian government did not adopt 
the same economic development model as other Asian countries, and was 
highly dependent on foreign aid and investments for industrialisation, the 
market access strategy pursued by TTCs was foreign investment to local 
tobacco companies. In this sense, the experience in Indonesia seems to be 
similar to Latin American countries. 
Through a comparative analysis of TTCs' behaviour in seeking access 
to markets in Latin America, Asia, and the FSU, this review suggests that 
TTCs' strategies varied in relation to the economic development models of the 
targeted countries, and the governments' attitudes towards foreign investment. 
3.3.2 TTCs' tactics for demand creation by regions 
Based on the review of the existing literature in Chapter 2, this 
research finds that, despite variation in market access strategies, TTCs appear 
to have acted similarly in terms of their strategies for demand creation over the 
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three phases of global expansion. The reason, as explained by Shepherd who 
analysed barriers to entry in the tobacco industry, has been "consumer 
preference" which is usually created by advertising and promotion for new 
products, and to a lesser extent differences in product form and packaging. 
Once TTCs successfully open closed markets, their interests focus on 
creating and stimulating demand for imported brands. Shepherd argues that 
"consumer preference" is the most powerful entry barrier to new entrants in the 
tobacco industry. Consumer preference may arise through the location of 
retail outlets, the provision of exceptionally good service by firms, the 
technology to produce physical differences in a product, or the creation of a 
favourable image of a product. The first two factors result from the 
manufacturer's investment in supply conditions, such as distribution networks, 
sales forces, and market research, but they are unlikely to be decisive in most 
markets. (4,36) The third factor, technology for producing differences in 
products or packaging, has permitted TTCs to gain a foothold in monopolised 
markets. However, the advantages gained by companies on the frontier of 
product technology are usually short-term, mainly because the differences are 
easy to copy. The fourth factor, the creation of favourable brand images 
through mass advertising and other types of promotion, reinforce differences in 
product form and packaging. Most industry analysts agree that established 
consumer preferences for existing products constitute the major obstacle to 
new entrants, and that demand creation through branding and related marketing 
techniques has been the most important source of the high degree of 
concentration in the industry. (36) Therefore, the consumer loyalties of 
existing brands are a powerful barrier to entry and make it difficult for new 
entrants to build brand awareness and loyalty. 
As discussed by Shepherd, TTCs' entrance into new markets was 
typically accompanied by detailed industry-conducted market research, 
sophisticated and effective advertising, and promotional activities to change 
existing consumer preferences and create greater demand for imported brands. 
TTCs undertook enormous expenditure through these marketing strategies for 
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consumer preference. The literature reviewed in Chapter 2 clearly supports 
Shepherd's argument. (4) TTCs' tactics to create demand in Latin America, 
Asia, and the FSU for their brands took a similar form, consisting of aggressive 
advertising and promotion in the media and at point of sale; targeting particular 
population groups such as young adults and females; introduction of light and 
low tar cigarettes; and promoting images of western lifestyles and a sense of 
personal freedom as associated with TTCs' imported brands. Additionally, 
political activities and influence were used by TTCs to mitigate existing and 
emerging tobacco control policies, and to enable activities to create and sustain 
demand for their brands. Given the above, it is argued that emerging markets 
engaged in market liberalisation with TTCs must be well prepared to deal with 
such demand creation tactics by TTCs. 
3.3.3 Response of local tobacco companies to TTCs 
Based on the review of the literature in Chapter 2, it is argued in this 
research that there have been differences in the responses of local tobacco 
companies in the targeted countries and regions depending on the specific 
strategies used by TTCs to gain market access. 
Since market access was gained by TTCs, the domestic monopolies in 
Asian countries have been transformed, but the transformations were different 
from that which took place in Latin American countries and the FSU. Unlike 
TTCs' acquisition of local companies in both regions, the monopolies in Japan 
and Taiwan were privatised. The different economic development model 
adopted in countries within Latin America, the FSU, and Asia seems to have 
influenced the different forms of transformation of domestic companies after 
TTCs' penetration. Domestic companies in Latin America mainly pursued 
strategies to meet local demand, rather than exporting their tobacco products to 
overseas markets under an import substitution economic development model. 
Governments in the Latin American countries believed that TTCs' acquisition 
of local companies could improve local production of tobacco product. 
56 
Monopolised and state-led tobacco companies in Asian countries, however, 
intensively focused attention on competition with new entrants after trade 
liberalisation. Governments in Asia believed that TTCs penetrated and 
circumvented their monopolised companies, resulting in negative impacts on 
their exports. Thus, local companies were quickly turned into market- 
oriented companies via privatisation, and prepared for competition with TTCs. 
Although state-owned companies in Asia were often privatised after 
liberalisation, they have been continually protected by governments rather than 
selling off or allowing foreign ownership. This is because, even after 
liberalisation, tobacco industry still has an important role for export-oriented 
economic development model in Asian countries. 
The Japan Tobacco and Salt Public Corporation was privatised in 1985, 
changing its name to Japan Tobacco Incorporated. However, as described 
above, despite this transformation, the Japanese Ministry of Finance retained 
half of the company's shares, which means the privatised company remained 
largely under the control of the Japanese government. The Taiwan Tobacco 
and Wine Bureau, the Taiwanese state monopoly, was also privatised in 2002 
after Taiwan joined the WTO. Meanwhile, the Thailand Tobacco Monopoly 
(TTM) is still a form of monopoly to date, although the tobacco market was 
liberalised in 1990. Even though the country pledged to privatise the state- 
owned companies under the pressure of the IMF in order to overcome the 
Asian economic crisis in 1997, the nation's health groups strongly opposed the 
privatisation of TTM, arguing that the privatisation would increase smoking 
rates among women and the young. Moreover, the employees of the TTM 
also participated in opposing the privatisation, fearing that it would result in 
losing their jobs. (8 1) The monopolies in these countries, which conformed to 
the Asian development model for industrialisation, including hostility to 
foreign ownership, have not been acquired by TTCs, although the governments 
removed trade barriers such as high tariffs and bans on imported cigarettes, 
under political pressure. 
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3.4 A conceptual framework for understanding TTC activity 
in South Korea 
3.4.1 TTC strategies and economic development models 
The conceptual framework of this research begins by arguing that TTC 
activities from the 1960s can be broadly relate to the economic development 
models adopted in the targeted countries and regions, and to governments' 
attitudes towards foreign investment. The patterns of TTC behaviour 
suggested by the literature review along with a comparative analysis, in 
seeking market access and expansion lead to the following observations: 
" To gain access to the countries adopting the import substitution 
growth model for industrialisation, TTCs have attempted to 
acquire local tobacco companies, preceded or accompanied by 
leaf development, local production, licensing manufacturing, 
and JV agreements. 
" To gain access to the countries adopting a state-led and export- 
oriented growth model for industrialisation, TTCs have used 
political power to impact on government's decisions and exert 
pressure for trade liberalisation. 
" To gain access to the former Communist countries seeking 
reconstruction and development of their economies, TTCs have 
used FDI as the main strategy. 
" Demand creation activities were extensive and similar in all 
regions throughout the period since 1960. 
This suggests that TTCs seem to have been influenced by the country's 
economic development model for industrialisation, and the government's 
attitude towards foreign investments. 
The conceptual framework developed for this research, argues that 
TTCs market expansion, from the 1960s onwards, was shaped by the economic 
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development models adopted by developing countries and regions, and 
governments' attitudes towards foreign investment. In relation to this 
research, in order to understand TTC behaviour to enter the South Korean 
market, as an examplar of the `Asian development model', it is argued that 
important insights can be gained by analysing such strategies against Korea's 
economic policies and attitudes towards FDI. It is also argued that this 
approach, not previously applied to analyse tobacco industry activities, 
provides a fuller understanding of the broader political and economic context 
behind TTC activities in South Korea, as well as potential insights into the 
expansion of TTCs into other emerging markets. 
3.4.2 The South Korean economic development model 
Based on the conceptual framework described above, the specific 
features of South Korea's political economy must be understood. After 
experiencing over three decades of Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945), and 
then the Korean War (1950-1953), South Korea emerged as one of the poorest 
countries in the world. (128) During the period of Japanese colonisation, 
although the Korean economy grew 4 percent per year, the main beneficiary of 
this growth was Japan and the Japanese people that lived in South Korea. In 
addition, the Korean War destroyed about half of the country's infrastructure. 
Between 1953 and 1960, recovery of the war-ravaged economy was 
emphasised which led to slow improvement. This was because the first South 
Korean government, under President Seung Man Lee, was heavily dependent 
upon foreign aid from allies (mostly the US) and economic policy was based 
on import substitution. (26) 
In 1961, when General Chung Hee Park took power following a 
military coup, Koreans were poverty-stricken and rapid economic development 
was urgently needed. In order to achieve a breakthrough, the Park regime 
established the Economic Planning Board in the Ministry of Finance (MOF) in 
1961, and sought to identify an appropriate development strategy for the 
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country. (28) Import substitution, the early economic development strategy 
adopted by the Korean government, was recognised as unsuccessful due to the 
small size of the domestic market, lack of natural resources, and continuous 
decline of foreign aid after reaching a peak in 1957. (26) For these reasons, 
the government modified its policy from an import substitution, to a state-led 
and export-oriented development strategy from 1962 which targeted the 
development of light industry, infrastructure, expansion of domestic savings, 
and accumulation of foreign capital through export earnings. (129) 
In order to achieve this new industrialisation strategy, the Economic 
Planning Board initiated the first and second Five-Year Economic 
Development Plans from 1962 to 1971. The result was a remarkable 
transformation of the economy. South Korea assumed the status of a Newly 
Industrialising Country (NIC) by the 1970s. (128) Five-Year Plans continued 
to be undertaken. From the third Plan in 1972, the government focused more 
attention on heavy and chemical industries rather than light industry. A total 
of seven Five-Year Plans from 1962 to 1997 were carried out to achieve rapid 
industrialisation, and economic growth stabilisation. 
Importantly, Korea's industrialisation process under this export- 
oriented development strategy was led by the actions of the government from 
the early stages, because sufficient investment could not be provided by the 
private sector alone following the long period of Japanese colonisation and the 
Korean War. (26) This state-led development firstly sought to transform the 
export market. For this purpose, the government selectively relaxed import 
restrictions in light industries in order to encourage industry to focus more on 
foreign markets by reducing the possibility of making a high profit in the 
domestic market. This policy of the government successfully led to a 
transformation of the market to a more externally oriented economy. (129) 
Moreover, large companies were assigned annual export targets and were 
closely observed by the government. Once a company succeeded in fulfilling 
their export goals, the company obtained numerous government benefits 
including preferential credit and loans, administrative support, and tax 
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reductions. Hence, the growth of Korean companies was fuelled by the 
export-driven principle, and the companies themselves made efforts to achieve 
their export goals. (26) In addition, as part of this export-oriented model, the 
government adopted protective measures for core-heavy industries, such as 
automobiles. Given their high contribution to national economic development, 
these industries were protected from foreign competitors' investment, 
takeovers and ownerships until they became competitive in the world 
market. (29) 
As a result of this state-led and export-oriented industrialisation policy, 
the share of non-agriculture in gross domestic product (GDP) increased from 
60.1 percent to 89.2 percent between 1960 and 1987, while the agriculture 
sector decreased from 39.9 percent to 10.8 percent. In addition, per capita 
gross national income (GNI) also increased from US$87 to US$5,199, and 
GDP of the national economy expanded from US$2.3billion to US$220.7 
billion during this period. Total national exports increased from US$55 
million to US$61.4 billion. (26,128) This remarkable economic growth 
overall was achieved by an expansion of exports, the growth of export 
industries, and the active involvement of the government in supporting the 
domestic economy. (26,128,130,131) 
On this basis, it is argued in this research that a fuller understanding of 
the economic development model, adopted by the Korean government during 
the period of market liberalisation, offers the basis of a framework for 
conceptualising TTC strategies and activities to gain a foothold in the Korean 
market. Similar to Japan, Taiwan, and Thailand, which have achieved 
industrialisation through an export-oriented development model, and 
consequently experienced trade pressure from the US government on behalf of 
TTCs, South Korea's pursuit of a similar economic development to these 
countries would be expected to result in intensive political and economic 
pressure by the US government, the largest trade ally for South Korea. 
Analysis of South Korea's tobacco market, in this context, will be provided in 
Chapter 5. 
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3.4.3 Geopolitical relationship between South Korea and the US 
In relation to this research, and as briefly described in the previous 
chapter, South Korea's geopolitical relationship with the US is expected to 
have been particularly important to TTCs' market access strategy in South 
Korea. After World War II, the US replaced Japan as the main foreign power 
with a military presence in South Korea albeit, given the Korean War, under 
very different strategic circumstances. Given its geopolitical and ideological 
struggle against the Soviet Union, the US saw the protection of South Korea 
from communism, under its so-called containment policy, as particularly 
important. (132,133) Under US foreign policy in the 1950s, South Korea's 
political and economic reconstruction was an important part of this objective of 
preventing the spread of Communist influence. (134) However, in asserting 
geopolitical influence in South Korea, critics argue that the US government 
intervened in the establishment of the first South Korean government as an 
independent country by shaping consideration of presidential candidates from 
the late 1940s. Thus, from the beginning of South Korea's contemporary 
history, the political influence of the US was strong. (134,135) In addition, 
due to the broken infrastructure left behind by the Japanese occupation and 
then the Korean War, the immediate lack of an economic development strategy 
coupled with the containment policy of the US brought a high level of 
economic assistance from the US which proved essential to the early political 
and economic survival of South Korea. (134) 
Within this context, General Chung Hee Park initiated a military coup 
in May 1961 (5.16 Coup) against the first government of Seng Man Lee, the 
latter criticised for supporting only the wealthier classes, and successfully 
seized power. (136) During the Park regime, South Korea was politically 
5.16 Coup (The May Coup d'6tat) was a military coup carried out by general Chung Hee 
Park in South Korea in May 16,1961. The purpose of the Coup was to bring the stability to 
the society and implementing the anti-communism policy. After this coup, the military junta, 
called "Supreme Council for National Reconstruction" took power and began to implement the 
national reconstruction policy. 
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stable and focused intensively on industrialisation, with a strong and close 
relationship with the US. (137,138) During the period of political turmoil, 
following Park's assassination in 1978 to the early 1980s, the South Korean 
economy suffered serious problems, notably decreasing levels of exports and 
mounting external debts. The unstable economy was mostly influenced by 
the unstable political situation. Thereafter, President Do Hwan Chun took 
power in 1980. However, due to the military coup in 1979 which brought him 
to power, there was widespread opposition to Chun. This led to frequent 
mass demonstrations by students and young educated people throughout the 
country. In this unstable domestic situation, Chun flew to Washington in 
1981 and met with newly-elected US President Ronald Reagan to seek his 
support. (134) Following this visit, Reagan buttressed the Chun regime, and 
promised political and economic support for his government. As a result, 
Chun's dependence on the US was further increased. Domestically, Reagan's 
support for Chun's regime accelerated anti-US feelings. (134) In addition, a 
US State Department official responded to the Kwangju Uprisings which is 
seen as representative of Korea's desire for democracy, as follows: "We 
recognise that a situation of total disorder and disruption in a major city cannot 
be allowed to go on indefinitely" (139) This fuelled anti-US sentiments even 
more, leading to an arson attack on the US Information Service Centre in 
Busan in 1982, the seizing of US cultural centres, and attacks on US consulates 
in major cities. These expressions of anti-American sentiment became 
common in the mid-1980s, setting the scene for complex foreign relations 
between the two countries on a wide range of economic and political issues. 
(140) 
To summarise, South Korea's relationship with the US, in particular, 
was a key factor in the political and economic development of the country after 
the Second World War. Korea's emphasis on export-based economic growth 
8 Kwangju Uprising was a student demonstration in Kwangju, in protest against the 
imposition of martial law, and the arrest of several opposition leaders. In response to brutal 
police action, demonstrators attacked government, police, and military institutions. An 
estimated 2,000 people died as a result of government brutality. 
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and opposition to foreign ownership defined its development paradigm, whilst 
its geo-political dependence on the US in the context of an anti-communist 
containment strategy defined its foreign policy. At the same time, Korean 
sentiment towards the US was a mixture of resigned dependence and, 
particularly among the younger generation, anti-American feelings. This 
complex political and economic context, it is argued in this research, played an 
important role in shaping the available means by which TTCs could attempt to 
enter the Korean tobacco market. The link between the geopolitics of South 
Korea and US relations, in short, is a key component of the conceptual 
framework for this research. 
3.4.4 Global political economy of the tobacco industry 
The conceptual framework of this research argues that the economic 
development model adopted by the Korean government, and the country's 
geopolitical relationship with the US, in turn, offers a fuller understanding of 
the global political economy (GPE) of the tobacco industry in South Korea,. 
Briefly, political economy is the study of the interrelationships between 
political and economic processes. As such, it is an interdisciplinary 
endeavour which draws political science, economics, and international 
relations. GPE locates these interrelationships within the globalisation of the 
world economy which is eroding the boundaries between domestic and global 
structures and forces. (141) GPE, thus, goes beyond relations between states, 
seeking also to understand non-state actors (such as private companies) as well 
as forces and causal relationships that circumvent national borders. The field 
of political economy is rich in theoretical perspectives and methodological 
debates whose review lies beyond the scope of this research. 
In relation to this research, this is a particularly appropriate approach 
given evidence of the globalisation of the tobacco industry since the 
1980s. (142) The research begins by locating the South Korean economy 
within the GPE since the Korean War. For the purpose of this research, to 
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understand the tobacco industry in South Korea, broad recognition of the 
importance of both state and market-based institutions, and the critical 
importance of global forces in shaping economic and public health policy 
frames the analysis. The integrated approach of Gill and Law, (143) who 
privilege the global over the international (inter-state), is especially useful in 
this respect. Their focus on such factors as the transnationalisation of capital, 
ascendance of non-state actors including transnational corporations, and 
corresponding impact of these forces on domestic political and economic 
processes, will inform analysis of the activities of TTCs and the domestic 
industry before and after market liberalisation . 
3.5 Summary 
This chapter puts forth a conceptual framework for more fully 
understanding TTC strategies and activities for market access and expansion 
worldwide. Figure 3.1 sets out this framework. First, it is argued that the 
specific economic development model pursued by an individual country or, in 
some cases, across regions, can be used to explain, in large part, what strategies 
and activities TTCs have adopted. Second, the economic development model, 
in turn, is shaped by a country's or region's political and economic history. 
Together, it is argued that these factors shaped the opportunities available to 
TTCs, seeking to enter an emerging market, and how market entry and 
expansion, in turn, impacts on a country's tobacco industry and tobacco control 
policies. 
Applying this conceptual framework to South Korea, this research will 
begin by considering the specific features of South Korea's political and 
economic history, and its economic development model based on state-driven 
export-led growth. South Korea's geopolitical relationship with the US, it 
will be argued, was of particular importance to the country's response to 
pressures to liberalise and regulate the industry. Understanding the South 
Korea in this way will contribute to a deeper understanding of the globalisation 
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of TTC strategies and activities. These insights, furthermore, will offer 
lessons for other emerging markets seeking to balance the complex challenges 
of economic development and the protection and promotion of public health. 
Following a description of the methodology used in this research in Chapter 4, 
how these factors shaped TTC strategies in South Korea will be the focus of 
the analysis in Chapters 5-7. 
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CHAPTER 4 METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the methodology of the research in terms of the 
sources of data used, how they were collected and organised, and how the data 
was used to analyse TTC strategies and activities to access and expand into 
South Korea's tobacco market. It also explains how the data sources were 
triangulated, to ensure validity and reliability, and to provide a cohesive 
approach for the research. It concludes with the caveats or limitations of the 
research. A summary of the research objectives, methods used to fulfil each 
objective, and the sources of data is provided in Table 4.1. 
Briefly, as the primary data source, tobacco industry documents (TIDs) 
were collected and analysed in order to understand the liberalisation of the 
Korean tobacco market and the strategies employed by transnational tobacco 
companies (TTCs) to gain access and expand their presence within South 
Korea. TIDs also provided insights into how TTCs' market entry impacted 
on the Korean tobacco industry. Other supplementary data sources offered a 
more complete context for the interpretation of events identified in TIDs. 
Semi-structured interviews with key informants, including former and current 
public officials, tobacco control advocates, and tobacco industry people were 
supplementary sources of primary data. The interviews provided means for 
contextualising and triangulating the industry documents, thus improving the 
reliability and validity of the research. In addition, an analysis of additional 
primary and secondary sources, such as industry publications and websites, 
tobacco control advocates' published and unpublished papers, media reports, 
scholarly journals, policy documents, and legislation were utilised to build an 
historical and thematic narrative. Both interviews and additional data were 
used in conjunction to contextualise and triangulate documentary data. 
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Table 4.1: Summary of the research objectives, methods, and data 
sources 
Objective 
(a) To review 
historical events 
leading to the 
opening of the 
Korean market 
(b) To understand 
the market entry 
strategies and the 
activities used by 
TTCs to gain access 
and expand their 
market share in the 
Korean tobacco 
market; 
(c) To draw broader 
theoretical 
conclusions about 
the behaviour of 
TTCs in seeking 
market access and 
expansion 
(d) To describe the 
impact of market 
opening on the 
domestic tobacco 
industry 
Method Data sources 
¢ Analysis of TIDs ¢ BATDA/LTDL 
¢ Review of ¢ Korean/US government 
additional sources documents, WTO/GATT 
Documents 
¢ Analysis of TIDs ¢ BATDA/LTDL 
Semi-structured y Key informants 
interviews r Media reports, official 
Review of statistics, policy 
additional sources documents, legislation, 
etc. 
Analysis of TIDs ¢ BATDA/LTDL 
y Review of ¢ Media reports, official 
additional sources statistics, policy 
Literature review documents, legislation, 
etc. 
Y Literature 
¢ Analysis of TIDs ¢ BATDA/LTDL 
Y Semi-structured ¢ Key informants 
interviews ¢ Media reports, official 
Review of statistics, policy 
additional sources documents, legislation, 
etc. 
(e) To draw lessons Synthesis and Consolidation of all the 
for strengthening analysis of all data 
tobacco control in findings 
South Korea in the 
context of the FCTC 
Note: BATDA British America Tobacco Document Archive, LTDL -- Legacy Tobacco 
Document Library 
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4.2 Tobacco industry documents 
4.2.1 Provenance of tobacco industry documents 
TIDs, which represent a unique resource for understanding the tobacco 
industry, began to be made public by an employee of Brown & Williamson 
(B&W) who sent documents, under the alias "Mr Butts" to various media 
outlets and scholars, in the early 1990s. (144,145) The first analyses of TIDs 
were published as a series of articles in the New York Times, and as academic 
papers in Journal of the American Medical Association in 1995. (146-149) 
These publications introduced the potential value of TIDs to tobacco control 
advocates, scholars, and policy makers. 
Meanwhile, additional documents began to become available through 
litigation. In 1998, the availability of TIDs increased exponentially as a result 
of the settlement of a lawsuit by the state of Minnesota and Blue Cross Blue 
Shield of Minnesota against several major tobacco companies to recover health 
care-related costs. The resultant Minnesota Consent Judgment required six 
tobacco companies - B&W, British American Tobacco (BAT), Lorillard, 
American Tobacco, Philip Morris (PM), and Liggett Group - and two affiliated 
industry organisations - Council for Tobacco Research and the Tobacco 
Institute - to make internal documents, released to the court during the 
discovery process, accessible to the public. As a result, over 32 million pages 
of industry documents are stored in a depository in Minnesota, in the US and 
approximately 8 million pages of documents are housed in the BAT Guildford 
depository, in the UK. (119,150,151) Initially, both depositories were to 
remain open for ten years, although this has now been extended to September 
2021 under the terms of a subsequent legal case brought by the US Department 
of Justice. (152,153) The detailed process of TIDs' disclosure to the public 
through the US based litigations has been discussed elsewhere. (119,151,154- 
158) 
The industry's internal documents were written by company scientists, 
consultants, lawyers, senior executives, and other employees, as well as by 
outside organisations associated in many ways with the tobacco industry, such 
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as public relations companies, advertising and law firms, and research 
laboratories. The documents, dating from the early 1900s, include letters, 
memos, telexes, emails, and research reports regarding, for example, 
advertising, marketing, media, and public relations strategies. (159) The 
contents of documents mainly contain business plans, correspondence, and 
reports on a broad range of topics, such as advertising and marketing strategies 
and sales information. () 19,159) 
Tobacco industry internal documents have been used to date in a range 
of studies, journals, and public reports. In the early stage of using TIDs, 
academic studies focused attention on disclosure of the tobacco industry's false 
representation to the public of such issues as nicotine addiction and tobacco 
and health risks. (145,160-162) The findings of previous TID studies 
successfully unveiled unethical and illegal practices of the tobacco industry 
including the following topics: TTCs' efforts to manipulate scientific research 
particularly on environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) (163-169); efforts to 
undermine the adoption of effective tobacco control policies and legislation 
(170,171); complicity in cigarette smuggling (54,172-174); and marketing 
strategies to access developing countries. (175) Journalists have also reported 
companies' connections to cigarette smuggling, collusion, anti-competitive 
practice, and price fixing. (176) International organisations, including the 
World Health Organisation's (WHO) Regional Offices, the Eastern 
Mediterranean Regional Office (EMRO) and the Pan American Health 
Organisation (PAHO), have studied TTCs activities in the Middle East (177- 
180) and Latin America (50), and non-government organisations (NGOs) have 
also studied TTCs' activities, such as marketing tactics targeting females and 
adolescents. (181-183 ) 
Although a wide range of studies using TIDs has been carried out, 
documents have so far not been used to understand TTCs' detailed strategies to 
gain access to the South Korean tobacco market. Unlike South Korea, other 
Asian countries including Vietnam, China, Thailand, Japan, and Taiwan have 
been reviewed and examined using the industry's internal documents. 
Previous industry document research in relation to Asian countries has 
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analysed the impact of cigarette market opening (8), TTCs' strategies to gain 
access to domestic markets (54,62,86,175), to target youths (184,185), to 
sponsor sporting events (82), and to circumvent tobacco control measures in 
the above Asian countries. (125,184,186) 
4.2.2 The analysis of tobacco industry documents 
Although TIDs offer an unparalleled resource for understanding the 
tobacco industry, the sheer size of the collections makes it challenging for 
researchers to meaningfully search and interpret this rich data source. (119) 
The field of tobacco industry document research is at a relatively early stage, 
with its methodology still developing. (187,188) 
This research applied Hill's framework to the analysis of TIDs. (See 
Table 4.2) Hill suggests a useful methodology for archival research which 
serves as a helpful starting point for analysing TIDs. This method has been 
used in the field of socio-historical research. The method is comprised of four 
main stages: understanding the provenance and weaknesses of the archive; 
planning and undertaking the search strategy; organising findings from archival 
data; and interpreting the data to minimise pitfalls. (189) 
Table 4.2: Hill's framework to analysis TIDs 
Stage I Understanding the provenance and weakness of the archive 
Stage 2 Planning and undertaking the search strategy 
Stage 3 Organising the archival data 
Stage 4 Interpreting the data 
S wr: Hill MR. Archival Strategies and Techniques. Newbury Park: Sage Publications; 1993. 
Under Hill's framework, first, the researcher understood the 
provenance of TIDs and what limitations TIDs pose for the research. As 
TIDs have been mainly made public through litigation, it is not an archive in 
the traditional sense. It is not a comprehensive collection of industry 
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documents and, indeed, has been provided reluctantly under court order by 
TTCs. Some material may compromise the interests of TTCs, and there have 
been reports of document destruction, abuse of privilege claims, and 
alteration. (156,190) The TIDs used in this research were inevitably limited, 
therefore. In the second stage, in order to narrow down the archives, the 
researcher defined search strategies. Through reviewing literature, basic 
knowledge of the targeted field and other primary and secondary resources, the 
researcher generated particular keyword search terms. In the third stage, the 
researcher organised data found through sorting by date, name, company, title, 
and so on. In the fourth stage, the researcher carefully interpreted the 
documents selected and organised through the previous stages by strategies as 
follows: reading the documents over and over again to avoid falsely rejecting 
documents or misinterpreting them, and contextualising and triangulating with 
other additional primary and secondary sources to validate the data. 
4.2.3 Strategies for searching tobacco industry documents 
4.2.3.1 Accessing the tobacco industry documents 
There are three ways to access TIDs. The first is to visit on-site 
depositories in Minnesota, US, and Guildford, UK. As mentioned above, 
following the Minnesota Consent Judgment, both depositories have to provide 
industry internal documents to the public. The second possible approach is to 
visit the tobacco companies' websites. As required by the Master Settlement 
Agreement (MSA), the tobacco companies (excluding BAT and Liggett group) 
and two affiliated industry organisations had to disclose their various internal 
documents on publicly available websites since 23 October 1998 (191), and 
following the additional legal order, they have to maintain the internet 
document websites until Ist September 2021. (152) Finally, TIDs can be 
accessed through the websites, Legacy Tobacco Documents Library (LTDL)9 
9 Legacy Tobacco Documents Library http: //leeacy. librarv. ucsf. edu/ 
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and British American Tobacco Documents Archive (BATDA)10, created by 
tobacco control advocates. 
There are several limitations to accessing and searching TIDs. (l 19, 
156-158) Briefly, first, visiting the on-site depositories is not as same as 
visiting a public library. Compared to the Minnesota Depository, the 
Guildford Depository, managed by BAT, has been found more difficult and 
inaccessible when searching TIDs. (192) For example, operating hours of the 
Guildford Depository are 10: 00-16: 00 daily, which is relatively short compared 
to the Minnesota Depository which opens between 8: 00 am to 20: 00 pm daily. 
Visitors must sign a waiver form and are closely monitored by CCTV. 
Furthermore, only six organisations and 12 visitors can visit the depository per 
day. The indexing system at the depository is very crude with keyword 
searches possible only at file not document level. Hence, these conditions of 
access to the Guildford Depository have been widely criticised by tobacco 
control advocates but there has been little effect on company practice. (192) 
Due to the difficulty and inaccessibility of the depositories, it is believed that 
searching TIDs on the industry websites11 provided by the tobacco companies 
is more efficient. Yet, these websites are also not recommended for TID 
research, because they were only created out of obligation and have limitations, 
such as different ways of indexing, misspellings, and limited search 
capacity. (119) In other words, industry websites are not designed to be user- 
friendly. Therefore, the websites, LTDL and BATDA, created and run by 
public health community, were used for this research to overcome the existing 
limitations of both visiting the depositories and searching through industry 
document websites. The LTDL and BATDA are fully searchable, accessible 
on-line anytime, and more comprehensive. The former provides the industry 
internal documents of US-based tobacco companies including PM, R. J. 
Reynolds (RJR), and B&W, which the latter holds documents of BAT. Since 
July 2008, BAT documents in BATDA have been integrated into LTDL so that, 
10 British American Tobacco Documents Archive http: //bat. library. ucsf. edu/ 
Lorillard Tobacco Co http: //www. lorillarddocs. com, Philip Morris Inc 
http: //www. pmdocs. com, RJR Tobacco Co/B&W Tobacco Corporation 
http: //www. rjrtdocs. com, the Tobacco Institute http: //www. tobaccoinstitute. com, Council for 
Tobacco Research http: //www. ctr-usa. or = ctr/. 
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by searching LTDL, the available documents of all the targeted companies for 
this research could be undertaken. 
4.2.3.2 Searching tobacco industry documents 
The strategies for searching TIDs for this research were mainly guided 
by two publications, one produced by the London School of Hygiene and 
Tropical Medicine (LSHTM) (156) and the other by the WHO (159). The 
above sources advise that, before searching TIDs, the researcher should be 
aware that: research with TIDs can be time consuming; it can be difficult to 
understand the specific context of a particular document; technical and 
scientific terms are commonly used; jargon, code words, and abbreviations are 
frequently used; and most of the documents are written in English. In 
addition, there is no system of organising documents, as in a formal archive, so 
their provenance is not readily available. (156) 
To collect primary data from industry internal documents, the 
researcher, first, selected keyword search terms. To identify appropriate 
initial search terms, the researcher drew on relevant literature and personal 
secondary knowledge of the topic. Guided by these sources, the researcher 
identified relevant technical terms, places, brands, names of industry personnel, 
policy makers, and government officials, organisations, Bates numbers 12. 
With these initial search terms, the researcher carried out an 
examination of TIDs in LTDL and BATDA, and then used the results to 
generate further or refined search terms. This `snowball' method, where one 
document provides search terms and is used to find additional terms, were 
applied until no new terms are evident. (193) Previous studies warn that 
"industry terms" can be an obstacle to the effective searching of TIDs. (159) 
These include industry abbreviations, jargon, code words, and acronyms. 
However, pioneer tobacco document researchers have compiled lists of these 
terms, which are available on the LTDL website. 
12 Bates number: The identity number given to each page of every TID and usually written in 
the margin of documents. 
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For the initial searching of LTDL and BATDA, the research focused 
on documents dating from 1980 to 2003, because TTCs first started observing 
the Korean market from the early 1980s, and the date of the latest released 
document in relation to South Korea in LTDL and BATDA was 2003. The 
keywords for initial searching were "Korea", "Seoul", and "South Korea". To 
narrow down the number of documents, several additional keywords from the 
research topic, such as "marketing", "strategy", and "liberalisation" were 
combined with "Korea" using Boolean terms `and' and `or'. (See Table 4.3) 
During the process of searching, PM, RJR, BAT, and BAT's US subsidiary, 
B&W, that mainly participated in the Korean tobacco market before and after 
market liberalisation, were targeted. Although Japan Tobacco International 
(JTI) had the largest market share among foreign tobacco companies in the 
early period following market liberalisation, the research excluded JTI from the 
targeted tobacco companies, because LTDL and BATDA do not store the 
company's documents. Furthermore, "wildcard searching" was usefully 
employed. This allows for searches of variations of words or phrases by 
adding an asterisk in place of the final letters of a search term or final digit in a 
Bates number. This was very useful to overcome some misspellings which 
are a potential pitfall as previous research has mentioned. (156) When a 
relevant document for the topics of the research was found, the researcher also 
looked at documents within either side previous and subsequent by Bates 
numbers to obtain additional potentially relevant documents. 
Table 4.3: Initial searching of BATDA and LTDL 
Keyword search terms 
Korea* 
South Korea* 
Seoul 
Korea* and strategy 
Korea* and marketing 
Korea* and market 
Korea* and liberalization 
Total 
Number of hits 
BAT PM RJR B&W Total 
10,916 20,043 9,064 3,596 43,619 
6,289 6,511 4,826 1,084 18,710 
1,063 2,870 1,130 242 5,305 
3,104 4,057 2,396 913 10,470 
4,607 7,482 4,068 1,880 18,037 
6,310 9,352 5,361 2,355 23,378 
477 85 54 14 630 
32,766 50,400 26,899 10,084 120,149 
Source: LDTL, BATDA (accessed 14 June 2008) 
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Through initial searching of LTDL and BATDA, names of TTCs' 
marketing strategies, specific persons' names (industry personnel, policy 
makers, and government officials), organisations, and Bates numbers etc., were 
collected, and then these particular searching terms were iteratively used in the 
expanded document searching in order to narrow down the TIDs collected by 
the initial searching. (See Table 4.4) In addition, given the enormous number 
of documents found during the expanded searching, the time periods between 
1985 and 2003 were applied for TID searching. The selected keywords for 
the expanded searching returned documents more relevant to the research. 
Table 4.4: Expanded searching of BATDA and LTDL 
Keyword search terms 
BAT PM RJR B&W Total 
Number of hits 
Korea* and lobb* NOT crop 284 501 179 90 1,054 
Korea* and "market access" 65 124 46 46 281 
Korea* and "market opening" 72 114 18 43 247 
Korea* and "Hankook Research" 
(Hankook Research conducted PM's market 0 198 00 198 
researches) 
Korea* and "local manufacturing" 36 70 6 21 133 
Korea* and "market entry*" 33 40 10 8 91 
Korea* and Yeutter 
(Clayton K. Yeutter - Representative of the US 
11 84 30 13 138 
Trade Representative (USTR)) 
Korea* and Deaver 
(Michael Deaver -A deputy of Reagan, a double 
2 43 17 8 70 
lobbyist between PM and Korea's government) 
Korea* and textile 
(textile - Korea's main exporting product to the 
90 157 69 21 337 
US) 
Korea* and USTR 74 132 77 32 
Korea* and Bliley 
(Tom Bliley - Congressman from Richmond) 
Korea* and Pepples 
315 
7 72 37 7 123 
(Ernest Pepples - The Senior Vice-President in 58 13 5 113 189 
B&Wl- 
- Korea* and McConnell 
(Mitch McConnell - US Senator) 
Korea* and Reagan 
(Reagan - President of the US) 
15 89 122 16 242 
71 229 101 46 447 
Korea* and Chun 41 15 47 28 131 
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(Chun - President of Republic of Korea) 
Korea* and Richard Allen 
(Richard Allen -A deputy of Reagan) 
Korea* and Laxalt 
(Michelle Laxalt - PM's hired lobbyist and 
daughter of Senator Paul Laxalt a close friend of 
Reagan) 
69 182 123 28 402 
0 15 31 19 
Korea* and Helms 49 148 105 33 335 (Jesses Helms - US Senator) 
Korea* and USCEA 46 105 51 36 238 (USCEA - US Cigarette Export Association) 
Korea* and 301 petition 51 162 65 23 301 
(Section 301 petition) 
Korea* and "gain* access" 28 85 38 5 156 
Korea* and GATT 
(GATT - General Agreement on Trade and 
177 146 47 19 389 
Tariffs) 
Korea* and "voluntary code" 39 67 35 6 147 
Korea* and "marketing strategy" 405 261 102 39 807 
Korea* and YAMS 0 180 00 180 
(YAMS - young adult male smoker) 
Korea* and "advertising strategy" 37 27 82 74 
Korea* and "advertising and 271 687 242 125 1,325 
promotion" 
Korea* and "market research report" 0 717 00 717 
Korea* and "sponsorship activities" 86 64 6 11 167 
Korea* and "consumer awareness" 73 117 36 38 264 
Korea* and "brand switching" 64 275 61 24 424 
Korea* and "marketing expense" 90 172 10 79 351 
Korea* and "vending machine" 157 351 96 64 668 
Korea* and YAUS 65 52 10 82 
(YAUS - young adult urban smoker) 
Korea* and "cigarette taxation" 75 65 45 2 187 
Korea* and "Tobacco Business Act" 16 28 42 50 
Korea* and "government regulation" 47 285 52 14 398 
Total number of hits 11,680 
Source: LTDL (assessed from November 2009 until April 2010) 
Within the range of the study topic, the searching process shown in 
Figure 4.1 below was iteratively undertaken. The search process was deemed 
completed when all possible keyword search terms had been utilised and the 
researcher found no new documents. When each process in the search 
strategy was finished, the documents retrieved were sorted and organised by 
date, company, and themes. Based on research questions, three themes and 
five sub-themes were identified to structure each result chapter and provided a 
systemic way of organising the retrieved documents. Documents, discussing 
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status of tobacco industry and business in South Korea, competitors 
intelligence reports and projections in South Korea, tobacco consumption, 
general consumer surveys, and smoking behaviour were classified under the 
theme, `market overview'. Documents, discussing marketing plans during 
particular time period, were classified under `marketing plans'. Under the 
theme, `marketing tactics', there were five sub-themes, including lobbying 
activities, creating a favourable mood, developing distribution routes, 
advertising and promotional activities, and marketing expenditure. 
The searching of TIDs mainly took place from November 2008 until 
April 2010. As a result of TID searching, the total number of relevant 
documents retrieved after excluding the documents which did not relate to the 
research objectives and copies of documents was slightly more than 3,000 and 
the total number of documents used in the analysis for this research was 
between 550 and 600. 
Figure 4.1: TIDs searching process 
Review of literature. Use knowledge of the topic and additional 
primary and secondary data to create `keyword search terms' 
ý 
Define relevant and creative `keyword search terms' 
4 
Conduct document searching using TID websites 
(until no new files found) 
Organise and sort retrieved 
documentary data 
i 
End of searching process 
Define new and creative search 
terms 
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4.2.4 Interpreting the retrieved data 
According to Bero, "interpretive data analysis", is a prevalent method 
for document research used by historians and social scientists, and the 
recommended methods for interpretation of TIDs. (119) Interpretive data 
analysis is conducted by iteratively reviewing data to construct an account that 
is coherent, supported by the evidence. It is important to seek out other 
primary or secondary sources to answer questions raised by the primary source 
material in interpretive data analysis. (119) Similarly, Bryman(194), Philips 
and Brown(195), and Forster(196) recommend using a "critical hermeneutic 
analysis" for document research. (194) Hermeneutics was originally 
developed in relation to the understanding or interpretation of texts. The key 
aim of a hermeneutic analysis is to understand the meanings of a text from the 
author's viewpoint. The methodology entails consideration of the social and 
historical context within which the text was produced by its authors. (195) 
While interpreting documents, it is suggested that the researcher should read 
them repeatedly because, as Forster observes, documents do not necessarily 
immediately reveal their true meaning. Therefore, it is important to re-read 
and go back to documents at different stages of the research process. 
The most important tenet of a hermeneutic approach and interpretive 
data analysis is the use of context to support and contextualise the retrieved 
documents. In other words, without context, it is difficult to establish the 
reliability and validity of individual documents. Therefore, in Forster's 
approach in analysing company documents, semi-structured interviews are 
carried out with a company's senior managers as well as a questionnaire survey 
in order to understand the social and historical genealogy of documents. (196) 
Similarly, Bryman argues that understanding the social and historical context 
should be a precondition of interpreting a text from the point of view of the 
author. (194) Forster's hermeneutic approach consisting of seven steps is shown 
in Figure 4.2. 
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Figure 4.2: Forster's hermeneutic methodology 
Step I Understanding the meanings of individual texts 
Step 2 Identifying sub-themes 
Step 3 Identifying thematic clusters 
Step 4 Triangulating documentary data 
Step 5 Employing reliability and validity checks 
Step 6 Contextualizing documentary data 
Step 7 Using representative case material 
Source: Adapted from Forster N. The Analysis of Company Documentation. In: Cassell C, 
Symon G, editors. Qualitative Methods in Organisational Research. London: Sage 
Publications 1994 
Forster's hermeneutic methodology was adapted in this research as 
follows in order to interpret the retrieved documents for this research. The 
researcher read through companies' internal documents and indexed key TIDs 
using basic indexing terms (subject, company, and date). The documents 
were re-read at a later date using the accumulated body of knowledge to check 
the initial selection of documents. As the second stage, the researcher began 
to identify themes and sub-themes within each document and groups of 
documents, and allocated subject coding to documents by TTC activities for 
market access and demand creation. In the third stage, the researcher ensured 
all documents were given a subject coding in the database, then ordered 
documents by subject and date order within the database. In the fourth stage, 
the researcher triangulated findings with other primary and secondary sources. 
In the fifth stage, which was identified by Forster as the most important, the 
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researcher re-read documents, as knowledge increased, to confirm the 
reliability and validity of the interpretation. Where uncertainty existed, the 
researcher invited other reviewers, including Korean tobacco control advocates 
and the research supervisors, to affirm or disaffirm the researchers' 
interpretation. Other documents and additional primary data also offered 
further corroborating evidence. The researcher also considered the 
circumstances in which documents were produced and the person producing 
the document. In the sixth stage, documents were placed in a broader context 
using newspaper reports, interviews, and other contemporary materials which 
ensured that they were interpreted in their appropriate political, economic and 
social context at the time they were written. Finally, in the seventh stage, the 
researcher selected document subsets on which to base the presentation of 
findings. 
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Figure 4.3: Interpreting process based on Forster's hermeneutic 
methodology 
Step I Reading and understanding relevant TIDs with the research topics 
4 
Step 2 Identifying themes and sub-themes of the retrieved documents 
4 
Step 3 Classifying documents under the thematic clusters 
i 
Step 4 Triangulating documentary data with supplementary data 
Classified TIDs 
i1 'ýý 
Other primary and 
secondary sources 
(Media reports, official 
statistics, policy documents, 
and legislation etc. ) 
fý 
4 
Interviews with informants 
(Tobacco industry employees, 
government officials, and 
health experts) 
Step 5 Re-reading TIDs with supplementary sources and employing 
reliability and validity checks 
ý 
Step 6 Considering political, economic, and social context of TIDs 
using other sources (e. g. newspapers, government reports) 
4 
Step 7 Selecting documents as evidence 
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4.3 Semi-structured interviews 
In order to contextualise and triangulate industry documents, this 
research carried out sixteen semi-structured interviews with key informants 
during two fieldwork visits to South Korea between 2009 and 2010. One 
planned interview, with Korea's former US ambassador was declined by the 
interviewee for personal reasons. The interviewees consisted of tobacco 
control advocates, lawyers, academic researchers, government officials, and 
former/current employees of tobacco companies. (See Appendix A) The 
interviews provided not only crucial and detailed historical information and 
evidence in regard to the research objectives, but also creative keyword search 
terms for TID searching. 
The method of interviews was mainly informed by the work of 
Anthony Seldon, `By Word of Mouth'. (197) At an early stage of the research, 
initial fact finding interviews with tobacco control advocates, notably, the 
Korean Association of Smoking and Health (KASH) and the Youth No 
Smoking Association (YNSA), in South Korea from March to April 2008 were 
conducted in order to better understand the background to the liberalisation of 
the Korean tobacco market. This contributed towards setting up a detailed 
research plan. In addition, in order to identify other relevant interviewees for 
the official interviews, the research employed a `snowball sampling' method, 
where an interviewee subsequently identifies or recommends further 
interviewees. With this approach to sampling, Bryman suggests that initial 
interviews should be done with a small group of people who are relevant to the 
research topic and then use these to establish contact with others. (194) This 
process was significant in identifying relevant informants. 
Brief letters of introduction about the research, which included a 
consent form and a description of provisions to ensure the confidentiality of 
interviews, were sent by email to each potential interviewee beforehand. An 
interview topic guide which listed key areas for discussion with suggested 
questions (See Appendix B) was also provided beforehand to assist the selected 
interviewees to decide whether or not to participate in the interviews. 
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Consistent with accepted ethical research practice, interviewees participated in 
the interviews on a purely voluntary basis and were allowed to terminate the 
interview at any point. Once the interviewee agreed to be interviewed, a date, 
suitable to the interviewee, was confirmed and the interview was carried out at 
a location convenient for the interviewee. 
All the interviews were carried out in Korean by the researcher. Only 
a few interviewees permitted their interviews to be digitally recorded, while 
others were recorded by hand by the researcher. Government officials 
working in the Ministry of Finance (MOF), in particular, declined the digital 
recording of the interviews and did not even allow face to face interviews. 
Thus, these were conducted by telephone. Similarly, the tobacco industry 
interviewees did not consent to any recording during interviews, although did 
agree to be interviewed in person. 
All interviews (recordings and hand-writing notes) were transcribed by 
the researcher on the same day. The interview scripts were then translated 
from Korean into English by the researcher, who was aware of the need to 
carefully carry out the process of transcription, translation, and interpretation. 
Given the time consuming process of translation, the researcher initially 
removed information which was irrelevant to the research topic, such as 
greetings and general conversations, from the Korean interview scripts before 
translating them into English. The completed English interview scripts were 
then passed on to the supervisors for third party review and analysed 
thematically. Third party review in the form of discussions with supervisors 
about the meaning of interview responses was an important device to improve 
the validity and reliability of interpretation. The analysis was conducted 
manually, involving an iterative process of reading and re-reading the 
transcripts, discussing them with the supervisors and triangulating with tobacco 
industry document data. A particular challenge was posed by those 
interviews where the respondent did not allow the interview to be recorded. 
In these cases, notes of the interview were carefully discussed with supervisors 
before forming a view about how the material could be used. Whether 
recorded or not, care was taken not to accept the veracity of interview 
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respondents' statements at face value, but to interpret these in the context of the 
respondent's position and interests. When interpreting interviews, reference 
was continually made to the documents and to other contextual secondary 
sources to check whether there was corroborating evidence and whether 
interview responses were consistent with these other sources. 
In order to carry out semi-structured interviews, the research required 
ethics approval from the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine's 
Ethics Committee. This was granted on 25th March 2009 prior to conducting 
interviews. (Appendix C) 
Figure 4.4: The semi-structured interview process 
Step 1 Initial informal interviews with tobacco control advocates 
1 
Step 2 Tobacco control advocates introduce important interviewees of public 
officials, tobacco company personnel and other tobacco control 
advocates (Snowball sampling) 
1 
Step 3 Conduct official interviews with all interviewees 
1 
Step 4 Transcribe digitally recorded and hand-written interviews and 
translate Korean scripts into English 
1 Step 5 Interpret and analyse the English scripts 
(Third party review was employed. ) 
It Step 6 Triangulate the results of interviews with TIDs and additional 
primary and secondary data 
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4.4 Analysis of additional primary and secondary sources 
Additional primary and secondary sources, identified via the literature 
review and interviews with key informants, were analysed in order to create 
keyword search terms for searching TIDs, provide important contextual 
background for industry document analysis, and aid in the construction of an 
historical, chronological, and thematic narrative of retrieved data. 
Literature related to the global tobacco industry, and the Korean 
tobacco industry, was reviewed. This literature was collected from published 
books, newspaper/magazines, and internet websites (www. tobacco. org, 
www. globalink. org, and www. kash. or. kr ). Additional data, specific to the 
tobacco sector, such as the US Department of Agriculture website 
(http: //www. usda. gov) and Euromonitor, was also analysed. 
Key informants provided further both unpublished and published 
documents. For example, regulations or laws on tobacco control and the 
tobacco business, statistical data of the Korean tobacco industry, such as 
cigarette consumption and market share of foreign/domestic companies, and 
marketing expenses of the domestic tobacco companies, were obtained from 
these sources. 
During fieldwork in Korea, in order to fully understand the context of 
the Korean tobacco industry before and after market liberalisation, local 
Korean newspapers, Korean and English language, dating between 1984 and 
1990, were searched at the Korean National Library. A total of seven of 
Korea's leading newspapers, notably, Chosun-Ilbo, Joongang Daily, Donga- 
Ilbo, Hankook-Ilbo, Keunghang-Shinmoon, Seoul-Shinmoon, and Hankook 
Economic-Shinmoon, and one English newspaper, Korean Herald were 
searched by using keywords, such as "imported cigarettes", "liberalisation of 
cigarette market", and so on. The resultant news articles provided historical, 
political, and economic background on the Korean tobacco market, and 
important context for understanding industry document. As a result of 
searching the keyword, more than 400 news articles were collected, including 
approximately 60 articles, containing crucial secondary data. These were 
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sorted and organised by research themes. The articles were analysed and 
triangulated with TIDs and other data sources. 
In order to understand the impact of liberalisation on the Korean 
tobacco industry, Korean government documents were collected by searching 
the National Archives of Korea (http: //www. archives. go. kr/) using similar 
keywords applied to TID searching. Additionally, tobacco industry 
publications, notably Tobacco Reporter and Tobacco Journal International 
and World Tobacco, provided valuable sources of information on industry 
developments, and industry reports, news and companies' websites, such as 
PM Korea (http: //www_philipmorrisinternational. com/KR/pa eg s/kor/) , BAT 
Korea (www. batkorea. com) and KT&G13 (www. ktng. com) were also used to 
understand TTCs' current activities. The KASH and YNSA provided 
relevant official/unofficial documents and data relevant to the analysis of 
tobacco companies' past and present marketing activities, including KT&G's 
market strategies, and to identifying the impact of TTCs market access on the 
domestic tobacco industry. 
Overall, the additional primary and secondary data obtained from the 
above sources were used to supplement, strengthen, contextualise and 
triangulate the primary data source from the TIDs. 
4.5 Caveats 
It is recognised that the research needed to address four caveats. First, 
the tobacco industry in South Korea has been one of the major sources of 
revenue for the local governments. For this reason, the Korean government 
has maintained a close and positive relationship with the industry. This link 
between industry and government posed an obstacle to data collection related 
to the tobacco industry and certain government officials, especially from the 
MOF, which used to control the tobacco monopoly. 
13 KT&G is the privatised current tobacco company in South Korea, which stands for Korea 
Tomorrow and Global. It used to be monopolised by the Korean government. 
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Second, undertaking research on TIDs involve various limitations and 
difficulties. (119) The documents released to the public so far are not the 
comprehensive records of the industry, only those requested by plaintiffs 
during the discovery process for selected litigation purposes. Moreover, 
tobacco companies have used a variety of tactics to try to limit access to their 
internal documents. Tobacco companies have, for example, been accused of 
withholding documents, abusing privilege claims, alternating the contents, and 
destroying evidence. (156,190,198-200) As such, it is often described as 
"hostile" archive, collected and disseminated through legal obligation and 
public health advocacy. In addition, the conditions of access to the on-site 
depositories set by BAT, in particular, have been widely criticised as unduly 
difficult and in violation of the spirit of the original Minnesota legal settlement. 
In order to mitigate the problem of access at on-site the document depositories, 
the research utilised document websites operated independently of the tobacco 
industry. Available documents from the TID websites remain an incomplete 
and imperfect record, and are searched and interpreted with this understanding. 
The triangulation of TIDs with additional sources has enabled the researcher to 
achieve a fuller, if not comprehensive, knowledge of tobacco industry activity. 
Third, in order to fully understand the impact of TTCs' market access 
on the domestic tobacco industry in Korea, the research required evidence of 
contemporary marketing strategies of the largest domestic tobacco company, 
KT&G. Recent marketing tactics of domestic tobacco companies are 
becoming more sophisticated and often employ indirect methods. However, it 
is not possible to access the internal documents of KT&G. To address this 
problem, semi-structured interviews were conducted, and other primary and 
secondary sources were used, such as industry or company websites and 
industry publications. It is recognised that information on Korean companies 
is far more limited. 
Finally, the currently available data on tobacco use related to public 
health impact in South Korea was insufficient to establish a firm relationship 
between public health outcomes and TTCs strategies on market access and 
expansion, however likely this might be. Given the limited nature of Korean 
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data on tobacco use, over time both before and after market liberalisation, and 
by specific population cohort, available data was used indicatively to 
understand broad trends and to triangulate findings from other data sources. 
What the thesis does clearly establish, however, is the impact of TTC entry into 
the Korean market in terms of substantially increasing competition, aggressive 
marketing of tobacco products and attempts to circumvent tobacco control 
regulations by tobacco companies. These factors were highly likely to have 
led to increased tobacco consumption and thus to negative health effects 
greater than would otherwise have been the case. 
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CHAPTER 5 MARKET ENTRY STRATEGY PART 1: 
GAINING ACCESS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter and Chapter 6 address the second objective of the 
research, namely to analyse, respectively, transnational tobacco companies' 
(TTCs) strategies and activities to gain access to the South Korean market in 
the 1980s, and TTCs' marketing tactics and behaviours to create demand and 
build awareness for their brands among the Korean population after market 
liberalisation. 
This chapter will, first, briefly describe the history of tobacco use and 
the tobacco industry in South Korea before market liberalisation, including 
how tobacco was introduced to Korea, how it spread throughout the country, 
and how the tobacco industry has transformed and evolved. Second, the 
reasons why the US-based TTCs targeted the Korean market, as a new market 
in the 1980s, will be described. Third, the chapter will discuss the barriers to 
TTCs' market access before and after market liberalisation. Finally, the 
chapter will discuss the detailed strategies TTCs utilised, to gain access to the 
Korean market, and analyse TTCs' behaviour in relation to the Korean 
economic development model and resultant regulatory regimes. 
This chapter focuses on the key players attempting to gain a foothold 
in the Korean market in the mid 1980s, notably Philip Morris (PM), R. J. 
Reynolds (RJR) and Brown & Williamson (B&W) which is British American 
Tobacco's US subsidiary. British American Tobacco (BAT) planned create 
opportunities to export its brands to the Korean market alongside other Asian 
countries, including Japan, China, and Taiwan, but the company began 
focusing on these markets only after 1988 when the Korean market had already 
been opened by the activities of US-based TTCs. (201) 
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5.2 The Korean tobacco industry before market liberalisation 
Tobacco originally arrived in Korea with the Japanese invasion of 
1592. Within 20 years, tobacco use had spread throughout the entire country, 
far more rapidly than, for example, cotton, which came from China and took 
100 years to become widespread in Korea. (202,203) How fast tobacco 
spread historically in Korea is well described. Jang Yu, who was an official 
in the council of state during the reign of King Injo, smoked even in the royal 
meetings, and said in his book written in 1635, "In Korea, people first smoked 
tobacco 20 years ago, but now everybody, from high officials to errand boys, 
smoke it". He predicted that "within 100 years, tobacco will compete against 
tea in the market". (202) In 1668, Dutchman Hendrick Hamel, the first 
westerner to write about Korea, wrote: "Tobacco in Korea is so common and 
even children start smoking when they reach 4 or 5 years of age". (204) 
In the early twentieth century, at the end of the Chosun Dynasty, the 
last kingdom in Korea from 1393 to 1910, the Monopoly Bureau was 
established. The Bureau began managing and controlling the tobacco 
industry, with revenues going to the Treasury. (205) Tobacco in South Korea 
has remained a leading and important industry for the Korean economy even 
since. In 1952, the Office of Monopoly (OOM), an independent government 
division under the Ministry of Finance (MOF), was established to strictly 
control 100 percent of the domestic tobacco industry, including manufacture, 
distribution, sale, and import/export. (205,206) The OOM continually 
encouraged heavy investment in tobacco farming and manufacturing to help 
build post-war economic recovery, by contributing to the Treasury through 
cigarette taxes. The government offered incentives to tobacco farmers to 
practice good husbandry and minimise the production of low quality leaf. For 
example, in the 1970s farmers received a 20 percent average increase in the 
purchase price of tobacco leaf from the government. Other government 
support to farmers, such as fertilizers, seeds, chemicals, and materials for 
drying sheds also helped increase yields an average of 20 percent annually. 
These government efforts, to improve tobacco leaf quality were not just for 
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increasing domestic tobacco use. The policy was intended to increase exports 
as part of the state's export-oriented economic development model. (205) 
The export of tobacco leaf in earnest began in the 1970s and, in order 
to increase volume, the OOM set the basic guidelines for tobacco production 
to: (a) raise the quality of tobacco leaf to international levels; (b) elevate the 
technology for cigarette manufacture, and (c) maximise the efficiency of 
management for higher productivity. As a result, cigarette exports rose by 30 
percent annually from 1967 to 1978. (205) South Korea also exported tobacco 
leaf. From 1985 onwards, South Korea exported tobacco leaf which was 
valued at US$91.4 million, almost 40 percent of the total crop, while the total 
amount of imports was only worth US$5.9 million. (207) The OOM also 
exported manufactured cigarettes in the 1980s but, given the lower quality 
compared to international brands, cigarette exports by the Monopoly were 
limited in this period. (See Table 5.1) 
Meanwhile, the OOM, which under government regulations was the 
only company able to import foreign cigarettes for resale, annually imported 
200 million sticks of foreign cigarettes worth about US$2 million mainly from 
the US, the UK, and Japan in order to supply the US soldiers based in Korea, 
and for foreigners. (208,209) (See Table 5.1) The reason why imports of 
foreign cigarettes in Korea were low, and provided only to foreigners, was that, 
before market liberalisation, the Korean people were not allowed to smoke, or 
even possess, foreign cigarettes under the Tobacco Monopoly Act (TMA) 
(1972, as amended). 
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Table 5.1: Exports and imports of tobacco leaf and cigarettes, 1981 to 
1985 
Tobacco leaf 
Year Output Export Import 
Quantity Quantity Value Quantity Value 
(metric tons) (metric tons) (US$ mil. ) (metric tons) (US$ mil. ) 
1981 86,997 37,868 100.4 12,621 68.8 
1982 115,173 31,610 104.9 3,900 15.6 
1983 100,677 32,843 108.9 2,212 7.2 
1984 94,172 30,009 100.4 2,800 9.6 
1985 75,679 28,954 91.4 1,040 5.9 
Cigarette 
Year Production Export import 
Million sticks Value (US$ mil. ) Value (US$ mil. ) 
1981 72,713 5.2 1.9 
1982 71,786 10.0 2.6 
1983 75,519 11.3 2.5 
1984 78,167 9.0 1.4 
1985 75,550 6.5 1.7 
Source: Kim JH. The Korean Tobacco Market. 29 Aug 1986. Philip Morris. Bats No. 
2500001861-98 (Available at http: //legacy_librarv. ucsf. edu/tid/clzO9e00) 
How and why was this unique criminal sanction introduced in Korea? 
An interview with a former OOM manager (Anonymous 1), who had worked 
for the OOM since 1967, suggested that it was linked to the export-oriented 
economic development model pursued by General Jung Hee Park, President of 
Korea following the military coup in 1961. This strategy sought to save 
foreign currency in order to invest in core domestic industries and to expand 
the country's exports. As part of this policy, President Park generally 
discouraged people from using foreign products and, in particular, prohibited 
people from the consumption of foreign cigarettes. Park believed that smoking 
foreign cigarettes had a negative impact on the country's trade surplus and 
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economic development. Thus, Article 49 of the TMA (1972) made smoking, 
and even possession of foreign cigarettes, a criminal offence. If a person 
broke the law, he or she had to pay a fine of 1 million won (about US$800) or 
be sentenced to up to 10 years in prison. In order to effectively control illegal 
use and possession of foreign cigarettes, the OOM installed a special 
surveillance department under the MOF, and authorised surveillance officers to 
work within this jurisdiction. (210) This included enforced surveillance to 
prevent smuggling of foreign cigarettes, which mainly came from US military 
bases in Korea. 
Despite these restrictions, unauthorised use of foreign cigarettes was 
common given their better quality and richer flavour compared to domestic 
cigarettes. In addition, foreign cigarettes were often given as gifts after 
travelling abroad, such as for Korea's gift giving seasons, especially for the 
higher socioeconomic classes. Cigarette smuggling from the US military 
bases was thus consequently widespread. A newspaper article explains how 
foreign cigarettes have been illegally traded, and describes the experiences of a 
surveillance officer who was about to retire from his position in the OOM: 
Lee's record of crackdown on illegal possession and smoking of 
foreign cigarettes reached more than 5,000 cases. ... 
The Park regime 
strictly controlled supply and consumption of unauthorised foreign 
cigarettes. As a result, smuggled foreign cigarettes, mainly from the 
US military bases in Korea, were privately used. Since then, foreign 
cigarette squads in the OOM have been busy. ... The ways of 
delivering foreign cigarettes to Korean consumers were getting 
smarter. The smugglers used children for foreign cigarette delivery. 
Sometimes, females pretended to be mothers-to-be by fastening 
smuggled cigarettes to their bellies. ... Lee was an expert when it came 
to finding out who was smoking foreign cigarettes. Once he looked at 
smoke or smelled it, he was able to distinguish whether smokers 
smoked foreign cigarettes or domestic ones. (211) 
Given government policy to develop and support the tobacco industry, 
as a leading source of tax and export revenues in the country, and the country's 
subsequent rapid economic development after the Korean War, by 1977 South 
Korea ranked eighth for tobacco production, ninth for tobacco exports (tobacco 
leaf), and fifteenth for cigarette production in international comparison. (205) 
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The OOM's profits grew in parallel with expanding cigarette sales in the 
domestic market, increasing around 11 times during a 10-year period, from 
US$180 million in 1971 to US$2 billion in 1981. (19,206) Domestic sales of 
tobacco products accounted for 93 percent of the OOM's total revenue. 
Concomitant with the rapid increase of cigarette sales, the OOM's contribution 
to the National Tax Revenue also increased. The amount transferred to the 
National Treasury was 6.1 percent of the government's total revenue in 1972, 
increasing to about 8.7 percent by 1986. (207) The former OOM manager 
stated when interviewed (Anonymous 1) that Korea's tobacco industry was the 
engine to cope with the country's destroyed economy after the Korean War. 
The tax contribution of the tobacco industry to the National Revenue just after 
the War was more than 10 percent, thus, the government steadily focused on, 
and invested in, the industry. He added that, when the cigarette tax was 
transformed from national tax to a local tax in 1989 after market liberalisation, 
local governments continually and more aggressively supported the industry. 
The economic value of the industry has subsequently been high bringing 
enormous investment in the industry from both central and local 
governments. (Anonymous 1) 
5.3 Barriers protecting the tobacco industry before market 
liberalisation 
As described in Chapter 3, the Korean government adopted an export- 
oriented development model from 1961 onwards. The government focused 
on, and invested in, manufacturing industries to export more products to 
Western and European countries. (212) As part of this development model, 
the OOM attempted to expand exports of domestically produced cigarettes, 
while the government strictly controlled imports by applying various 
regulatory barriers. This was part of government policy to protect core 
domestic industries until they were believed capable of competing in the world 
market. Four types of trade barrier provided the tobacco industry with 
significant protection from international competition. 
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First, the OOM completely monopolised cigarette manufacturing, 
distribution, and sales under the TMA (1972). Under the Act, only companies 
which were licensed by the OOM, or the OOM itself, could import, distribute, 
and sell foreign cigarettes. (213) This was an extremely effective barrier 
against foreign competition. 
Second, as discussed in Section 5.2, it was a criminal offense for 
Korean nationals to sell, buy, possess, or smoke foreign cigarettes. (213-216) 
Korean people were expected to smoke only domestically produced cigarettes. 
Robert Bockman, the Director of Corporate Affairs for PM Asia reported in 
1983 that there were more than 5,000 violation incidents and fines equivalent 
to US$800,000. Bockman also complained to the US Department of 
Commerce in 1984 that this criminal offense was a significant barrier to free 
trade. (217) 
Third, a tariff of 100 percent ad valorem duty 14 was applied to 
imported cigarettes. (206,218) Although the OOM had a monopoly in the 
tobacco market, and it was illegal for Korean people to buy or smoke foreign 
cigarettes, the tariff on foreign cigarettes was needed, because, as mentioned 
previously, the OOM imported foreign cigarettes for the US military and 
particular shops, such as hotels, only to be consumed by foreigners. 
Finally, the importation of US-grown tobacco leaf, which was 
formerly available, was prohibited after 1980. (215,218) According to a US 
Department of Agriculture publication in February 1989, titled "World 
Tobacco Situation", the Korean government had stopped imports of US-grown 
tobacco leaf from 1981: 
As recently as 1980, US exported 6,155 metric tons of unmanufactured 
leaf tobacco to South Korea, valued at US$45.3 million. Yet, through 
the early to mid-1980s, U. S. leaf exports to Korea sagged, in fact, they 
fell to zero in 1983 as Korea pursued a policy of self-sufficiency in 
tobacco production and utilization. (215) 
14 Ad valorem duties of customs are duties levied according to the value of goods and are 
usually expressed as percentages of value. Such duties are distinct from specific duties that 
are based on specific measures of goods such as number, weight, volume, area, capacity etc. 
97 
According to the interview with the former OOM manager (Anonymous 1), the 
reason for this change was to save foreign currency. After President Park's 
assassination, exports of goods decreased and foreign debts mounted. (134) 
(Anonymous 1) Under the downward trend of economic development, 
Korea's next President, Do Hwan Chun introduced this prohibition of imported 
US tobacco leaf. In an effort to decrease foreign debt, the Chun regime 
intensively focused attention on trade protection in all industries, including the 
tobacco industry. (Anonymous 1) As shown in Table 5.1 above, imports of 
tobacco leaf from 1981 to 1985 sharply decreased. 
5.4 A "home run" market: TTCs' interests and opportunities 
in the Korean market 
As discussed in Chapter 2, declining tobacco sales in the US domestic 
market since the 1960s, and in established markets in North America and 
Europe since the 1970s, have led TTCs to seek new markets abroad. After 
successfully expanding into Latin American markets during the 1960s and 
1970s, TTCs' strategic focus moved to Asian countries during the 1980s. (4) 
A 1987 B&W document, used in an operational planning meeting, 
describes the Korean tobacco market as one of the "home run" Asian markets, 
along with Japan, Taiwan, and China for their leading brand, Capri, in the 
future. (219) Previous analyses indicate that TTCs' interest in Asian 
markets in the 1980s centred on the enormous scope for growth of cigarette 
sales, given their rapidly growing economies, large populations, and high 
cigarette consumption. (6,8,62,126,220) A "Home Run" market was thus 
defined as a market with `very significant volume and share growth 
opportunity', which must therefore be supported. (219) 
What specific merits did the South Korean market have from TTCs' 
perspective? First, South Korea was a sizeable market with an annual 
cigarette consumption volume of 80-85 billion sticks in the mid-1980s (221), 
ranked 12th in the world tobacco market. (See Table 5.2) In 1984, the 
country was the 6h largest leaf exporter in the world and among the 15 largest 
tobacco leaf producers in the world. (210) In particular, the high 
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consumption of cigarettes among Korean males was an obvious attraction for 
TTCs, as was confirmed in an interview with a former Korea Tobacco 
Ginseng and Corporation (KTGC) executive (Anonymous 3). According to 
the Korea Association of Smoking and Health (KASH), the smoking rate 
among Korea's adult males aged over 20 was 71.2 percent in 1985. (12) This 
was relatively high compared to other developed countries, such as the UK 
and the US at the time, where cigarette sales were declining. The smoking 
prevalence of male adults in the US and the UK steadily declined due to the 
strengthening of the tobacco control movement and increasing health 
concerns. The rate in the UK in 1985 was 35.8 percent for adult males and 
31.5 percent for adult females. (222) The rate in the US was 30.8 percent for 
adult males and 25.7 percent for adult females in 1988. (223) However, the 
smoking rate among Korean adult females was only 8 percent in 1985. (12) 
This contrasting situation of prevalence between high male, and low female, 
smoking offered opportunities to TTCs. Whilst the country had one of the 
world's highest male smoking rates and was recognised as a huge established 
tobacco market, at the same time, the lower female smoking rate offered 
future opportunities for growth. (224) 
Table 5.2: World cigarette consumption and production in 1987 (Billion 
sticks of cigarettes) 
The biggest cigarette consumers 
1 China 1,452 
2 United States 575 
3 Soviet Union 464 
4 Japan 295 
5 Brazil 161 
6 West Germany 124 
7 Indonesia 112 
8 Poland 103 
9 Italy 98 
10 United Kingdom 95 
11 France 94 
12 South Korea 82 
The biggest cigarette producers 
1 China 1,441 
2 United States 689 
3 Soviet Union 390 
4 Japan 266 
5 West Germany 163 
6 Brazil 161 
7 Indonesia 115 
8 United Kingdom 114 
9 Poland 99 
10 Bulgaria 92 
11 South Korea 81 
12 Spain 80 
Source: US Department of Agriculture (Available at 
http: //www. usda. gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome, accessed I0i° May 2009) 
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Second, it was anticipated that the tobacco market in South Korea 
would grow very fast. A PM 1985 internal document entitled `Korea's 
restrictive cigarette trade polices: a multi-million dollar loss to U. S. leaf 
producers', addresses future opportunities in the Korean market between 1985 
and 1990. The document stresses the importance of the Korean market for 
US-based TTCs: 
The Foreign Agricultural Service of the US Department of Agriculture 
has forecasted growth to 91.9 billion units in Korean cigarette 
consumption in the year 1990. Such a growth rate, roughly 2% per 
year, would place Korea among the fastest growing markets in the 
world. (210) 
However, US leaf producers as well as cigarette manufacturers were 
losing potential profits as a result of Korea's restrictive tobacco trade policies, 
as illustrated by the estimates in the following passage of the document: 
Between 1970 and 1984, the demand for cigarettes, in the Republic of 
Korea, doubled from 39.6 billion units to about 76.2 billion (Appendix 
Table B). Total Korean cigarette consumption during this period 
amounted to 891.6 billion units. Due to restrictive and prohibitive 
trade practices, total cigarette imports from the U. S., during this period, 
amounted to 1.4 billion units, all of which were consumed by foreign 
residents. ... 
If the U. S. cigarette exporter had captured 15% of the 
domestic Korean cigarette market during the period 1975-84, U. S. leaf 
producers would have sold an additional 130 million pounds of leaf 
tobacco (fs. w. [farm sales weight] equivalent) valued, at auction (that 
is, to the grower), at $183 million. ... Similarly, if U. S. cigarette 
exporters captured 25% of the domestic Korean cigarette market, U. S. 
leaf producers would have sold an additional 216 million pounds (f s. w. 
equivalent) worth $305.4 million to the leaf producer. (210) 
According to this calculation, the document concluded that if South 
Korea opened the tobacco market between 1985 and 1990, "As the least cost 
cigarette maker and the highest quality leaf producer, the U. S. has the most to 
gain from a liberalization of the Korean cigarette and tobacco market". (210) 
Similarly, other US-based international tobacco companies also 
predicted that if the Korean market was liberalised, the domestic tobacco 
company would import not only US manufactured cigarettes, but also US high 
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quality unmanufactured tobacco leaf. To compete with relatively higher 
quality cigarettes manufactured in the US, the Korean domestic brands would 
also need to use US high quality tobacco leaf. Because there was a limited 
amount of high quality tobacco leaf in Korea, due to a lack of technology, 
TTCs saw potential profits by exporting both manufactured cigarettes and 
unmanufactured tobacco leaf to the country. (218,225,226) One US 
Cigarette Export Association (USCEA) progress reports argued that US 
tobacco farmers would benefit from an increase of cigarette exports to Korea, 
forecasting that `the benefits would increase with increased competition in fair 
trade settings'. (227) In fact, according to a General Accounting Office 
(GAO) study, about 55 percent of the increase in US tobacco production was 
attributed to imports of US cigarettes by Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. 
The US produced 64 billion cigarettes in 1986, before gaining access to East 
Asian markets, but after acquiring a foothold in Japan, Taiwan, and South 
Korea, this more than doubled to 142 billion in 1989. (227) This extra- 
ordinary increase in US cigarette production indicates how important 
penetration of East Asian markets was to TTCs. As noted in 1990 by the US 
Agriculture Secretary, Clayton Yeutter: 
The local tobacco monopolies (in Japan, Taiwan and South Korea) 
responded to new market challenges by importing more American 
burley and flue-cured tobacco to improve the quality of their own 
products. As a consequence, we are now selling more leaf tobacco 
than previously, as well as more of the value-added product, cigarettes. 
(227) 
In 1988, the expectation of these increased sales was widely used to gain 
support for market liberalisation from US Senators and Congressmen from the 
tobacco growing states. (216,228) 
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5.5 Market access strategies by TTCs 
TTCs' initial efforts to enter the Korean market involved attempts to 
agree joint ventures (JVs) with the Korean government in the early 1980s. 
However, when these were unsuccessful, they turned their efforts towards 
lobbying for trade liberalisation. 
5.5.1 Joint ventures and licensing agreements 
The establishment of JVs was one of the key strategies used by TTCs 
to access the Vietnamese market in the 1990s. (88) Similarly, some of the US- 
based TTCs attempted to agree JVs as a means of gaining access to the South 
Korean market in the early 1980s. (229,230) RJR and PM both pursued a JV 
or a licensing agreement with the OOM to gain a foothold in the market, hiring 
lobbying agents to meet with senior government officials in Korea to discuss 
possible commercial ventures. (221,231) 
PM's five year plan for 1981 to 1985 recommended that the company 
"[w]ork towards concluding a licensee agreement with the Korean monopoly" 
to gain access to the market. The document outlined the tactics to be used to 
achieve this: 
Initial contacts with the monopoly have been encouraging. We will 
build on this favourable early association by discussing matters of 
mutual interest, particularly in the area of technology and the potential 
for one of our international trademarks. We hope to conclude an 
agreement by the end of 1981. (232) 
Following the strategic plans, the company initially attempted to obtain a 
licensing agreement with the Monopoly but, when this failed, the development 
of a joint brand with the OOM was proposed. (233) A 1989 PM document 
titled "Negotiations with Korean Monopoly" described the company's efforts 
to access the Korean market from 1980 by using licensing agreements and JVs: 
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1980 PM submits proposal to Korean Monopoly Office (KMO) 
for a license agreement. 
1981 PM re-submits proposal to KMO 
1983 PM proposes joint brand with KMO. 
1984 PM sends Korean Embassy background information on the 
Marlboro License Agreement with Japan 
1985 PM presents joint venture proposed [proposal] to KMO. 
1986 Letter from PM to Finance Minister of Korea, offering a new 
joint venture proposal to the KMO (233) 
A 1989 RJR document responding to the GAO's investigation of 
TTCs' expansion in Asian markets also notes the company's efforts to gain 
access to the Korean market via a JV: 
In the early to mid 1980's, RJR pursued various strategies and 
proposals to open the Korean market to RJR products. These included, 
among other things, proposals for access via import licensing or a joint 
venture. (234) 
However, these approaches by RJR and PM were generally unsuccessful. (235) 
As the RJR document concludes, "All proposals were ignored or rejected by 
the Korean government". (234) In the mid 1980s, following the failure of 
negotiations for JVs with the OOM, the consulting arrangements on this issue 
between lobbying agencies and PM/RJR were terminated. (10) One possible 
reason why the Korean government strongly resisted JVs/licensing agreements 
with the US tobacco companies was explained by the former OOM manager 
(Anonymous 1) during interview: 
I was not involved in the issue of JV agreements with foreign companies 
when I worked for OOM. However, I assume that the refusal of the 
Korean government to make JV agreements with the US tobacco 
companies was an absolutely natural outcome. As I know, there was 
no regulation prohibiting JV agreements between domestic and foreign 
companies under the law. Then why did the government reject US 
tobacco companies' suggestion? The reason was that the top priority 
in the government economic policies was saving foreign currency at 
that time. Signing JVs with foreign companies would result in a huge 
outflow of foreign currency for brand loyalties, thus the government did 
not allow the monopoly company to sign JV agreements with the US- 
based tobacco companies. (Anonymous 1) 
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This view is consistent with the Korean government's development approach at 
the time, which was generally resistant to foreign investment, including 
through JVs or licensing agreements. 
5.5.2 Trade lobbying 
After the failure of the initial approaches on JVs and licensing 
agreements, TTCs turned their market access strategy towards lobbying the US 
government to exert pressure on the Korean government for trade liberalisation. 
An RJR performance record emphasised: "continue to increase market access 
in monopoly markets (Korea, Thailand, Taiwan); utilizing US Government 
support where needed". (236) 
Some particular features of South Korea favoured the new strategy. 
First, South Korea was only one of four Asian countries along with Japan, 
Taiwan, and Thailand which controlled their tobacco industry by a monopoly 
system. (237) Second, as discussed in Section 5.3, a number of barriers to 
foreign participation in the Korean market were in place prior to 
liberalisation. (238) Third, the overall trade surplus of South Korea with the 
US was extremely high in the mid to late 1980s. Three countries, South 
Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, accounted for US$73 billion of the US$137 billion 
US trade deficit in 1988. (227) In particular, as shown in Figure 5.1, South 
Korea's trade surplus with the US sharply increased from 1982. 
Based on these factors, TTCs began to raise the issue of 
"discriminatory trade restrictions" in the Korean tobacco market with the US 
Congress and President Reagan. The opening of foreign markets to US goods 
was a priority policy for President Reagan during the mid 1980s. (239,240) 
Thus, the protection of the tobacco industry in South Korea became a good 
target for the Reagan Administration. TTCs' next approach to entering the 
Korean market therefore focused on exerting pressure on these trade issues in 
the mid- I980s. 
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Figure 5.1: Trade surplus for South Korea with the US (US$ billions) 
Source: Financial Times. World Trade News, 12 Feb 1988 
5.5.2.1 Lobbying the US government 
In order to effectively pursue an industry-wide policy on market 
liberalisation in the four targeted Asian countries (Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, 
and Thailand), the big three US-based TTCs, namely PM, RJR, and B&W, 
formed the USCEA. The USCEA was a not-for-profit corporation chartered 
in 1981 to improve the competitive position of US-produced cigarettes in 
foreign markets. The core role of the USCEA was to offer market 
information on the targeted countries to US government officials during trade 
negotiations and to lobby for the interests of the US tobacco companies. 
Towards that end, the executives of the Association frequently met with US 
government officials, usually at US embassies in the targeted countries. (10, 
229) 
In contrast to the approach with JV agreements or local production, 
during the mid-late 1980s, the USCEA actively worked on the Korean case as a 
collective representative of the US-based TTCs. It frequently contacted and 
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met with US government officials in order to argue alleged discriminatory 
practices by the Korean government. (10) In doing so, the USCEA was 
extremely successful in recruiting the Administration to its cause. 
In order to raise the Korean case as an important issue with the US 
government, PM's Richard L. Snyder, an executive officer of the company, 
asked Hamish Maxwell, the Chief Executive Officer, to mention the issue of 
the Korean tobacco market during a meeting with Vice President Bush in 
January 1985. Snyder's letter set out the potential benefits to US tobacco 
companies of opening the Korean market: 
The Korean cigarette market is a potentially lucrative one for U. S. 
cigarette exporters. Each one percent of the total market is valued at 
approximately $15 million. There is a market for U. S. exports, since 
even the Monopoly's own brands are American-style blended 
cigarettes. Increased exports would have a direct positive effect on 
the utilization of U. S. tobacco leaf Yet because of Korea's closed 
market policy, U. S. cigarette manufacturers and, consequently, U. S. 
tobacco leaf growers are denied the benefits of having access to this 
important market. (241) 
Snyder also provided recommended action for the US government to achieve 
Korea's market liberalisation: 
U. S. government officials, when discussing trade issues with the 
Republic of Korea, should impress upon the Korean government the 
importance of providing market access to a competitive U. S. 
manufactured consumer product. It is incomprehensible that U. S. 
cigarette manufacturers should be denied access to this important 
market and in fact have the usage of their product outlawed. (241) 
The US government began to exert pressure on Korea during Reagan's 
first visit to Seoul to meet Korean President Do Hwan Chun in November 1983. 
There were three summit meetings in total between Chun and Reagan. The 
first meeting was held in Washington in 1981. Once Reagan had initiated his 
presidential work, Chun officially visited him. This meeting was arranged by 
the White House Deputy Chief of Staff, Michael Deaver, who was later 
employed by PM to lobby the Korean government. At the meeting, both 
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Presidents agreed to establish the Security Consultative Meeting and the 
Economic Consultative Meeting between the two nations. Tobacco was not 
included on the agenda during this first meeting. However, the second 
summit meeting in 1983 focused on free trade, including liberalisation of the 
tobacco industry. In order to strengthen negotiations on free trade, both 
governments agreed to establish the Korea and US Economy Association 
(KUEA). (242) Through the KUEA, US and Korean officials regularly 
discussed free trade issues between the two countries. Subsequently, Chun 
visited Reagan again in 1985 to further strengthen the two countries' military 
and economic links. 
Figure 5.2: The second presidential meeting between Chun and Reagan 
in 1983 in Seoul 
Source: The Korean National Archive: Two Presidents during the second summit meeting in 
Seoul in 1983 
For the visit by Chun to Reagan in April 1985 individually, TTCs were 
eager to raise tobacco as a key topic for discussion. Each TTC and the 
USCEA collectively, lobbied US government officials, Senators, and 
Congressmen to convince President Reagan to support the industry's case. 
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Chun's visit to Washington was seen as an opportunity for TTCs to influence 
the negotiations. (214,243) In order to effectively raise the industry's case 
during the presidential meeting, TTCs began to lobby high-level US contacts in 
earnest. 
B&W's lobbying activities are well described in industry documents. 
The Senior Vice President and General Counsel in B&W, Ernest Pepples, was 
central to these lobbying activities. Additionally, Thomas Jerome Bliley Jr., 
known as Tom Bliley, the Congressman from Richmond, supported Pepples by 
connecting him with other Senators and Congressmen. In a 1985 memo titled 
"KOREA", Pepples introduced Bliley as the key person to obtain support from 
the US Congress: 
Tom Bliley, the Congressman from Richmond, was most helpful in 
obtaining support from Members of Congress for letters protesting 
Korea's discriminatory treatment of imported cigarettes. (243) 
All the Congressmen named on Bliley's letter - William Hill Bonner, James T. 
Broyhill, Dan Daniel, John Duncan, Hal Rogers, Roy Rowland, Gene Snyder 
and Lindsay Thomas - agreed to raise the issue with US government officials, 
including President Reagan. (243) Indeed, Congressmen Carroll A. Campbell 
Jr. sent a letter to directly to the President saying: 
Given the liberal trade benefits Korea receives from the United States, 
the irony of this situation is self-evident. The U. S. enjoys a 
substantially favourable worldwide balance of trade in tobacco and 
tobacco products. However, Korea is one of only a handful of 
countries where the opposite is true. I believe this issue needs to be 
addressed, and I would appreciate your assistance in raising this 
problem with President Chun Doo Hwan. (244) 
B&W's efforts to convince US Senators were supported by Senator 
Mitch McConnell. Ernest Pepples believed that Senator McConnell would 
send protest letters regarding the closed Korean tobacco market to other 
Senators, including Mark Andrews, Wendell H. Ford, Ernest F. Hollings, Bob 
Packwood, Paul S. Trible, Jr., Jesse Helms, John P. East, Mack Mattingly, and 
John Warner. (243) Later, these ten Senators sent a co-authored letter to 
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President Reagan emphasising that the issue of Korea's discriminatory barriers 
against US cigarettes had to be the priority issue of the list of trade matters 
when the two Presidents met in Washington on 24th - 27th April 1985: 
The methods used to prevent U. S. access to the Republic of Korea's 
tobacco market are not as crude as an outright ban on importation, 
but through a 100 percent ad valorem tax tariff barrier and such non- 
tariff barriers as civil and criminal sanctions against Korean nationals 
possessing cigarettes of American manufacture, a state tobacco 
distribution and wholesale monopoly, and restrictions against the 
importation of quality US. grown leaf tobacco. ... We would hope that 
some form of an "agreement in principle " could be reached during the 
President of the Republic of Korea's visit. This `agreement' could 
allow for more US. leaf imports, increase retail outlets for American 
cigarettes in, say, larger metropolitan areas, and a relaxing of 
sanctions against the possession of American cigarettes. (214) 
Senator Jesse Helms, in his role as Chairman of the Senate Committee 
on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, also sent a letter to President Reagan 
on 11`h April 1985 to urge the following: 
An agreement in principle regarding Korean imports of US leaf 
products: Relaxing of Korean laws against possession of US cigarettes 
by Korean citizens; Expanding Korean retail outlets allowed to sell US 
brands; and Possible (sic) joint ventures or license arrangements 
allowing Korean manufacture of American brands with quality 
American leaf (245) 
Similarly, Senator Ernest F. Hollings sent a letter to the US Trade 
Representative's (USTR) Ambassador, Robert E. Lighthizer on 4t1 April 1985: 
In the light of Korea's large and growing volume of trade with this 
country, the United States is favorably positioned to insist firmly on the 
prompt beginning of a program to liberalize the unfair restrictions 
Korea now imposes on trade in tobacco products. Such a program 
commencing now and timed for full implementation to coincide with 
the opening of the Olympic Games might include: A gradual, 
substantial increase in the number of retailers licensed to sell imported 
cigarettes, particularly in Seoul and Pusan, Korea's two largest cities; 
Relaxation of the law forbidding Korean nationals from consuming or 
possessing foreign cigarettes; Consideration of licensing or joint- 
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venture arrangements for the local manufacture of foreign cigarette 
brands, which could also contribute to an increase in exports of 
Korean-made cigarettes. When President Chun Doo Hwan of South 
Korea visits you later this month, I would hope that his country's 
policies toward United States tobacco will be high on your discussion 
agenda. Since Korea is planning to showcase itself to the world as 
host of the Asian Games in 1986 and the Olympics in 1988, the time is 
propitious for pressure to be applied on Korea to begin promptly a 
liberalization of its discriminatory restrictions on the importation of 
foreign cigarettes. (235) 
Most of these letters from Senators and Congressman were sent 
directly to the President because the USTR worked under his direction and his 
agreement on any action was therefore necessary. The USTR, William E. 
Brock, subsequently responded as follows: 
I fully agree that the import licensing restrictions, the high tariffs, the 
law which prohibits Korean citizens from purchasing foreign 
cigarettes, and the limitations placed on the distribution of tobacco 
products in Korea have all worked to impede the importation of U. S. 
cigarettes. ... In the meetings with the economic officials 
accompanying President Chun this month, we plan to reiterate the 
necessityfor liberalizing trade in cigarettes. ... 
We also intend to hold 
discussions with Korean officials in May-June regarding market 
access. Our objective will be to get the Koreans to commit to begin 
liberalizing their market access restrictions. Please be assured that 
cigarettes are a top priority for these discussions. We feel strongly 
about the need for Korea to open its market, and we will press very 
hard for such liberalization. (246) 
An internal PM memo explained how important these letters were to 
the company's strategy: 
The letter is one of many elements in a program which Philip Morris is 
employing to: (1) sensitize U. S. government officials in the legislative 
and executive branch to trade barriers and trade opportunities in 
South Korea; and (2) ensure that the cigarette trade barrier issue is as 
prominent as possible during President Chun's visit later this 
month. (247) 
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5.5.2.2 Lobbying the Korean government 
While B&W sought for support from US government officials, PM 
and RJR respectively lined up strong teams of lobbyists to exert direct pressure 
on the Korean government. RJR hired Richard Allen, a former national 
security director, and PM made contact with Michelle Laxalt, daughter of 
Senator Paul Laxalt and close friend of President Reagan, and Michael Deaver, 
a former presidential deputy chief of staff. (248) 
In July 1985, Michael Deaver, asking PM to pay US$150,000 for 
lobbying President Chun, flew to Seoul. (249) In a 75 minute meeting with 
high-level officials and the President, Deaver argued a classic case of "You 
scratch my back, I'll scratch yours". By citing the protectionist textile bill's 
(250) which was introduced by Representative Ed Jenkins of Georgia, as a 
negotiation card, Deaver told President Chun that "the tobacco issue was tied 
to the Korean textile exports to US". (251) When Chun complained about the 
textile bill, Deaver said that he would help South Korea in the textile bill in 
return for the help from President Chun on tobacco, given that the key Senators 
who agreed to the textile bill were from the tobacco growing states. When a 
senior advisor of the Chun Administration subsequently requested Deaver's 
help on Jenkins's bill, Deaver agreed by saying "If you help me on the tobacco 
access issue, I will help you in [textiles]". (251,252) In doing so, Michael 
Deaver also became a lobbyist for the South Korean government, signing a 
three year contract for US$475,000 to influence White House decisions on 
Korean matters. (207) 
Michael Deaver resigned from the White House Staff in May 1985 
under investigation for corruption. Subsequently, he was investigated by the 
Office of Independent Counsel Whitney North Seymour, Jr because of 
allegations of illegal lobbying activities in May 1986. During the 
15 Ed Jenkins's textile bill pressured President Reagan to tighten textile trade far more from 
international competition to protect the US textile industry. According to the bill, US textile 
factories were being force to close. However, the US government had been strongly opposed 
to textile industry protection under the Multi-Fiber Arrangement since 1961. Reagan, who 
was leading free trade in the world market at the time, unavoidably faced pressure on his 
economic policy from Congress. 
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investigation, he lied on five counts before a congressional committee and to 
federal grand jury investigators about his lobbying activities. Deaver was 
eventually charged with perjury and false testimony on 16th December 1987 
and sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment. However, later the sentence was 
reduced to 3 years' probation and a fine of US$100,000. Deaver was also 
ordered to perform 1,500 hours of public service. (229,249,253) 
5.5.2.3 Limited liberalisation 
The Korean government adhered to the policy of restricted entry for 
foreign cigarette companies in order to save foreign currency through not 
buying imported products or paying royalties, and protecting the domestic 
tobacco industry from international competition. Its protection of a key 
national industry, and continuing opposition to foreign investment in that 
industry, was entirely in keeping with its overall development model. 
However, due to the consistent pressure from the US government since the 
presidential talks in 1985, the Chun Administration inevitably had to consider 
making concessions. 
The need to make such concessions was almost inevitable because the 
US was Korea's largest trading partner, absorbing approximately 40 percent of 
total exports worth about US$27 billion in the mid-1980s. (254) In addition, 
as shown in the previous section, US threats to restrict textile exports, which 
alongside cars was the top Korean exported good, was a tactic the Chun regime 
could not ignore. After the assassination of President Jung Hee Park in 1978, 
Korea's economy had faced a number of challenges, whilst economic aid from 
the US continually decreased. (134) Thus US pressure on textile exports was 
serious for the Chun regime. As well as depending economically on trade 
with the US, Chun also depended on military support from the Reagan 
government. (134) This was crucial given the rising tension between South 
Korea and North Korea in the 1980s, particularly following North Korea's 
112 
bombing of Rangoon in Burma 16 (currently Myanmar) in an attempt to 
assassinate President Chun in 1983 and the mid-air explosion of Korean Air 
Flight 85817 in 1987, which was believed to have been perpetrated by North 
Korean agents, (Anonymous 1 and 3) 
Following the decision to make concessions on the extent of market 
liberalisation, the MOF and the OOM considered three options that would 
minimise the impact on the Korean tobacco industry. As the first option, the 
OOM would import a fixed amount of US cigarettes annually. Second, the 
OOM would sign an agreement with the US-based TTCs for technical support. 
Finally, the OOM and the US-based TTCs could sign a JV or local 
manufacturing agreement. The government calculated the pros and cons of 
the three options, and carefully compared them in order to minimise the 
expected losses following liberalisation. The main criterion of the 
government's decision on the issue was how much foreign currency could be 
saved. (255) After careful consideration, the government selected the first 
option; the OOM would regularly buy a fixed amount of US manufactured 
cigarettes from July 1986. Based on the agreement, the Korean government 
16 North Korea's Rangoon bombing: In October 1983, President Chun officially visited 
Burma. On 9 October, he went to lay a wreath at the martyrs' memorial in Rangoon, which 
commemorated Thankin Aung San, founder of independent Burma. Chun's car was delayed 
by traffic, and just before he arrived, a bomb was exploded and demolished the memorial, 
killing 21 and wounding 46. The dead included the Korean foreign minister, Bum Suk Lee, 
the economic planning minister and deputy prime minister, Suk Joon Suh, and the minister for 
commerce and industry, Dong Whie Kim. The others were advisers to the president, 
journalists and security personnel. Just before the explosion, the South Korean ambassador 
had arrived in a large car. Presumably the terrorists, watching from a distance, had assumed 
that the president had arrived and the ceremony was beginning, and so detonated the bomb by 
radio. Two days later, police arrested their first suspect, who tried to blow himself up with a 
hand grenade. The same day, villagers reported two suspicious foreigners to police, and they 
were North Koreans. During the investigation, they confessed that they had been sent to 
assassinate President Chun. (Korea's Military White Paper) 
17 The mid-air explosion of the Korean Air Flight 858 in 1987: Korean Airlines Flight 858 
(KAL 858) flying from Abu Dhabi to Seoul, exploded over the sea near Burma, killing all 115 
passengers and crew members on board on 29th November 1987. It later emerged that two 
North Korean agents, Hyun-hee Kim and Sung-il Kim, had conducted the bombing mission 
upon receiving orders from their superiors to disrupt preparations for the upcoming Olympic 
Games in South Korea. The two agents posed themselves as father and daughter tourists from 
Japan, and travelled to Moscow, Budapest, Vienna, and Belgrade before arriving in Baghdad 
on 29th November. The two boarded KAL 858 with the purpose of programming the 
improvised explosive device (IED), disguised as a transistor radio to detonate after nine hours. 
Hyun-hee Kim and Sung-il Kim disembarked in order to transfer to Bahrain and the IED 
exploded as planned after nine hours over the Andaman Sea, killing all 115 passengers and 
crew. (Korea's Military White Paper) 
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removed its ban on the public sale of imported cigarettes so that Korean 
nationals could buy foreign cigarettes. (256) The fixed amount of foreign 
cigarettes the OOM agreed to buy annually was one percent of the total 
market. (257) 
After one percent of the market was opened to the US-based TTCs, 
several changes took place to tobacco-related regulation and the government 
monopoly. First, the OOM was transformed from a government division into 
a state-run corporation, Korea Monopoly Corporation (KOMOCO). In order 
to compete better with the TTCs, the newly formed company initiated a more 
market-oriented approach. Second, the criminal sanction on possession and 
use of foreign cigarettes by civilians was eliminated by revising the TMA. 
Third, cigarette advertising and product promotion were initially restricted by 
adding a new provision into the revised TMA, so that almost all forms of 
cigarette advertising were prohibited, in an attempt to restrict TTCs' 
opportunities to expand. Under Article 30 of the TMA (1987, as amended), 
mass media, printed media, public transportation, signboards, posters, public 
places, and promotional activities etc. should not be used for cigarette 
advertising. Before the limited market access, there were no provisions in the 
TMA (1972) to regulate cigarette advertising. (213) Several other changes 
were also made to the tobacco-related regulations. The detailed changes to 
the regulations following market liberalisation will be discussed further in 
Chapter 7. Finally, the duty on imported cigarettes was reduced from 100 
percent to 70 percent in July 1987 (218), and later, due to consistent complaints 
about the remaining import tariff by the US government, the tariff was reduced 
again to 50 percent in January 1988. (206,258) 
However, despite limited market liberalisation, like the OOM, the 
newly created KOMOCO continued to monopolise the domestic manufacture 
of cigarettes, as well as the distribution and sale of all cigarettes, including 
imports. Additionally, the cultivation of tobacco leaf was subject to the 
corporation's quota. KOMOCO paid compensation to farmers in the event of 
poor harvests and prepaid part of purchase expenditures in advance of actual 
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purchase in order to support tobacco farmers. The pricing of cigarettes, 
including foreign ones, was governed by presidential decrees. (259) 
5.5.2.4 TTCs press for complete liberalisation 
Although the US-based TTCs gained a small foothold in the Korean 
market with limited market liberalisation, companies doing business in Korea 
continued to complain of tariff and non-tariff barriers. (215) Moreover, 
despite the agreement to allow access to one percent of the market, imported 
cigarette sales at the retail level, in fact, accounted only for 0.06 percent of 
the total market in the first year of limited market liberalisation. TTCs 
alleged that this was due to continued discriminatory trade practices by the 
state-run corporation, KOMOCO. (257) In this context, the US government 
again pressed to the Korean government for further market opening including: 
allowing that private companies could import and sell foreign cigarettes; 
removing the remaining tariff on imported cigarettes for fair competition with 
the domestic brands in terms of price; and permitting all forms of cigarette 
advertisements. (260) In response to this request, the Korean government 
agreed to seek an acceptable agreement on tobacco market liberalisation by the 
end of 1987 during the KUEA's meeting in June 1986, and in order to achieve 
the agreement, both governments' officials met four times in 1987 and once 
again in January 1988. (261) 
Following the actions of the US government, a number of US Senators 
from the tobacco-producing states once again pursued the issue of Korea's 
trade barriers to US cigarettes. Senator John Warner (Republican politician 
and Senator from the tobacco state Virginia), who played an important role in 
the liberalisation of the tobacco market in Japan, fully supported intervention 
by the USTR on the Korean case. As in the Japanese case, he took a keen 
interest in the tobacco talks between the US and South Korea, writing several 
letters to President Chun and Korea's US Ambassador Kyung Won Kim urging 
the removal of all the remaining barriers to foreign entry to Korea's tobacco 
market, by arguing that these were discriminatory and that the Korean 
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consumer should enjoy a real choice. (216) In addition, he also warned the 
Korean government that he would support a Section 301 petition, which allows 
the USTR to initiate an investigation of the trade practices of another country, 
if talks between the two countries regarding tobacco trade issues broke down. 
He stated that "It was time for the Republic of Korea to realize that the United 
States will not sit idly by and allow unfair trade practices to continue"(216, 
261) 
Similarly, Senator Wendell H. Ford from Kentucky and Senator Jesse 
Helms from North Carolina, the US's leading tobacco-producing state, wrote a 
letter to President Chun on 14th July 1987 to urge the Korean government to 
make a commitment to open its market to the sale of more imported cigarettes. 
In the letter, the Senators argued "The Korean government simply must go 
further in removing all the restrictions that limit sales of cigarette imports in 
Korea" and claimed that "The Government of the Republic of Korea and the 
Korea Monopoly Corporation unreasonably restrict the import and sale of 
foreign cigarettes in the following ways": 
" By fixing the retail price of imported cigarettes at a prohibitively 
high level through a combination of unreasonably high tariff, 
discriminatory domestic taxes and excessive monopoly profit; 
" By magnifying the economic effect of the tariff by calculating the 
domestic taxes and monopoly profit on a price base that includes 
that import duty; 
" By imposing a I% per annum limit on import penetration; 
" By allowing only KOMOCO to import foreign cigarettes; and to 
dictate the timing, brand mix, price, and quantity of each order 
without reference to market factors; 
" By granting KOMOCO sole warehousing and distribution rights 
for foreign cigarettes, and restricting the availability of imports for 
dealer pickup; 
" By imposing an unreasonably low retail margin, which discourages 
retailers from stocking foreign cigarettes; 
" By restricting competition by banning virtually all forms of 
advertising and promotion; and 
" By restricting manufacturing, licensing, joint venture, and 
investment in the Korean tobacco industry by non-Korean private 
entities. (262) 
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At the end of the letter, the Senators urged several steps to be taken to 
completely open the market: 
" Give foreign cigarette companies or their agents the right to 
import cigarettes in Korea without any involvement of the 
Government of Korea or its instrumentalities; 
" Allow foreign cigarette companies or their agents, at their option, 
to distribute cigarettes in Korea either through the existing 
KOMOCO distribution system on a non-discriminatory or through 
an independent wholesaler network; 
" Terminate unreasonable and discriminatory import duties, internal 
taxes, and distribution charges on imported cigarettes, and set 
such charges at reasonable levels; and 
" Guarantee foreign cigarette companies the right to advertise and 
promote their products. (262) 
Later, Senator Jesse Helms again wrote a letter to President Chun on 
2lSt July 1987 and argued, in particular, that Korea's prohibitions on 
advertising and promotional activities for cigarette sales were "unreasonable 
and discriminatory actions [which] deprive US tobacco companies access to a 
cigarette market". (263) In order to further negotiation and mediation, Korea's 
US ambassador, Kim wrote back asking for more time, but Helms threatened in 
a letter co-signed by 19 other Senators that: 
[F]ailure to reach an agreement promptly on removing barriers to 
cigarette imports could seriously erode the trade relations between the 
US and Korea. (263) 
Although there were five meetings between Korea and the US on the 
tobacco issue in 1987 and 1988, they failed to reach agreement. The USCEA 
subsequently filed a petition to the USTR requesting assistance in overcoming 
the Korean government's restrictions on access by US tobacco companies on 
22nd January 1988 under Section 301. (38,264) In the petition, the USCEA 
charged that the Korean government and KOMOCO "discriminate against and 
unreasonably burden" the import and sale of US cigarettes, and argued that 
"Our experience in other major markets leads us to believe that imports of 
American cigarettes could garner 25 percent of the total Korean cigarette 
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market". (257) In the process, the USTR had 45 days to decide whether to 
initiate a formal investigation of the alleged trade barriers. 
Once notified and to avoid a USTR investigation, Korean officials 
flew to Washington and met US officials from 10th"11th February, 1988. Once 
again, dependence by South Korea on the US as its largest trading partner and 
military ally led the Korean government to agree to take action. During the 
meetings, the Korean government offered to cut the retail prices of imported 
cigarettes to 820 won (about US$1.00) in February 1988 and to 700 won (about 
US$0.80) in 1989 from the current price ranged from 1,400 won to 1,600 won, 
by cutting the duty. However, the USTR countered by requesting an 
immediate move to the lower price of 700 won for all imports, and the drastic 
improvement of marketing channels for foreign brands. (264) The 
negotiations were unsuccessful in reaching agreement so that, finally on 16`h 
February 1988, the USTR initiated an investigation and requested consultations 
with the Korean government under Section 301. When Section 301 was 
initiated, a BAT Area Manager, Coburn Ronayn (RJM) predicted that the 
Korean tobacco market would be opened soon after visiting Seoul in February 
1988: 
[T]he Koreans will bow to the threat of sanctions, particularly if these 
are aimed at two of their principal exports, i. e., electronics and motor 
cars for which at this time they would have great difficulty in finding 
alternative markets. (265) 
Basically, when any US exporter of legal products faces allegedly 
"discriminatory" foreign trade barriers, the US government can use the USTR 
for assistance in removing those barriers. The USTR's policy has been that 
when petitioned by an industry with a legally sound complaint dealing with 
unfair trade practices, it must act on the petition. The US trade policy for 
tobacco was the same as that for any other legal product. Hence, such 
assistance from the USTR was also available to the US-based TTCs. (38) On 
the USTR's involvement in TTCs' market access, the USTR's representative, 
Sandra Kristoff argued that "as long as cigarettes remain a legal commodity in 
the United States and abroad, there is no legal basis to deny cigarette 
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manufacturers assistance in gaining market access" and clearly explained the 
role of the USTR on international trade issues under the Reagan 
Administration as follows: 
This Administration's trade strategy is to open markets, so that trade 
can expand, and to negotiate a clear set of enforceable rules that will 
curb unfair trade practices that inevitably lead to controversy and a 
disruption of trade. We seek to implement our strategy in three ways. 
First and foremost, we are working very hard to achieve a successful 
conclusion on the current round of international trade talks ongoing in 
Geneva under the auspices of the GATT [General Agreement on Trade 
and Tariffs]. The second way we are implementing the President's 
trade strategy is through market-opening negotiations with our key 
trading partners. And finally, we are using our own trade laws to pry 
open markets and enforce our legitimate rights under trade 
agreements. (266) 
On May 27,1988, South Korea and the US signed a Record of 
Understanding (ROU-Appendix D), providing open, non-discriminatory access 
by US tobacco companies to the Korean market. Following the agreement, 
the USTR terminated its investigation of Section 301 on May 31,1988. (38, 
267) 
Subsequently, the Korean government initiated drafting of revised 
legislation on the tobacco industry based on the ROU. During the legislative 
process, the USTR and Korea's officials met and discussed the detailed 
provisions of the regulations, and each TTC and the USCEA collectively 
continued to work closely with the USTR to improve their opportunities in the 
newly opened market. According to a 1988 PM document, the representative 
of USTR, Kristoff told the company that "she will actively pursue our [PM's] 
interests during the interim and do so even more actively as the ROK [Republic 
of Korea) begins to draft the legislation". (268) In the letter, the author, 
Donald Nelson, Vice President of Sales Development & Training for PM, 
stressed how the company was able to help Kristoff: 
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Her experience with the intellectual property dispute 
18 [with the 
Korean government] has embittered her with respect to their drafting 
of legislation. She emphasized that she needed our help in gathering 
intelligence as that process begins. She noted that Amembassy 
Seoul has not been particularly adept in getting draft legislation, so 
our involvement in the process is critical if we are to head off bad 
provisions before they advance too far. (268) 
The result was a series of major concessions which substantially 
liberalised the Korean market. Under the ROU, which became effective on 
July 1,1988, South Korea wholly removed the import tariff on foreign 
cigarettes, increased the number of licensed retail outlets selling imported 
brands, and permitted limited cigarette advertising by revising the TMA and its 
Enforcement Ordinance in July 1988. The key changes following the ROU 
were as follows (269,270): 
a) The prices of imported cigarettes were to be determined by foreign 
cigarette manufacturers, but the companies were to notify the 
Korean MOF in advance of the retail prices as determined; 
b) Only a specific excise tax was to be levied on cigarettes. The 
excise tax was to be applied to all cigarettes, both imported and 
domestic manufactured ones; 
c) The remaining import tariff on cigarettes of 50 percent was to be 
reduced to zero percent. 
d) The government was to modify the relevant regulations to permit 
any foreign cigarette manufacturer to conduct temporary and 
permanent point of sale promotions. The modified regulations 
were to permit each foreign cigarette manufacturer to place 120 
advertisements per brand family in magazines annually; 
18 Intellectual property dispute between South Korea and the US: Before initiating Section 
301 on tobacco, the USTR had already used Section 301 petition to open the Korean insurance 
market and protect foreign intellectual property rights in Korea. As a result of that, Korea 
Intellectual Property Rights & Insurance Understandings were signed in July 1986 by both 
governments. 
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e) Any foreign cigarette manufacturer could sponsor social, cultural, 
musical, athletic, or similar events or functions, if such events did 
not specifically directly target women or youths; 
f) A health warning was to appear on each pack of cigarettes; and 
g) Cigarette samples by sticks were to be permitted at licensed retail 
outlets. 
5.6 Obstacles to market share following initial liberalisation 
Although the Korean market was formally fully opened following the 
signing of the ROU, there were still substantial social and regulatory barriers in 
the market. In particular, the hostile attitude of many Korean nationals 
towards imported US cigarettes sharply increased. 
5.6.1 Social barriers 
5.6.1.1 Public hostility following the beginning of import sales in 1986 
After the limited market liberalisation in 1986, KOMOCO licensed 
five hundred retailers to sell foreign imported cigarettes to Korean nationals. 
Tourist hotels and popular sightseeing sites were also permitted to sell 
imported cigarettes to the public and additionally retailers were temporarily 
permitted to sell imported brands near sports complexes during the 1986 Seoul 
Asian Games. (27 1) 
The MOF announced that KOMOCO imported 6 million packs of 30 
kinds of foreign cigarettes in 1986 for sale in the domestic market. However, 
in fact, only 10 brands including Kent, Kool, Lark, Marlboro, Parliament, 
Winston, Silk Cut, and More were selectively displayed in the licensed retail 
shops initially. The price per pack was in the range from 1,400 won (about 
US$1.80) to 1,600 won (US$2.00). This was relatively expensive compared 
with the domestic mainstream brand, Pine Tree, which cost only 500 won 
(US$0.60) due to the 100 percent tariff on imported cigarettes that was still in 
place at that time. (272) 
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Figure 5.3: Foreign cigarettes begin to be sold in Korea 
tioui cc il, u, dook-Llho. Inil, l>iied cigarettes start to be sold in the market from tomorrow. 31 
August 1986 
Note: An employee of the OOM delivered imported cigarettes to a retailer located in Seoul. 
When US manufactured cigarettes became available in the Korean 
market in 1986, on-going hostility towards imported cigarettes effectively 
prevented wide-spread consumer acceptance of them. (209,273) The depth of 
hostility to imported brands is illustrated by interviews for a newspaper report. 
On the first day of sales, a newly licensed retailer of imported cigarettes 
described the strong anti-imported cigarette sentiment: 
Although 1 have displayed imported brands since 6: 00 am today, I 
have not yet sold a single pack of imported cigarettes until 9: 00 am. 
This is because the consumers of domestic brands are conscious of the 
eyes of others due to patriotism and the pricy cost of the cigarettes 
also led people to not buy the imported brands (272) 
A PM employee reported the hostility towards imported cigarettes 
among the Korean people: 
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In Seoul, the Consumers Union of Korea launched a campaign urging 
Koreans to boycott foreign cigarettes..... The Korea Labor Union of 
Cigarette Manufacturers launched a "Let's not smoke foreign 
cigarettes" campaign on August 30 in the middle of city Seoul with a 
slogan "Do we need to smoke foreign cigarettes? " distributing 14,000 
leaflets.... Also the Citizen's Association ... decided to bring meetings 
beginning from August 30 in Seoul to other major cities around the 
nation to urge and educate people, mainly housewives, of their roles in 
the age of foreign cigarettes. Furthermore, 30,000 people 
demonstrated in Seoul with a slogan "Do not smoke imported 
cigarettes! " showing strong opposition to the government's ban-lift, 
and the nation's 500,000 tobacco farmers appealed to the authorities 
through their union asking protection of their possible loss of income 
because of imported cigarettes. Even nightclubs posted signs reading 
"We won't sell foreign cigarettes! ". (207) 
As the above PM report indicates, anti-US cigarette groups began to 
organise themselves through non-governmental organisations (NGOs). In 
regard to TTCs' market access, several organisations, including the Korean 
Consumer Union, the YMCA, and radical anti-government groups opposed the 
opening of the tobacco market and aggressively contributed to anti-imported 
cigarette activities. The organisations, the Association of National Tobacco 
Retailers (ANTR) and the Federation of the Tobacco Production Guild (FTPG), 
which used to have close relationships with the monopoly division, also joined 
the movement, urging smokers not to smoke imported cigarettes and arguing 
that South Korea was under a heavy burden of foreign debts. The FTPG 
which represented about 100,000 leaf tobacco farmers, expressed concerns in 
terms of the possible damage to Korea's economy of increased foreign 
debts. (207,274) The Korean Consumer Union, which embraced 560,000 
regular and associate members at the time, conducted an hour-long campaign 
in downtown Seoul to boycott US-made cigarettes. In a street demonstration, 
about 30 union members urged passersby not to buy or smoke imported 
cigarettes. They carried placards, one of which read, "Smoking imported 
cigarettes only serves to snowball foreign debts". (207,275) However, during 
this period, smoking was overwhelmingly seen as a trade and economic issue 
rather than a public health one. Activities and organisations usually urged the 
public to smoke Korean-manufactured cigarettes instead of foreign ones. 
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Figure 5.4: Mass campaigning on the street against smoking foreign 
cigarettes 
Source:. Chosun-llbo. Do not smoke foreign cigarettes. 31 August 1986. 
Note: Domestic tobacco producers, the Federation of the Tobacco Production Guild carried out 
a street education drive to appeal for consumption of locally made cigarettes. The picket 
reads "Be proud civilian by using domestic cigarettes" 
SuUilc. ; ; l,; ,, N , i. -i, 1 11 ,I1. 
Note: A harmer at liaemyong I ligh School reads; "Those who smoke imported cigarettes are 
traitors to the country" written by the principal of the school. 
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This anti-US sentiment can be explained by understanding the political 
relationship between the US President Reagan and Korea's President Chun. 
A large section of the Korean public, particularly radical students, resented the 
dependence of President Chun on the Reagan Administration (discussed in 
Chapter 3). Reagan's support for Chun legitimised the regime, despite the 
repression of Korean students and civilians demanding democracy. Reagan 
had criticised the student rising in Gwangju, `GwangJu Democratisation 
Movement', which fought against Chun's military dictatorship in May 1980, as 
an illegal riot. In this context, when Reagan visited South Korea for trade 
negotiations including tobacco in 1983, anti-US sentiment reached a peak, and 
even the US embassy in Busan was set on fire by radical students. (134) 
Internal TTC documents complained about the hostility towards 
imported cigarettes in South Korea during this initial period from 1986. A 
PM document notes that there were various forms of anti-import movements in 
the market, with massive education drives; media reports leading the anti-US 
mood; protests by radical student groups, KOMOCO workers, the retailers 
association and leaf tobacco farmers; consumer groups' domestic product use 
campaign; and a non-smoking campaign by tobacco control advocates. (276) 
5.6.1.2 Imported cigarette boycotts following the signing of the ROU 
When imported cigarettes were initially distributed in the market from 
September 1986, anti-imported cigarette sentiment was mostly led by general 
anti-US feeling, attributable to the Reagan Administration's policy on South 
Korea. (277) Furthermore, when the ROU was signed between the US and 
South Korea in 1988, the anti-US mood intensified, and imported cigarette 
boycotts were promoted with references to "Korea's Opium War" and the US 
as "the envoy of death". (278) 
The highly nationalistic local media generally contributed to anti- 
imported cigarette sentiment. From 1988 onwards, hardly a day passed when 
anti-imported cigarette news did not appear in the Korean newspapers and 
broadcast media. Most of the stories in regard to imported cigarettes were 
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designed to create a xenophobic and exclusionary climate towards foreign 
cigarettes. A BAT document describes the main themes of the Korean media 
reports on the topic of imported cigarettes: 
a) Imports constitute an "invasion" 
b) Foreign advertising, promotions and sponsorships are unfair, 
illegal and exaggerated 
c) Import tar and nicotine contents are higher than for domestic 
products and give the impression that imported products are 
"unsafe" when compared to domestic products. 
d) Non-smokers, minors and women are the main targets of foreign 
companies. 
e) Smoking Korean cigarettes benefits the country tax-wise at both the 
national and local levels. (279) 
The leading newspaper, Chosun-Ilbo, even published an article in the opinion 
section on 13`h Feb 1992 in order to convince Korean nationals not to smoke 
foreign cigarettes after the market share of TTCs grew in the early 1990s: 
It seemed like our consumer movement and market protecting 
measures are[were] experiencing some level of success in the 
beginning of market opening for foreign cigarettes. However, now 
the market share by foreign cigarettes is over 5 yo, our citizens' 
loyalties to our products are being crumbling[crumbled] down. We 
need to recreate an environment in which a smoker who is unable to 
cut smoking should at least feel ashamed of smoking foreign 
cigarette[s]. Moreover, we need to reflect upon our behaviours 
which cause harm to our national economy. (280) 
This media coverage contributed to the initiation of the US GAO's 
investigation on the marketing activities of the US-based TTCs in Asian 
markets, including South Korea. (281) Moreover, academic research also 
contributed to the anti-imported cigarette sentiment, via a project which 
analysed and compared the amount of tar and nicotine included in domestic 
and imported cigarettes. This research found that imported brands contained 
more tar and nicotine than domestic ones and this was widely reported 
throughout the country. (282) 
Furthermore, a 1991 BAT document claimed that the hostility to 
imported cigarettes among Koreans was often supported by KTGC. (283) 
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According to interviews with a former OOM manager (Anonymous 1) and a 
KTGC executive (Anonymous 3), KTGC ordered licensed cigarette retailers 
not to display imported cigarettes in their shops. Basically, under the 
regulations, the OOM was able to give orders on how to display cigarettes to 
licensed retailers, which was enforceable due to the right of OOM to permit or 
cancel the license. Although this provision in the regulations was eliminated 
following market liberalisation, KTGC still had similar powers over retailers 
because it had been committed for the right of licensing retailers by the 
MOF. (Anonymous 1 and 3) In addition, once the market was opened in 1988, 
KTGC distributed official internal documents to all retailers to inspire owners' 
patriotism, for example, designating the selling of imported cigarettes as an 
unpatriotic activity. (Anonymous 1) 
5.6.2 Regulatory barriers 
5.6.2.1 Changes to cigarette taxation 
After market liberalisation, the most serious regulatory barriers to 
TTCs, such as the 100 percent duty on imported cigarettes and the criminal 
sanction prohibiting possession and use of imports by Korean nationals, were 
removed by revising the TMA (1972). However, changes to the tax payment 
system after market liberalisation affected import sales. (38) 
Following the ROU, it was agreed that only a specific excise tax was 
to be levied on both imported and domestic manufactured cigarettes. The US 
government requested this change of the Korean government, in order to allow 
fair competition with domestic brands in terms of price. With this change, the 
cigarette tax was also transformed from a national to a local tax in 1989. The 
reason for this decision by the Korean government was the increase in property 
tax following rapid income growth in the late 1980s. To change the property 
tax from a local tax to a national tax, the government conceded cigarette 
consumption taxation to local governments. While this research finds no 
clear evidence that the Korean government revised this cigarette tax system to 
protect the domestic tobacco company from TTCs' penetration in practice this 
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caused an unexpectedly negative effect on TTCs' sales. Since this change, 
the cigarette consumption tax has provided a substantial percentage of local 
governments' tax revenue. Therefore, the economic benefit of the tobacco 
industry became deeply embedded at the local level. According to a KTGC 
report on the contribution of the cigarette consumption tax to local 
governments from 1989, the average contribution rate of cigarette tax to local 
governments in 1989 was 37.2 percent. Approximately a third of the total 
revenue for local governments came from the sale of cigarettes. (284-286) 
Additionally, according to a report from a Korean newspaper, one of the largest 
local governments, Kyonggi Province, significantly depended on the cigarette 
consumption tax, which accounted for 40 percent of its total tax revenues in 
1992. (287) Cigarette sales played an important part in the allocation of 
municipal tax revenue. Therefore, local governments aggressively 
encouraged the smoking of domestic cigarettes so as to increase their tax 
revenues. The more domestically produced cigarettes that were purchased in 
an area, the more money that area received in tax revenues. Imported 
cigarettes were only sold in the capital city of Seoul and other large cities in the 
country including Busan, Daegu, Daejun, and Incheon, thus, the local 
governments emphasised the use of domestic cigarettes. Hence, some 
consumers came to perceive consumption of foreign produced cigarettes, as 
self-indulgent, costing the local community valuable entitlements. (288) After 
these changes to the cigarette tax system, campaigns entitled "Let's smoke our 
hometown cigarettes" spread across the whole nation. An RJR, document 
complains about the harassment surrounding imported cigarette sales by local 
governments in Korea: 
Anti-Import Rally - In Kwangju a "Buy Hometown Cigarettes" rally 
was staged, organized by 12 Korean institutions, including an ROK 
government supported organization, clearly aimed at discouraging 
foreign imports rally could not have taken place without implicit 
government support . (289) 
Recently released research on Korean local governments' dependence 
on the cigarette consumption tax showed that the tax still contributed highly to 
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their revenues, ranging from 8.8 percent to 54.1 percent between 2002 and 
2003, with the average dependence of local governments on cigarette 
consumption tax at 26.4 percent during the same period. (285) 
5.6.2.2 Restrictions on cigarette advertising 
The restrictions on marketing activities in the tobacco industry also 
hindered TTCs' sales. As newly entered competitors in the market, TTCs had 
to build brand awareness, thus marketing activities including advertising and 
promotional campaigns were essential for them. Hence, as discussed above, 
during the trade negotiations, the USTR, following lobbing by TTCs, pressured 
the Korean government to allow all forms of marketing activities. 
As a result, the ROU allowed limited advertising, notably magazine 
advertising (a maximum of 120 magazine insertions per year per brand family), 
point of sales advertising (such as sampling by stick and signboards inside of 
cigarette retail shops), and sponsoring events by using the name of the 
company but not the products they sell. (290) Nevertheless, most forms of 
cigarette advertising, including broadcasting, newspapers and standing 
signboards, were banned. Indeed, a 1993 PM General Consumer Tracking 
Study emphasised the importance of advertising in the Korean market: 
"Advertising, although limited, should be used to boost the awareness and 
images of Philip Morris' imported brands". (291) 
Although some advertising was permitted, there were limitations in the 
regulations. Cigarette advertising in magazines read by youths or females 
was strictly prohibited. All cigarette packages and advertising in magazines 
had to exhibit the health warning, "Smoking can cause cancer and is especially 
hazardous to pregnant women and youth. " All point of sale materials had to 
be in the immediate vicinity of the particular sales area. Free sampling of a 
cigarette stick was tightly controlled and had to be conducted within one meter 
of retail facilities. Moreover, any events targeting youth or women were 
banned from cigarette promotion. (290,292,293) 
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Within this context of strong social and regulatory barriers to market 
entry, TTCs attempted to increase their market share by employing various 
direct and indirect marketing strategies. The detailed tactics used by TTCs 
will be described and analysed in the following chapter. 
5.7 Summary 
This chapter has discussed the strategies TTCs employed to gain 
access to the Korean market, and analysed TTCs' behaviour in relation to the 
Korean economic development model and regulatory regimes. TTCs' early 
tactics to gain market access involved attempts to agree JVs and licensing 
agreements with the monopolised domestic tobacco company to gain a 
foothold in the strictly controlled market. However, these tactics were 
ineffective given the Korean government's economic policies focused on 
industrialisation and foreign investment through export-led growth. After the 
failure of these initial approaches, TTCs subsequently lobbied US officials and 
politicians to exert trade pressure on the Korean government. This pressure 
was successful in opening the market, largely because of Korea's economic 
and military dependence on the US. 
While the Korean government made efforts to review regulatory 
provisions during trade negotiations, these were to protect the domestic 
tobacco industry and support economic policy rather than in the interests of 
public health. The research offers lessons to other developing countries 
attempting to balance the complex relationship between health and economic 
development to be in Chapter 9. 
Although the market was opened to TTCs, social and regulatory 
barriers still remained, requiring TTCs to find more sophisticated marketing 
tactics to build their brand awareness. The detailed marketing strategies of 
TTCs will be discussed in the following chapter. 
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Table 5.3: Timeline of key events of the Korean tobacco industry 
Year Event 
1952 " The Office of Monopoly (OOM) was established to 
monopolise the tobacco and ginseng business. 
1986 " The Korean and US government signed trade agreement in 
July. The Korean government agreed to lift a ban on 
importing cigarettes for domestic sales with import quotas. 
1987 " The OOM was transformed from the government agency into 
the state-owned corporation, Korea Monopoly Corporation 
(KOMOCO). 
1988 " The Korean government signed the Record of Understanding 
(ROU) with the US, providing open, non discriminatory 
access to the Korean tobacco market. 
1989 " The Tobacco Business Act (TBA) became effective. 
" The TBA allowed limited cigarette marketing, advertising, 
and promotional activities at retail outlets to a limited extent 
in certain magazines, and by sponsoring social, cultural, 
musical, athletic, or other events. 
" The TBA required cigarette packs and advertising materials to 
include health warnings. 
" KOMOCO was renamed to Korea Tobacco and Ginseng 
Corporation (KTGC). 
1991 " The Korean Tobacco Association (KTA), composed by 
Brown & Williamson (B&W), KTGC, Philip Morris (PM) 
and R. J. Reynolds (RJR), signed a `Voluntary Self-regulatory 
Code' for tobacco marketing in South Korea. 
" The Code was formulated in consonance with the provisions 
of the TBA and its enforcement decree and the provisions of 
the Korea-US ROU. 
1995 . National Health Promotion Act (NHPA) became effective to 
protect young adolescents aged under 19 years from smoking, 
and regulate tobacco companies' advertising which targeted 
the young generation and females. 
2001 " Abolition of the tobacco manufacturing monopoly right of 
KTGC was implemented. 
" Levy 40 percent duty, which used to be zero percent after 
market liberalisation, on imported cigarette. 
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2002 " KTGC became a joint-stock company from a state-owned 
corporation. 
" The name of company was also changed to KT&G (Korea 
Tomorrow and Global). 
" British American Tobacco (BAT) established a local 
manufacturing facility in Sachon city in South Korea. 
" PM also established a local manufacturing facility in Yangsan 
city 
2004 " Japan Tobacco International (JTI) signed a licensing 
agreement with KT&G for local manufacturing of its' 
international brand, Mild Seven. 
2005 " South Korea ratified the Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control on 16 May. 
2007 " South Korea acceded to Korean-US Free Trade Agreement. 
40 percent of import tax for foreign cigarettes will be 
abolished within 15 years. 
2008 .A new local tobacco company, `Woori Tobacco' won a 
license to manufacture and sell cigarettes in the Korean 
market. 
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CHAPTER 6 MARKET ENTRY STRATEGY PART 2: 
CREATING DEMAND 
6.1 Introduction 
As described in Chapter 5, following intensive trade pressure by the 
US government, in 1988 the regulatory and trade barriers restricting cigarette 
imports to South Korea were lifted. This opened the way for transnational 
tobacco companies (TTC), Philip Morris (PM), R. J. Reynolds (RJR) and 
Brown &Williamson (B&W), to move into the Korean market, competing with 
one another and with the domestic company, Korea Tobacco and Ginseng 
Corporation (KTGC). (226) 
Prior to this development, the government division, Office of 
Monopoly (OOM), monopolised the tobacco market, so that cigarette 
advertising to create demand and build brand awareness, while legal at that 
time, was not so crucial for the OOM. However, once the market began to be 
opened to TTCs, initially through import quotas in September 1986, the 
government quickly recognised the need to restrict cigarette advertising. 
Thus almost all cigarette marketing, advertising, and promotional activities 
were prohibited under the revised tobacco-related regulations from April 1987. 
During the trade negotiations on complete tobacco market liberalisation 
between the US and South Korea, the US Trade Representative (USTR), 
lobbied by TTCs, pressured the Korean government to allow the US cigarette 
manufacturers not only to sell in its market, but also to advertise and promote 
their products. Therefore, based on the Record of Understanding (ROU), the 
Korean government had to allow some forms of advertising and promotional 
activities to tobacco companies from July 1988, however, they were strictly 
limited compared to the Japanese case where TV advertising was allowed. (62) 
In response to the ROU, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) amended the 
Tobacco Monopoly Act (TMA) in July 1988, and based on the reformed TMA, 
limited marketing, advertising, and promotional activities were permitted at the 
point-of-sale, in selected magazines, and for cultural, social, and sport events. 
All other forms of direct tobacco advertising were prohibited in an effort by the 
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government to restrict market competition between domestic and imported 
brands. However, under the limited advertising conditions in South Korea, as 
well as anticipated hostility to US tobacco products, TTCs pursued aggressive 
and sophisticated marketing tactics to overcome the negative market conditions. 
This chapter will analyse how PM, RJR, and British American 
Tobacco (BAT), including its US subsidiary B&W, sought to create demand 
for their brands among Korean consumers and establish a firm market presence. 
The actual shift in market share suggests TTCs were relatively successful at 
achieving these goals despite an initially anti-foreign mood, and stronger 
tobacco control policies. This chapter seeks to understand how this was 
achieved. 
6.2 Target populations for TTCs marketing practices 
With the assistance of the USTR, TTCs successfully gained access to 
previously closed markets in Asia from 1986 onwards. Following access to 
these new markets, cigarette manufacturers implemented intensive marketing, 
advertising, and promotional campaigns, including in South Korea. However, 
these activities of tobacco companies in the US became increasingly 
controversial because of the harmful effects of cigarettes on health. Due to 
the efforts of US public health advocates, the Chairman and four other 
members of the Senate Committee on Labour and Human Resources, and 20 
members of the House of Representatives requested that the US General 
Accounting Office (GAO) review certain marketing, advertising, and 
promotional practices of the US-based TTCs in selected Asian countries, 
including South Korea. 
At a meeting held between PM and the GAO in November 1989, at 
PM's Seoul office, the company's marketing strategies and its impacts on 
public health in Korea were discussed. The GAO questioned what strategies 
PM applied in the Korean market, and whether the strategies were intended to 
entice non-smokers. A 1989 PM document stated the company's official 
response to this issue: 
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[A]lthough Korean advertising seemed a bit cluttered there was no 
magic in Philip Morris advertising. Basically, you just try to get your 
name out there in the hope that the consumer will try your product and 
prefer it to that of your competitor. Advertising does not make a 
person buy a type of product, it only gets him to try a particular 
brand. (294) 
Duck Song (PM Asia's President) added that there was no evidence that PM's 
brands induced non-smokers to smoke, offering as an alternative explanation to 
the "recent increased cigarette consumption trends in Korea after market 
liberalisation", "dramatic increases in disposable income and spending patterns 
for other consumer goods. "(294) 
After interviewing PM, the GAO met representatives of RJR in 
December 1989 to discuss the same topic. During the meeting, RJR similarly 
argued that the company only marketed their brands to established consumers, 
and did not encourage non-smokers to initiate smoking: 
Prior to liberalization, there was no advertising (or very limited in the 
case of Korea) because the government monopolies didn't need to 
advertise. We have minimal advertising opportunities in these 
markets - just enough to tell consumers that our products were 
available. (295) 
Both companies insisted that the marketing practices they carried out in South 
Korea were minimal, intended only to raise awareness of their brands as newly 
available in the market. 
Despite these claims, the GAO's 1992 report drew attention to 
allegations by the South Korean government that "U. S. cigarette companies 
violated "implicit" advertising restrictions". (35) The Korean government 
attributed such violations, in part, to "excessive competition among the three 
big U. S. cigarette companies". (35) One of Korea's leading newspapers also 
reported that the number of reported "unfair" business practices by TTCs was 
almost 13,000 cases in 1991 alone. (278) (See Table 6.1). Such tactics 
included: cigarette sales at unlicensed places, such as nightclubs and coffee 
shops; installation of sign boards at unlicensed locations; free sampling in non- 
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licensed places; and gifts to consumers that exceeded the value limits imposed 
by Korea's Fair Trade Regulations (FTR). (35,278) The detailed marketing 
strategies of each TTC will be discussed in the following sections. 
Table 6.1: Reported violations of TTCs' marketing activities in 1991 (by 
KTGC} 
Forms of 
activities 
Details of the activities Number of Cases 
Sales of imported cigarettes by 
Sales unlicensed retailers, e. g. 5,595 
entertainment places 
Placing advertisement materials at 
Advertisement unlicensed spots or missing 7,134 
warning phrase 
Promotion Offering free cigarettes at 54 
unlicensed places 
Others 129 
Source: Foreign Cigarette Smoke Covers the Whole Nation. 15 Feb 1992. British American 
Tobacco. Bats No. 600503056 (Available at httID: //Iepacy. librarv. ucsf. edu/tid/mfj43a99) 
6.3 TTCs' strategies to overcome barriers and create 
demand for their brands 
TTCs justified their circumvention of advertising regulations by their 
need to desire compete with other TTCs and domestic companies, Korea's 
strict regulations, and strong anti-foreign sentiment towards imported cigarettes. 
As previously discussed, according to Shepherd, building brand image and 
loyalty is the most important factor for new players attempting to access a 
market. Yet, foreign brands had an inherently negative image for many 
Korean people, due to political and cultural biases related to anti-US 
sentiment. (238) According to TTC documents, a 1990 PM Asian Plan 
describes the impact of nationalism on hostility to imported cigarettes: 
The cigarette market in South Korea was growing rapidly. However, 
imports had failed to gain the acceptance of mainstream Korean 
smokers. This reflects both widespread consumer belief that buying 
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foreign cigarette was unpatriotic, and the effectiveness of local 
activities aimed at disrupting sales of imported brands. (296) 
In order to overcome these challenges, TTCs first sought to identify 
and target particular population groups that were relatively less nationalistic 
and more interested in foreign manufactured products by conducting market 
research. (297) Second, TTCs developed efficient distribution routes to avoid 
the disruption of the domestic company which used to monopolise all the 
distribution routes prior to market liberalisation. Third, TTCs adapted the 
types, packaging, and sizes of cigarettes to those of Korean styled cigarettes. 
Furthermore, the companies developed and introduced various lower tar and 
nicotine cigarettes with the eye-catching words "Light", "Slim", and "Super 
Slim" in order to target young people and females, and to discourage 
established consumers from quitting. Finally, TTCs carried out marketing, 
advertising, and promotional activities to build brand awareness. 
6.3.1 Creating "a favourable mood and atmosphere" to overcome 
social barriers 
Due to strong anti-foreign sentiment and regulatory barriers, TTCs and 
their Korean distributors and retailers, suffered during the initial stage of 
market liberalisation. (278) Jung Hoon Kim (Market Service, PM), in his 
market report, suggested ways to create more favourable attitude and feelings 
towards imports: 
Since the life of foreign tobacco provision is an emotional and 
sensitive issue, we PM have to be the initiator of creating a favorable 
mood for import brands to gain leverage in terms of PM brands' 
image and value. "The market is big, but the society is small. " For 
example, if in case of going for local manufacturing, PM should take 
the initiative, i. e., take the leadership role in buying Korean leaf 
tobaccos[tobacco] at an attractive price, or provide favorable terms to 
the tobacco farmers. This may sound unfavorable and would raise a 
question of "Why should we?, " but if this fact is publicized well and 
carefully through selected media sources enough to create a favorable 
mood and atmosphere for PM, the extra cost will definitely payback as 
PR or Ad expenses. Moreover, PM will be able to reduce the 
resistance among the people, and they will be more willing to buy PM 
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brands with little emotional resistance. Also, PM can leverage with 
the authorities for favorable tax advantages and establish a smooth 
working relationship with them, both of which are critical success 
factors. (207) 
This recommendation was not acceptable in the market, because while Korea 
Monopoly Corporation (KOMOCO) still monopolised the Korean tobacco leaf 
under TMA (1987), tobacco farmers remained under control. (298) Thus, 
there was no opportunity for PM to "provide favourable terms to the tobacco 
farmers". (207) Local manufacturing by TTCs was also not allowed under the 
limited conditions of market access agreed in 1986. However, after the 
government's announcement of the complete privatisation of the domestic 
company in 2001, PM and BAT established their own cigarette manufacturing 
facilities. Leading up to local manufacturing, both TTCs drew up plans to 
create a more favourable mood towards them, such as buying Korean leaf 
tobacco and recruiting local labourers. Within this context, PM had 
alternatively made efforts to soften anti-foreign sentiment by attempting to 
influence public opinion, and to improve its relationship with KTGC. 
First, we will continue efforts through Corporate Affairs. Our action 
plans to influence public opinion and media coverage, manage 
potential crises, and ensure that the trade agreement is fully respected 
are detailed in the Korea Corporate Affairs section. Second, we will 
work through purely commercial channels to improve our relationship 
with the Monopoly. We have succeeded in opening communications 
with KT&G [KTGC], and at their request are now exploring the 
possibility of transferring Diet technology. While we cannot assess 
the direct impact such a venture would have on our overall relations 
with KT&G [KTGC], we believe a successful technical and 
commercial exchange could pre-empt competitors' attempts to make 
local production agreements and would, as in other markets where we 
have worked successfully with monopolies, strengthen our overall 
competitive position. (296) 
6.3.2 Targeting of particular population groups 
TTCs' marketing strategies to create demand in Korea for their brands 
and to build brand awareness were as important as overcoming anti-imported 
cigarette feelings among the Korean population. In this sense, TTCs needed 
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to know which population groups were more inclined to smoke foreign 
cigarettes. 
One of Korea's import distributors, Samyang International Corporation, 
submitted a business proposal, which included Korea's market research, to PM 
in 1988. In the proposal, it was predicted that after complete market 
liberalisation, foreign cigarette consumption would grow among high-income 
smokers, frequent overseas travellers, health-conscious, young smokers 
(seeking new fashion), and female smokers (seeking better quality and new 
fashions). (209) This kind of information, from a variety of market research, 
was carefully used by TTCs considering target groups for their marketing 
activities. 
Based on this kind of research, TTCs mainly targeted three groups: 
young adult male smokers (YAMS) aged 18 to 24; "starters" (who recently 
started smoking); and young females usually aged 18 to 25. First, TTCs 
prioritised the targeting of young people because, apart from politically active 
college students, this group tended to be less nationalistic and anti-foreign. 
Targeting this group would allow TTCs to get a foothold in the market and 
begin to overcome the entrenched social and cultural barriers to expand their 
market share. (273) TTCs attempted to target young adult males through 
deploying "below-the-line"19 tactics (299-303), which focused on non-media 
advertising and promotional activities. These activities were conducted soon 
after market liberalisation and the forms of tactics varied. The tactics were 
based on the results of focus group studies and other market research to obtain 
particular information on the target groups. (304) For example, PM's Korean 
marketing team planned to conduct research to understand the young adult 
male smoker aged 18 to 24 years, mostly college students, in terms of their 
attitudes, values, aspirations, interests and lifestyle. Through the research, 
PM investigated which international brands Korean YAMS smoked; which 
19 There are two broad types of marketing tactics that can be used to promote products: 
"above-the-line" and "below-the-line". Forms of promotion by "below-the-line" tactics 
include events, point-of-sale displays, direct marketing, email promotions, text message 
promotions, premiums, price reductions, public relations activities, sponsorship, trade show, 
exhibitions, and so on. On the other hand, "above-the-line" tactics are carried out through 
promotional activities and advertisements in newspapers, magazines, cinema, TV, radio, 
billboards and so on. 
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events they intended to attend; what they thought about lighter cigarettes; and 
what they thought about imported cigarettes. (305) A B&W document 
anticipated young adults would comprise a substantial market by the mid 
1990s: 
Import volume growth will continue to grow, reaching over 19% SOM 
[share of market] by 1998 primarily as a result of the popularity of 
imported cigarettes with young adult smokers. (306) 
Among imported brands, the most successful was PM's Marlboro Red 
with half of Korean young male smokers, who smoked imported brands, 
smoking this brand. The brand's image attempted to appeal to this group by 
associating itself with values, such as freedom, open-mindedness, 
straightforwardness, confidence, composure, rebellious, relaxed, hard-working, 
and stoical. (307) In a 1994 PM's Korean market research, a young male 
smoker describes the image of Marlboro Red: 
[Young] People like to do more of what they are told not to. That is 
positive for the people who smoke this brand.... It's preferred by the 
new generation because the image is rebellious. They feel suppressed 
by many things. They have to be aware of how their parents feel and 
they want to be free at least when they smoke outside. So they like to 
enjoy more freedom through the brand. (307) 
Second, TTCs focused attention on "starters" who recently 
experienced smoking in their life, were not addicted to tobacco yet, and did not 
have any preferred brands. The starters were not defined as regular smokers 
but could be enticed to smoke regularly. A 1990 PM Korean Cigarette 
Market Study (n=1,200) defined the characters of Korean smokers and divided 
them into five groups in terms of participants' demographics, smoking 
behaviour, and preference of cigarettes types. (297) As shown in Figure 6.1, 
among the five groups, PM decided to pay more attention on better 
understanding Group IV `Young Appealing Imports', because the group mainly 
consisted of young people who were under 25 and preferred foreign 
manufactured products, not only cigarettes but also other imported products. 
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Moreover, the members of this group were expected to have fewer anti-foreign 
feelings towards imported cigarettes. (297) The most important characteristic 
of individuals in Group IV was that a third of the group were starters. 
Therefore, the research confirmed this group should be "the prime 
development target market" and emphasised that "to build the import segment 
in the Korean market, a higher intake of starters was necessary". (297) 
According to the PM's research, in 1990, the number of starters in South Korea 
was 6.4 percent of the total smokers which was seen as a good level, compared 
to other Asian countries. Over two thirds of Korean starter smokers were 
high school or college students. (297) 
Group H "Luxury Imports", relatively wealthy, was also classified as 
the target market given their higher likelihood to smoke imported cigarettes. 
Unlike Group IV and 1 1, Group I "Light, Mild & Korea", who were generally 
older, believed that "Smoking imports is unpatriotic and too expensive", and 
Group III "Young, Contemporary & Korean", who were generally younger, 
also believed that "I'd be embarrassed to smoke imports. It's unpatriotic". 
Group V "Full Flavor, Rich Taste" tended to smoke less expensive and strong 
taste cigarettes. (297) 
Figure 6.1: Korea's smoker groups with different characteristics in 1990 
Groua ll Grow 
Luxury Imports Light, Mild 
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IhUh£OhOSZ 
Young Appealing Imports 
& Korean 
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Full Flavor, 
Rich Taste 
GrouD IV 
Source: Korean Cigarette Market Study. Sep 1990. Philip Morris. Bates No. 2504034023 
(Available at http'. ! lea Iibrary. ucsf edu/tidlbda42e00) 
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In the initial period following market liberalisation, TTCs made efforts 
to win a share of the substantial market offered by existing male smokers, 
focused on YAMS and starters. However, TTCs quickly recognised an 
opportunity offered by the Korean females for longer term business. Like 
other Asian countries, smoking was a social taboo for women in Korea, but the 
country's rapid economic development also brought widespread social change 
towards females' roles. (14,260) TTCs recognised this change. For example, 
PM observed through market research that 14 percent of Korean starters were 
young females. (297) Encouraged by such change, TTCs targeted young 
Korean females by portraying smoking as the symbol of equality. (14) 
6.3.3 Developing distribution routes 
Once TTCs identified their target groups, they sought efficient 
distribution routes. According to market research, the most attractive places 
for imported cigarette sales in the Korean market were coffee shops, bars, 
nightclubs, sauna (public-bath), billiard game room, convenience stores, hotels, 
and sport facilities (such as golf and bowling) etc. (209) However, due to 
existing social barriers and legislation regulating cigarette retail sales, TTCs' 
sales usually challenge. Distributions in rural areas were a particular 
challenge due to strong anti-foreign sentiments towards imported cigarettes. 
Documents describe how TTCs attempted to develop new distribution routes in 
order to improve sales. 
6.3.3.1 Developing retailers 
In the early 1990s, there were about 140,000 cigarette retail outlets 
which were licensed by KTGC. Under the Tobacco Business Act (TBA, 
1989) these retailers were licensed by KTGC under the authority of the MOF. 
Retailers' decisions on whether or not to stock, display, or recommend 
imported brands had a considerable impact on the buying patterns of 
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consumers. About 90 percent of these retailers were "mom and pop" grocery 
stores, the owners of which were largely conservative and older Koreans, who 
were nationalistic and loyal to domestic cigarette brands. In this context, 
these traditional cigarette sellers contributed significantly to hindering the 
growth of TTCs' sales. (292,308) This form of market restriction was a tough 
challenge for TTCs. 
When the national economy grew quickly in the 1990s, mom and pop 
outlets were rapidly replaced with convenience stores. People were more 
likely to use convenience stores which provided clean and modem 
facilities/services. As this change took place, TTCs benefited from increased 
distribution levels and visibility in a less hostile environment. (292) In order 
to increase these sale channels, TTCs developed cooperative relationships with 
convenience stores. (308) For example, TTCs delivered their brands more 
often than KTGC in order to help the stores to reduce inventory costs, and 
allowed 10 percent more sales margin, compared to KTGC. (283) These 
tactics helped to build positive relationships between TTCs and convenience 
stores, in contrast with mom and pop stores. Moreover, as part of "below-the- 
line" tactics, TTCs offered gifts to owners of convenience and mom and pop 
stores. The most effective time for this promotional tactic was, the Lunar 
New Year and the September "Chusok", Korea's Thanksgiving Day, as 
traditional gift giving times. Each TTC competitively offered gifts, such as 
kitchen appliances and lighters to retailers. In case of free lighters from TTCs, 
the retailers resold contributing extra income. As one BAT document stated, 
this tactic "was almost required for import manufacturers... to keep 
distribution". (292) 
Moreover, TTCs subsidised contracted Korean wholesale distributors. 
For example, PM had five distributors that imported its brands and sold them to 
the Korean market. Due to the low level of imports in the early stage of 
market liberalisation, the distributors experienced difficulty maintaining their 
business. Hence, TTCs supported them by offering subsidies until import 
volumes increased: 
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Distribution is critical to succeeding in Korea, and independent 
distribution is the only realistic option available in the current 
environment. All five PMK [PM Korea] distributors remain fully 
committed to our business despite operating losses sustained for more 
than a year and a half Under current volume projections, they will 
not reach breakeven during the Plan period. Subsidizing distribution 
is a cost of building our business in Korea. Therefore, until volume 
increases, we plan to mitigate the financial pressure on our 
distributors. We will: 
" Continue the current distributor subsidy, covering up to 75% of 
operating losses. 
" Freeze distributor headcount at the 1990 level. Additional 
coverage in rural areas will be obtained through sub distribution 
networks. 
" Increase the subsidy level to fully cover operating losses 
beginning in 1991, if volume does not meet or exceed the current 
projection. Should that occur, we will also evaluate further 
rationalization of the existing distribution and merchandising 
infrastructure. (296) 
PM continued their support of distributors in order to expand market 
share in the mid 1990s. In the company's three year plan between 1994 and 
1996, PM decided "to increase the distributor margin from Won 50 to Won 60 
concurrent with the January 1994 retail price increases". (309) In addition, the 
document stated: 
[TJo expand the current direct service capability to handle the forecast 
growth in our customer base in metropolitan areas, we will provide 
the distributors with a temporary investment incentive of an additional 
Won 4 (0.5 cent) per pack for next three years. (309) 
6.3.3.2 Cigarette vending machines 
As well as using convenience stores to expand sales, TTCs invested in 
cigarette vending machines which were first introduced in Korea in 1980. 
The OOM established 392 vending machines in 1980, but only a small amount 
of cigarettes were sold by machine due to well-established retailers across the 
country. (261) However, following market liberalisation, cigarette vending 
machines quickly became a common and effective route for foreign cigarette 
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sales, because there was no regulation on it until 1991. (261)(ISK) RJR signed 
a contract with a Korean distribution company to install cigarette vending 
machines for RJR brand. Based on the contract, Choil Distribution 
established 3,000 cigarette vending machines in Seoul and other metropolitan 
cities in 1989 alone. PM installed 4,000 machines in 1989. (261) 
The vending machines had some clear advantages for TTCs. First, it 
made foreign brands more accessible to targeted population groups, such as 
young females who usually found it socially awkward difficult to buy 
cigarettes from retailers. Second, the machines could be used as a venue for 
point-of-sale advertising. (296,310) As advertising was only available at 
retail outlets under existing regulations, displaying their brand images on 
cigarette vending machines circumvent the regulation. (See Figure 6.2) For 
example, B&W installed advertising panels for the company's leading brand, 
Kent, on contracted cigarette vending machines. (31 1) 
Figure 6.2: Cigarette vending machine with Vantage advertisement 
image 
VAN' 
Source: l)onta-llho. I urcign cigarette smoke covers the whole nation. 15"' 1"ebruary 11), 
145 
Importantly, cigarette vending machines were located where young 
people usually gathered, around school zones, entertainment areas, and high 
streets. Because there was no regulation of vending machines, it was possible 
for the companies to install a machine wherever they wanted. (312) Following 
TTCs' example, KTGC recognised this new point of competition, and 
established a new vending machine company, Korea Cigarette Vending 
Machine. The company installed 3,300 vending machines in 1991. (261) 
Even though TTCs conducted various tactics for cooperative 
relationship with retail owners, only a third of them, approximately 50,000 out 
of 140,000, displayed and sold imports in the early 1990s. (238) Hence, 
TTCs' investment in cigarette vending machines became more aggressive. At 
their peak in 1991, vending machines accounted for approximately 7 to 8 
percent of all cigarette sales including imports and domestic brands, and TTCs 
made about 20 percent of their sales through the machines. (296) 
However, this effective sales channel for imported cigarettes 
eventually attracted concern. From 1990, the growth in the number of 
vending machines was criticised by consumer and tobacco control advocates, 
who complained that the machines were a leading point of access to cigarettes 
for young males and females. In addition, it was argued that the machines 
were deliberately placed by TTCs in areas where youths gathered and were 
used to cover sales to minors who were not supposed to smoke. (292) This 
attention by non-government organisations (NGOs) and the mass media caused 
TTCs to carefully consider whether to invest further in them after 1991. (281) 
In 1992, one of the local governments finally enacted a new provision, 
prohibiting cigarette vending machines from being installed within 200 meters 
of schools and other places where young people gathered, so that the 
significant upward trend in the installation of vending machines was 
slowed. (313) A total of approximately 15,000 cigarette vending machines 
were installed in South Korea from 1987 until 1993, but this sharply decreasing 
because of high maintenance costs and strengthening restrictions. (308) 
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6.3.4 Marketing practices 
6.3.4.1 Advertising to gain attention of Korean nationals 
Given restrictions on tobacco advertising on TV, radio, and 
newspapers, TTCs actively developed opportunities for magazine advertising 
in order to bring their brands to the attention of potential and existing Korean 
smokers. Under TBA (1989), cigarettes including imported brands were 
permitted in magazines as long as it is not published more than once a week 
and be registered under the Act concerning Registration of Periodicals. There 
was also a limit of a maximum of 120 magazine insertions per year per brand 
family. Additionally, Korean language magazines which were usually read 
by youths and females were excluded from cigarette advertising. Any kind of 
foreign language magazines were available for cigarette advertising. (3 14) 
To develop and maximise the effect of magazine advertising, TTCs 
carried out research to find out which Korean magazines best matched the 
targeted market segments of particular brands. A BAT consumer survey 
showed the company's efforts to reach, for example, Korean females despite 
prohibitions against cigarette advertising in women's magazines: 
In terms of communication, a gateway to more effective 
communication may involve taking advantage of the increased 
prominence of women's magazines. Since 1997 there has been a 
move towards imported magazines such as Vogue, Elle, Marie Claire. 
This kind of environment should be born in mind as an option for 
Finesse in the future . 
(315) 
The Korean government also restricted cigarette advertising 
signboards and posters. The TBA (1989) only allowed this method at the 
point-of-sale. In practice, however, this regulation was ineffective due to a 
lack of enforcement by the government. As a result, TTCs' signboards and 
posters quickly covered busy streets in the large cities. Perhaps the best 
example is "Daehak-Ro (University Road)" which is known as the main 
location where young people gather in Seoul. RJR evaluated this street as the 
key place to introduce its brands to this target market. Consequently, Daehak- 
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Ro was completely covered by RJR signboards and sunshades advertising 
RJR's leading brand, Salem, with the result that the street was called "Salem 
Street" among Korean young people. (278) Similarly, PM advertised its major 
brand, Marlboro on signboards. Images of Marlboro covered a third floor 
restaurant building and a huge signboard of Marlboro was installed on top of 
the restaurant. (278) As one newspaper report described "Seoul and other 
large cities became full of signboards and the colours of US imported 
cigarettes". (287) 
TTCs' offers for cigarette signboards were generally attractive to 
Korean small business owners. An article in a Korean newspaper describes 
how TTCs obtained permission to install billboards: 
One Korean restaurant building ... is 
fully covered with Marlboro 
cigarette advertisement. Theses advertisement signboards are very 
luxurious, made of tapholin [tarpaulin] and panaplex [panaflex]. The 
owner of the building says "There is no reason to refuse this free 
signboard and sunshade which cost [a] couple of million won 
[US$2,000]. They also clean these signboard every month and 
promise to give gift[s] on national holidays. (278) 
Amid indifference by the government to enforce restrictions 
signboards and the rapid a widespread increase of tobacco advertising, anti- 
foreign sentiments towards imported cigarette sentiment diminish, and TTCs' 
brands became more popular. This change, in turn, encouraged TTCs to 
expand their signboards across the country. Figure 6.3 shows an example of 
PM's Parliament signboard for a clothing shop. (316) 
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Figure 6.3: PM's Parliament signboard on a clothing shop in Seoul 
Source: Parliament Below-the-Line Programs. Philip Morris, 1993. Bates No. 2501222953. 
(Availabe at httl2: //1egacy. library. ucsf. edu/tid/gjs32e00) 
TTCs' company logos and cigarette brands have been used on non- 
tobacco products, such as clothing, footwear, and toiletries, to build brand 
awareness. This has been known as "trademark diversification" or "brand 
stretching" and has been extensively used in many countries. (317) This 
strategy has been used, in particular, to familiarise non-smokers, such as young 
people with cigarette brand images. (317) 
Trademark diversification was prohibited in the Korean market under 
the TBA (1989). However, documents describe examples TTCs attempts to 
use this method. For example, to develop non-tobacco products, as an 
advertising channel a Business Risks International (BRI) conducted `South 
Korea market survey' on behalf of RJR in 1991. BRI's contacted hundreds of 
traders of children's products in Seoul, Busan, and Daegu through the help of 
the Korean Trade Office, a government sponsored organisation dedicated to the 
promotion of Korea's industry and trade. After the survey, BRI sent the 
survey results with approximately 400 business cards of Korean companies that 
printed brand logos on bags, toys, hats, towels, stationery, and watches. The 
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report shows the negative perception of the strategy in the Korean market as 
follows: 
The overall impression given by KOREAN vendors was that cigarette 
brands are rarely used on non-cigarette or cigarette accessory 
products for local sale. The reason most commonly cited was that 
cigarette brands, particularly foreign ones that are used on these 
products do not sell well. Although some vendors claimed to have 
sold cigarette candy several years ago, most have since ceased sales of 
such due to low profit margins. For your information, sightings of 
non - R. J. REYNOLDS cigarette brands on products of interest (i. e. 
for children or women) were also scarcely found (318)(emphasis in 
original) 
Despite this unpromising research, former president of Korean Association of 
Smoking and Health (KASH) (ISK) recalls such tactics: "I remember when 
foreign tobacco companies sponsored music and sports events, they handed out 
free caps or shopping bags with their logos". (ISK) Figure 6.4 shows a 
brochure of a Korean hat manufacturer surveyed by BRI including a Marlboro 
branded hat. 
Figure 6.4: Brochure of a Korean hat manufacturer 
i ll LöJxL ? Best 
, 
Source: RJR. South Korea Market Survey. Jul 1991. Bates No. 515221420 (Available at 
http: //Ie¬; acv. library. ucsf. e(iu/tid/wfcO3dOO) 
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Cigarette advertisements in magazines mainly read by youths and 
females, and cigarette signboards installed outside of buildings, were "illegal" 
activities under the TBA (1989). TTCs also recognised these strategies were 
illegal once they joined the market in July 1988. In a PM internal document 
titled "Materials for Conference on Details of Criteria for Advertisements and 
Promotional activities on cigarettes, July 1988", the detailed criteria for 
cigarette advertisements under the regulation were explained. In the case of 
magazines, Lady Kyungyang and Yeosung Dong-A, which were carefully 
observed by BAT to improve communication with the Korean females, had to 
be excluded from the advertisements. In addition, the outdoor advertisements, 
such as store name signboards, skylight screens, and projecting billboards etc. 
were classified as "examples of illegal and improper cigarette advertisements 
and sales promotional activities". (319) However, in order to boost market 
share, in fact, TTCs often circumvented the existing regulations. 
6.3.4.2 Promotion to stimulate demand for imports 
Under the TBA (1989), cigarette promotion was permitted only at 
retail outlets. Free sampling by sticks was a common tactic for both TTCs 
and KTGC to promote their own brands. Through such promotion, TTCs 
expected Korean smokers to switch their brands to imported ones. But, free 
sampling of sticks at retail outlets was not seen as sufficient by foreign tobacco 
companies, so TTCs used the method in unauthorised places, such as bars, 
night clubs, and coffee shops where target groups gathered. Bars, night clubs, 
and coffee shops were basically not able to be licensed by KTGC to sell 
cigarettes at that time. Under the TBA (1989), each cigarette retailer should 
be located 200 meters away from other retailers. (314) In order words, KTGC 
strictly controlled the licensing of retail outlets. Bars, night clubs, and coffee 
shops were not designated as retailers. Yet, almost all sold cigarettes to 
customer's demand. As customers often asked waiters or waitresses for 
cigarettes, these venues bought cigarettes in advance from the retailer for 
resale. (ISK) TTCs took advantage of this situation to distribute free samples. 
151 
As a result of promotion activities in bars, night clubs, and coffee 
shops, in the early 1990s, imported brands sold well in these areas. TTCs 
continued to develop this opportunity and supplied their brands via a network 
of "underground" dealers who distributed imported cigarettes to unlicensed 
outlets. (283,320) A BAT market overview recommended the company: 
"Expand coffee shops and night-life programs to cover all areas in Korea and 
continue to lead in these important areas of import segment growth"(321). A 
B&W market plan for 1996-1998 also suggested focusing attention on "night 
life campaigns" to inspire Kent image within target groups. (306) 
A related tactic was the provision of free gifts, such as lighters, towels, 
shavers, teaspoons, fountain pens, and calculators to consumers who bought 10 
packs of imports. (278) This was permitted in Korea under the Fair Trade 
Regulations (FTR), which treated cigarettes as a normal consumer 
product. (322) The FTR limited the value of trade gifts to 10 percent of the 
product's retail price if the price range was between 5,000 won (about US$6) 
and 500,000 won (US$600). A consumer who bought a product priced more 
than 500,000 won could be offered a gift worth 5 percent of the price paid, and 
the maximum cost of gifts was 50,000 won (US$60). (322) Despite these 
rules TTCs offered gifts which exceeded the limits permitted. PM in 1989 
firstly introduced "consumer pack promotion", which included a pocket sized 
address book, in the Korean market to promote its leading brand, Virginia 
Slims. (316,323) (See Figure 6.5) The company also gave desk diaries, 
valued at 3,500 won to consumers who bought 10 packs of Marlboro, which 
cost 8,000 won. Similarly, RJR offered luxurious cigarette lighters, valued at 
2,400 won to those who purchased 10 packs of More, which cost 10,000 
won. (35) 
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Figure 6.5: PM's address book promotion with Virginia Slims 
Address Book Promotion 
Source: PM. Virginia Slims Below-the-Line Programs Update Hong Kong Taiwan Japan 
Korea. 1990. Bates No. 2500152276 (Available at http: //legacy. library. ucsfedu/ti(iist. n19e00) 
During the US GAO's investigation on the marketing practices of US- 
based TTCs, the Korean government complained that: "The companies [US- 
based TTCs] induced smoking by giving consumers gifts that exceeded the 
value limits imposed by the Korean Fair Trade Act. " Nine cases of illegal 
gifting under the FTR, involving the brands Marlboro, Yves St. Laurent 
(YSL), Winston, and Mild Seven, were reported by the Fair Trade Committee 
in 1991. (312) 
6.3.4.3 Sponsorship 
US-based TTCs faced increased restrictions on marketing and 
advertising during the late 1960s and 1970s in their domestic market. To 
overcome these restrictions TTCs sponsored sports and cultural events. (324- 
327) The expansion of overseas markets from the 1960s onwards was met 
with similar restrictions. Thus, sponsorship has been an important tactic to 
expand and maintain market presence worldwide. (328) 
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According to previous studies, the purpose of TTCs' sponsorship 
programmes is to obtain recognition and acceptance from young starters for 
their brands, and compete with other brands. (324) The rationale for appealing 
to young starters is that they are on the stage of initiation of smoking and 
potential consumers in future. Through sponsorship, TTCs hope that young 
people would not view cigarettes as a derelict product but as a legitimate 
source of meaning and consumptive pleasure. (324,329-333) Moreover, 
sponsorship programmes enable TTCs to associate their brands with desirable 
lifestyle images, and also to circumvent tobacco regulations which become 
increasingly restrictive. (283,324,334,335) 
In Korea, TTCs were able to use sponsorship programmes since the 
revision of TMA Enforcement Ordinance in July 1988. Under the amended 
regulation, sponsorship programmes by tobacco companies of various events 
have been allowed. (336) Any events for women or youths, however, were 
excluded from TTCs' sponsorship. Under the regulation, TTCs sponsored 34 
times on various events, such as tennis tournaments, Takwondo (Korea's 
martial art) championships, boxing games, golf tournaments, and music 
concerts etc, from 1986 to 1991. (278) These cigarette sponsorship 
programmes have been generally undertaken to integrate a brands' established 
image with the image of the sponsored events. For example, B&W 
considered sponsoring a golf tournament for Kent, the company's leading 
brand in Korea: 
Golf and KENT are very compatible in terms of positioning. KENT is 
a high quality, milder U S. International brand for stylish, self- 
assured adults. Golf is a high quality, relaxing, international sport 
for stylish, self-assured adults. The target audiences of both KENT 
and golf are nearly a perfect match: male and female, 25+ years old, 
better educated, above average income. Both are very image 
compatible in that they are a creative natural fit for upscale sociability 
in a resort setting. (337) 
PM also considered how best to match events to its leading brand images. In 
a letter entitled "Special events", PM's marketing manager considered different 
events for its top three brands, Virginia Slims, Parliament, and Marlboro. (338) 
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The letter, sent to another marketing expert in order to discuss suitable ways of 
sponsoring in the Korea market, illustrates how PM decided which events to 
sponsor. For Virginia Slims, the author agreed that a women's tennis 
exhibition was seen as `ideal', but, at the same time, it was warned that while 
sponsoring the women's tennis, "we have to be careful that we don't seem to 
be targeting females". Similarly, the author agreed a Jazz band event would 
be ideal to promote Parliament, because the expected audience were young 
adults. (See Figure 6.6) To build awareness and demand for Marlboro and its 
family of brands, men's tennis and golf tournaments were recommended. (3 16, 
338) Discos, motor sports, and skiing were also recommended for 
sponsorship programmes (339), as informed by market research which 
attempted to understand the lifestyles of target groups such as YAMS. (296) 
RJR sponsored a tennis match which was very popular with Korea's young 
adults to advertise its leading brand, YSL. As RJR's expectation, the 1989 
YSL Tennis Tournament achieved good media coverage for YSL. (311) 
Figure 6.6: PM's backdrop for the Jazz Superband World Tour in Seoul 
PAki. i. aMENT ® hkU, atilf ti i 
Backdrop 
Source: Parliament Below-the-Line Programs. 1993. Philip Morris. Bates No. 2501222953 
(Available at http: //legacy. library. ucsf. edu/tid/gjs32e00) 
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The increase in tobacco sponsorship led public health advocates to 
raise concerns that they targeted those who were not supposed to smoke. A 
leading newspaper criticised PM's sponsorship of concerts by leading US 
singers and bands, such as Jean Harris and Jose Feliciano, for being "targeted 
at potential customers, middle schoolers and high schoolers who were not 
supposed to be smokers. " (278) A group of thirty tobacco control and 
consumer advocates sent a letter to PM demanding an immediate halt to the 
Marlboro Concert Series. The group accused PM's sponsorship of inducing 
minors to smoke by holding concerts featuring popular young entertainers. 
Similar letters were also sent to co-sponsors, usually broadcasting companies, 
and advocacy groups pressured entertainers to decline invitations to perform at 
TTC sponsored events. (340) Given the increasing criticism of sponsorship 
programmes by TTCs, this tactic became less common in the middle and late 
1990s. (ISK) 
As shown in the above examples of TTCs' sponsoring programmes, 
when they considered suitable events for sponsorship, the expected participants 
of the events were the most important factor. Some of the sponsored events 
were targeting youths and women, which was prohibited under the regulations. 
However, it was usually difficult to distinguish legal and illegal sponsorship 
programmes under the law, because the participants for almost social, cultural, 
musical, and sports events were mixed. Such sponsorship programmes has 
been therefore widely used and efficient form of "below-the-line" activity for 
TTCs. 
6.3.5 Adapting products to local tastes 
In the initial period following market liberalisation, TTCs generally 
failed to meet the preferences of Korean smokers in terms of taste and flavour. 
The reason was that imported cigarettes tended to be too strong for Korean 
smokers who preferred flavoured and relatively lighter cigarettes. (207) TTCs 
quickly responded by developing new versions of their leading brands to meet 
local tastes. In fact, TTCs cigarette blends for domestic use and international 
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use were different. Blend formulations for certain individual brands and 
brand styles for certain markets occasionally varied, in order to make the 
cigarettes more responsive to local tastes or to comply with local restrictions 
and regulations. (234) TTCs therefore conducted market research on the 
specific tastes of the targeted groups developing products cigarettes 
accordingly. Product development also took into account its appearance, such 
as package design and cigarette length. (341) 
Once the Korean market was opened, based on market research TTCs 
strategically introduced long length cigarettes of 100mm, although 84mm 
cigarettes were the general trend in Korea. PM's market overview in 1986 
observes the characteristics of Korean cigarette: 
The Korean cigarettes, with only 15 different cigarette brands in the 
market, have dominant characteristics. 12 out of 15 brands are king 
size (84mm) filter cigarettes in 20's soft packs, and 13 out of 15 are 
non-menthol. Also, 10 out of 15 brands have white tips, and 7 out of 
15 are 500 Won brands. (207) 
Although the Korean tobacco monopoly, OOM only manufactured shorter size 
cigarettes compared to foreign ones, there was strong interests and demand for 
long length cigarettes among Korean smokers. Many Korean female smokers 
in particular preferred long length cigarettes. An interview with a young 
female smoker on a TV programme described this trend in the initial period 
following market liberalisation: 
Song [Producer]: "What do female smokers smoke these days? foreign 
cigarettes? " 
A young female smoker: "Yes. Do you really think young female 
smokers smoke Korean cigarette? No, foreign cigarettes are more 
popular and attractive. " 
Song: "Are Korean cigarettes dull? " 
A young female smoker: "Yes, of course. They are too short. 
Foreign brands are longer, slimmer and much prettier" 
Song: "Do young smokers know cigarette tastes " 
A young female smoker: "Who knows tastes? I don't think so. They 
just follow others. "(312) 
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The top five imported brands, shown in Table 6.2, were all long length 
ones. This tactic was successful, with these brands attaining significant 
market share (68.5 percent of the imported cigarettes in 1988). (277) 
Table 6.2: The top five imported brands in the Korean market in 1988 
Brand Share of imported cigarette market (%) 
1 Kent Deluxe 17.2 
2 YSL 16.5 
3 Parliament 13.6 
4 Marlboro Lights 100's 11.7 
5 Kent KS 9.5 
Source: Republic of Korea: Demographic Data. British American Tobacco0000. Bates No. 
401856309 (Available at http: //legac . ly ibrary. ucsf. edu/tid/trvO2a99) 
Note: KS - king size 
TTCs' cigarette packages were also different from those of traditional 
Korean cigarettes. Like long length cigarettes, luxury and better designed 
cigarette packages, and hard packages were introduced by TTCs. Before 
market opening, the domestic cigarette package was relatively plain and 
occasionally used to advertise government's policies. Korea's smokers never 
expected good designed and hard packages of cigarettes at that time. (ISK) 
Korean smokers responded readily to TTCs' new style cigarette packs. Box- 
style hard packs, with their more luxurious look, have led the market since the 
early 1990s. In 1993, of domestic brands, more than 97 percent of sales were 
in soft pack styles, while soft pack sales of imported brands were only 2.8 
percent. Almost imported cigarettes used box-style packs. (308) As 
expected, the long and box style packaged cigarettes were effective in 
appealing to the targeted groups. Following the new package trend in the 
market, PM strategically planned to introduce a new version of Marlboro: 
In the area of line extensions, we will launch Marlboro Lights KS Box 
in 1991 and a KS Box Ultra lights version in 1992. Marlboro Lights 
100's Box is being developed as a contingency replacement for the 
Soft Pack version in 1990. (296) 
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Whenever PM considered introducing new brands to the market, package 
design was an important factor. The following quote illustrates how carefully 
PM considered the design of packaging when selecting brands for the market: 
In terms of pack design, I am very positive that PM brands' pack 
designs are better appealing to Koreans than other import brands in 
the market. However, if "Merit" is in the market, instead of "Lark", 
it will definitely do well as much as "Marlboro Lights" will do, 
because both brands' pack designs have similar images to the Korean 
high priced brands, hence very much appealing to the Korean smokers. 
The pack designs of Winston and Camel would not be attractive to 
Korean people. (207) 
Virginia Slims was PM's primary brand in Korea following market opening. 
This brand appealed especially to Korea's females. Thus, when the market 
became more competitive in the early 1990s due to the aggressive marketing 
activities of competitors, PM also planned to replace the package design of 
Virginia Slim to appeal to females more effectively: 
VSL [Virginia Slim Light] has the potential for further growth in 
Korea, and during the Plan we intend to maintain full support for the 
brand. In 1990, we will make a change in creative to position VSL 
for growth over the long term, replacing the current pack-as-hero 
communication with the US/international campaign attractive to 
fashion-oriented young adults. (296) 
TTCs' investigations of the preferences of Korean smokers showed 
that there was a strong proven demand for lower tar and nicotine cigarette 
which had a mild taste and rich flavour. (292,342) The demand for these 
products rapidly increased in Korea "due to the fact that people prefer to enjoy 
rich tobacco flavor, but are getting more health conscious with the growing 
anti-smoking movements". (207) TTCs saw that Korea was a predominantly 
low-tar market. (273) 
Once TTCs started selling light and mild cigarettes in the Korean 
market, they were particularly popular with female smokers and starters among 
young adults who naturally find lighter tastes, much more palatable, and easier 
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to enjoy. A BAT document evaluates that light and mild cigarettes were 
"... offering a way to respond to the growing awareness of the health impacts of 
smoking, since they are attractive to existing smokers who wanted to quit 
smoking for health concems. "(343) In fact these types of cigarette, 
containing less than 10mg tar, quickly came to dominate the market and 
accounted for 88 percent of total cigarette sales in Korea in the early 
1990s. (292) A 1991 PM's document entitled "New product development - 
Korea" emphasises the importance of lower tar and nicotine cigarettes in the 
Korean market based on market survey, and suggests that: 
Our new product development objective is to develop an LTN [lower 
tar and nicotine] products which flavour system will appeal to 88 
Lights smokers at the same time to deliver a claimable level of lower 
nicotine. (342) 
The document also explains why this objective was so important in the market, 
and the reason was that image communication between cigarette brands and 
consumers was difficult in Korea given the restricted marketing situation: 
A new product must carry a more tangible consumer benefit that is 
easier to communicate than an image benefit. Since market opening 
in Korea, except Marlboro, and YSL to a certain extent, no other 
import brands have been able to create any strong image. Any image 
benefit will take a long time and much resource to establish itself in 
the Korean smokers' mind if successful at all. The consumer benefit 
of a similar flavor system to 88 Lights will also be difficult to 
communicate. Thus, we believe that it is critical that the ring product 
to be launched in the third quarter next year must offer a [ta]ngible, 
claimable product benefit such as lower nicotine delivery while 
promising the mainstream taste. (342) 
As part of actions to achieve their objectives, PM reformulated its brands with 
reduced tar deliveries to fit local tastes. The company changed its leading 
brand in the Korean market from Marlboro Red to Marlboro Lights to directly 
compete with Japan Tobacco International's (JTI) growing Mild Seven. 
When PM launched Virginia Super Slims in the market, the new lighter brand 
was quickly ranked the second largest imported brand behind JTI's Mild Seven 
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in the early 1990s. (344) In addition, PM reduced tar deliveries of Marlboro 
Red from 16mg to 13.5mg. (296) However, after investigating the preferences 
of Korean smokers through a research programme, called Seoul Consumer 
Panel, Marlboro Red reduced its tar level again, from 13.5mg to 12mg in 
1991. (345) Afterwards, market research was regularly undertaken and in 
1993 a further reduction of tar levels for the Marlboro brand family was 
recommended, in order to achieve the mainstream taste preferred by Korean 
smokers: 
To reduce the strength of Marlboro and thereby move it further into 
line with the mainstream taste perception the following actions will be 
taken: 
" Reduce tar level to 10mg. 
" Filter length will increase from 21 mm to 27mm. 
" Specification will be similar to Marlboro Lights but ventilation 
will be modified to achieve 10mg tar. 
" Tipping paper will be cork on white with Marlboro pre-printed, 
similar to Marlboro Medium tipping. 
" The reduction in tar to be actioned immediately. No external 
panel testing required prior to release as Marlboro at 12mg, 
9mg and 7mg has already been tested. (346) 
Through its analysis of major markets, BAT, which joined the market 
later than other US-based TTCs found that South Korea was dominated by 
lower tar and nicotine brands and expected that the mild segment in Korea 
would grow at the annual rate of 2 percent by the mid 1990s. In addition, the 
company recognised that PM had achieved a dramatic increase of market share 
from 5 percent to 32 percent of imports in Korea from 1989 to 1990 as a result 
of the enhanced performance of light and mild brands such as Virginia Slims 
and Marlboro Lights. Hence, BAT also planned to introduce mild versions of 
its brands between 1991 and 1995 to the Korean market. (347) 
Similarly, B&W predicted the growth of the low tar segment under 
5mg in the Korean market in the mid 1990s, given that consumers were 
becoming more aware of smoking and health issues. Based on this forecast 
and following the increase of female smoking incidence, the company 
marginally expanded the menthol segment. (306) Prior to this, B&W had 
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already introduced Kent, a primary brand with mild flavour perception, and 
had launched Finesse, a super slim cigarette (called `Capri' in other countries) 
to appeal mainly to females. (306) In 1992, to respond to the upward trend of 
low tar deliveries in the market, B&W introduced Kent Mild. (348) 
In RJR's case, most of the cigarette brands it imported to the Korean 
market were low tar products and/or menthol flavoured, including Camel Filter, 
Camel Lights KS, Winston KS, Winston Light KS, Winston Lights 100, More 
Filter, More Lights 100, Salem King Size, Salem Lights 100, Salem Lights 
King Size, YSL Regular, and YSL Menthol. (234) 
Table 6.3: Percentage share of low tar cigarettes among imported brands 
in Korea (%) 
1989 1990 1991 
More tar than 11 mg 21.9 19.2 18.3 
Low tar 78.1 80.8 81.7 
Source: PM. Marlboro Red Situation Analysis (Korea). 1989. Bates No. 2504026063 
(Available at http_//legacy. library. ucsf. edu/tid/aggl9e00) 
Note: There was no exact norm on lower tar cigarettes in Korea in the 1990s, but generally the 
cigarettes containing less than l0mg of tar were classified as low tar cigarettes. 
Table 6.4: The top four brands by each TTC in the early market 
liberalisation 
RJR PM B&W 
1st YSL (65%) Parliament (36%) Kent Deluxe (47%) 
2nd Winston (12%) Marlboro Light (31 %) Kent KS (26%) 
3rd More (11%) Marlboro KS (18%) Kent Mild (17%) 
4th Other (12%) Lark (15%) Pall Mall (10%) 
Source: Republic of Korea: Demographic Data. British American Tobacco0000. Bates No. 
401856309 (Available at http: //legacv. library. ucsf. edu/tid/trvO2a99) 
Note: KS - king size 
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6.3.6 TTCs' initial marketing expenditure 
There is limited evidence available of how much TTCs spent on 
marketing activities to create demand for their brands in Korea following 
market liberalisation. However, the former president of KASH, Il Soon Kim 
(ISK) recalls during the interview that "After the market liberalisation, some of 
the US tobacco control advocates we trusted said that TTCs spent tens of 
thousands of US dollars to access and advertise their brands to the Korean 
tobacco market". (ISK) In addition, one of the popular TV programmes in 
Korea, PD Diary reported that PM invested 16 billion won (about US$15 
million), a third of the company's total revenue in 1991, while accusing TTCs' 
marketing penetration in the market after market liberalisation. (312) 
The analysis of tobacco industry documents and Korean sources in this 
chapter suggests that TTCs intensively undertook advertising and promotional 
activities, involving both "above-the-line" and "below-the-line" tactics. Some 
activities circumvented regulations restricting their activities, which usually 
cost much more than general advertising. Hence, attempting to unveil TTCs' 
marketing expenses can be useful for better understanding their market access 
strategies, and may also shed light on how much TTCs spent on "below-the- 
line" activities. 
Since regulations restricted marketing activities, allowing only limited 
advertising in magazines and promotional activities only within retail outlets, 
marketing expenses of TTCs' might be relatively low. Yet, according to a 
BAT document, TTCs were predicted to have a net loss in the years following 
market liberalisation due to increased overheads and huge marketing 
costs. (292) The expected losses of PM, JTI, RJR, and B&W for 1992 and 
1993 are shown in the table below. 
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Table 6.5: Profit contribution in 1992 and 1993 (US$ millions) 
1992 
1993 
PM RJR 
- 8.0 
- 3.0 
- 8.0 
- 9.0 
B&W 
- 4.9 
- 3.6 
Source: Tobacco Strategy Group: Major Market Strategies - Korea. British American Tobacco. 
Bates No. 500036015 (Available at http: //legacy. library. ucsf. edu/tid/riz7Oa99) 
Detailed evidence of TTCs' marketing expenses is given in a BAT 
market overview document. (292) The document illustrates how much PM, 
RJR, and B&W spent in the Korean market in 1992. The expenses were 
broadly divided into media/promotion and sales. PM had a relatively high 
level of marketing expenditure. In 1992, the company's marketing expense 
was estimated at a total of US$37.7 million, US$28.7 million in 
media/promotion, US$5 million in selling field and US$4 million in other. 
RJR spent a total of US$23 million, US$19.4 million in media/promotion, 
US$2.6 million in selling field and US$1 million in other. B&W used 
US$10.9 for marketing activities. (292) The total of marketing expense the 
US based TTCs spent in Korea in a single year 1992 was US$71.6 million and 
US$78.4 million in 1993. (308) 
Table 6.6: Marketing expense in 1992 (US$ millions) 
PM 
Media/promotion 28.7 
Selling field 5 
Total 37.7 
RJR 
19.4 
2.6 
B&W 
Source: Korea. British American Tobacco. Bates No. 500059543 (Available at 
http: //legaacv. library. ucsf. edu/tid/goxO8a92) and Tobacco Strategy Group: Major Market 
Strategies - Korea. British American Tobacco. Bates No. 500036015 (Available at 
http: /! le acy_library. ucsf. edultid/riz70a99) 
Note: No data on B&W's expense on media or promotion and selling field. But the total 
expenditure B&W used in 1992 was available from a TID. 
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Table 6.7: Market expense in 1993 (US$ millions) 
PM RJR B&W 
Media/promotion/vending 36.5 17.5 - 
Selling field 5.5 3.0 - 
Other areas 4.5 1.5 - 
Total 46.5 22.0 9.9 
Source: Republic of Korea - Imports Picking up Market Shares. British American Tobacco. 
Bates No. 500224594 (Available at http: legacy. library. ucst'. edu; tid/ygm33a99) 
6.4 The role of corporate social responsibility initiatives to 
expand market share within a "dark" market 
By the late 1990s TTCs recognised that the Korean market had 
become "darker", an industry term for markets that had adopted stronger 
tobacco control measures. (349,350) One key response to this trend has been 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) tactics. In a 1997 market overview by 
BAT Korea, the planned role of Corporate and Regulatory Affairs (CORA) in 
overseeing the company's CSR activities in the Korean market was described: 
Increased pressure on the industry is expected on smoking and health 
issues and the market becoming darker due to further marketing 
restrictions. We will increase our emphasis in this area by 
appointing a CORA manager and enlisting a PR firm to act on our 
behalf (321) 
In fact, according to a former BAT Korea employee and a member of CORA 
from 2001 (Anonymous 5), only two persons in the Marketing Team developed 
"below-the-line" strategies, with most of the CSR tactics planned and 
conducted by public relations companies. (Anonymous 5) One of his main 
duties in CORA was to improve public relations through CSR activities. The 
marketing companies he mentioned (without exact names), usually carried out 
research to analyse market trends and develop aggressive marketing, 
advertising, and promotional tactics. (Anonymous 5) He recalled during the 
interview that the Legal Team in CORA and the Marketing Team often argued 
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in regard to new marketing tactics, because most tactics were "too aggressive"; 
"might break the law", and "could be targeted by tobacco control activists". 
(Anonymous 5) 
The major TTCs in Korea's market, PM and BAT, have carried out 
various CSR activities since they established their local manufacturing 
facilities in Korea following privatisation of KTGC, in order to improve the 
companies' images and communication with the public. The following 
examples of the companies' recent CSR activities mostly come from additional 
sources, such as newspapers, companies' CSR reports/websites, and tobacco 
control advocates' published/unpublished data, rather than the industry internal 
documents, given the limited access to the recent documents of PM and BAT. 
As CSR activity, since 1999 PM has started the refrigerator van 
donation with Korea's largest charity, Community Chest of Korea (CCK)20. 
To date, 32 vans with PM's logo are used to deliver fresh food to neglected and 
poor people with the catchphrase "Philip Morris delivers love". This 
programme might be the model of KT&G's car donation. However, unlike 
KT&G's free vehicles programme donating 100 cars each time, PM (PM Korea 
since 2001 after establishment of its local manufacturing facility) just donates 
one van each time to one selected social care organisation. 
20 Community Chest of Korea (CCK) is a nationally networked non-government 
organisation in South Korea. The organisation consists of 16 local offices and works to create 
lasting positive change in the community and people's lives. Since its establishment in 1998, 
CCK has grown to become Korea's largest community-impact charity. CCK seeks to engage 
individuals, businesses, and local organizations to cultivate a culture of sharing in the 
community. 
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Figure 6.7: PM Korea's donation ceremony of refrigerator vans 
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Note: PM Korea donates its 32°a refrigerator van to a social welfare centre on 27`h January 
2011. 
The other programme PM Korea has conducted is a campaign 
targeting convenience stores not to sell cigarettes to youths under 19 years of 
age (as stipulated by the TBA). The campaign mainly focused on owners of 
convenience stores and clerks to check the age of cigarette buyers by asking for 
their identity cards, if they look younger than the age restriction. In the 
process of the campaign, PM Korea has provided signboards, stickers, and 
posters which are decorated with the company's logo and name (See Figure 
6.8) to promote the campaign. According to a media interview with the 
President of PM Korea, the company would not provide their brands to 
convenience stores that violated the minimum age restriction. In addition, the 
President emphasised that protecting youths from smoking could result in a 
short term profit loss, but that the company was expected to benefit in the 
longer term. (349) In other words, although the company's sales might 
decrease in the short term, socially responsible activities can build good 
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relationships with the public and achieve "sustainability management21" under 
a stricter market environment. However, the actual effect of the campaign on 
preventing youth smoking has never been reported publicly, and most 
convenience stores proved uninterested in this kind of campaign, according to 
Bok Kun Lee, a key informant. (BKL) 
Figure 6.8: PM Korea's "protecting youth from cigarette sales" 
campaign at convenience stores 
ýý luurcc: UIHl, I'nrli 'l . lom11, rl v\L'I»I( (: AV III 
U2 101 I UUII, 2UU6/07102 I t)1 I (I )U 2U(16U7OoO6I 7U 'I . luuli, accessed 2U'ß January 2010) 
Note: PM Korea's President checks a customer's identify card to confirm his age. 
BAT's CSR programmes have been relatively varied compared with 
PM. Since BAT Korea was established in 2001, the focus of CSR activities 
21 Sustainability management is a strategy or goal to achieve long-term prosperity. 
Through balancing social, environmental, and economic considerations, corporations can 
achieve sustainability management. A company should provide products and services which 
fulfill not only the needs of the customers, but also are environmentally and socially 
responsible at the same time. If customers do not feel good about the products and services 
they are buying, they will not continue to buy them. There must be an emotional investment 
from the customer. This creates brand loyalty and a sense of belonging. To the tobacco 
industry, this sustainability management is, particularly, important due to the rapidly increased 
tobacco control policies and regulation. Given this, to achieve long-term prosperity, the 
industry must communicate with customers and obtain strong loyalty by focusing sustainability 
management. 
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has been to achieve sustainability management based on the company's CSR 
manual. As one former BAT Korean employee (Anonymous 5) describes: 
The headquarters of BAT provides the manual for CSR activities. 
The local subsidiaries conduct their own CSR programmes and 
sometimes modify the manual to meet local situations. (Anonymous 5) 
Like PM, CSR programmes of BAT Korea have given attention to youth 
smoking prevention in the form of the "I love I" campaign with major media, 
such as a leading Korean newspaper, Jongang-Iibo, and an internet portal site, 
Yahoo Korea. The programme targeted youths aged from 11 to 17 years, and 
was intensively advertised through its co-organisers, the newspaper and 
internet portal site. Similar with PM Korea's campaign, BAT Korea has also 
carried out campaigns to cigarette retailers not to sell cigarettes to youths. As 
well as youth smoking prevention, BAT has aimed its CSR efforts at college 
students (normally aged 19-27 years) through the "BAT Leadership Academy". 
While the programme is ostensibly billed as enabling participants to learn what 
they need to become a leader, according to a key informant, the company also 
learns how young people think. (BKL) BAT Korea has not only targeted 
youths, but has also conducted CSR activities aimed at poor and neglected 
people. Like PM Korea, BAT Korea has worked with CCK by donating 
funds collected by the company's employees. "Han-Sa-Lang", which means 
`one love', is a voluntary community service team in BAT Korea. The team 
regularly raises funds which it donates to CCK to support elderly and low 
income families. The CSR activities of BAT Korea have been reported in the 
company's annual "Social Report" since 2003, changed to the "Sustainability 
Report" in 2009. 
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Figure 6.9: BAT Korea's website to introduce its' CSR activities 
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Source: BAT Korea website (Available at www. batkorea. com, accessed 10`h September 2010) 
BAT Korea and PM Korea have made efforts by CSR activities in 
order to change their image from a harmful industry to a socially responsible 
industry in Korea. Through this, they have attempted to obtain sustainability 
management in the market which has become continually "darker". Although 
many CSR programmes have particularly supported poor and old people, as 
marketing tactics they have paid attention to targeted groups, young adults and 
females by advertising how much they are responsible on social issues and how 
much they give back to the society through CSR programmes. 
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6.5 TTCs' recent practices 
BAT and PM Korea continued to undertake "below-the-line" tactics to 
improve their sales. For example, both companies, as well as KT&G, pay a 
"listing fee" to owners of convenience stores to place their brands in an eye- 
catching spot, such as the cashier's counter, although the current TBA states 
that cigarette manufacturers are prohibited from giving money to licensed 
cigarette retailers. According to a newspaper article, the "listing fee" is a few 
million won (a few thousands US$) on a monthly or yearly basis. (35 1) 
Whilst BAT Korea has initiated its CSR activities since 2001, the 
company also ran a task force team at the time to promote its' leading brand in 
Korea, Dunhill. The team employed various "below-the-line" tactics, such as 
free sampling at night clubs, bars, and coffee shops. In particular, the unique 
tactic of the team was that the young people recruited by the company 
"accidentally" left empty Dunhill packages on the tables of the above places. 
According to the interview with the former BAT Korea employee (Anonymous 
5), this tactic was very successful and contributed to an increase of Dunhill's 
market share from 5 percent to 13 percent in the period of 2001 to 
2002. (Anonymous 5) 
These days, young adults aged over 19 prefer private parties rather 
than night clubs. Not only BAT Korea, but other tobacco companies do not 
miss this opportunity. Although BAT Korea and PM Korea officially denied 
their sponsorship of private parties, according to a newspaper interview with a 
party organiser, tobacco companies support all or half of the costs for parties 
and get chances to advertise their brands to the participants. (351) 
In addition, BAT Korea runs a unique cafe, "Cigarette", in the 
wealthiest street of the country, Chungdam-Dong, in order to study the lifestyle 
of the young Korean people according to the former BAT Korea employee 
(Anonymous 5). Through the cafe, the company collects information on 
young people's smoking habits, trends, and so on. The cafe offers customers 
relatively cheap beverages, a comfortable/luxury environment, and also sells 
BAT cigarettes. The cafe is popular with smokers, but, these days, non- 
smokers also often visit it. 
171 
Figure 6.10: BAT Korea's "Cigarettes" cafe 
Source: Youth No Smoking Association 
Although such "below-the-line" tactics are still undertaken by BAT 
Korea and PM Korea in order to maintain and expand their sales, building the 
image of a socially responsible tobacco company has become more important 
for TTCs. In response to the growth of tobacco control policies and 
legislation, CSR activities allow tobacco companies: to acquire credibility in 
the eyes of the public; to silence potential critics; to restore its battered 
reputation; to mitigate future lawsuits; and thereby to increase the value of 
corporate stock. (352-354) 
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6.6 TTC success in achieving growth in market share 
An analysis of trends in market share suggests that TTCs have been 
relatively successful at achieving sales growth by undertaking the above 
described tactics, despite anti-foreign sentiment, and adoption of stronger 
tobacco control policies in Korea. Since 2001, in particular, when BAT and 
PM established their own cigarette manufacturing facilities in South Korea, 
growth in market share of their brands has accelerated. (206,355,356) Table 
6.8 shows the growth of TTCs market share from 1988 to 2007. The 
exception during this period was a decline in the market share of imported 
brands between 1996 and 1998, due to the Asian economic crisis, which led to 
a large outflow of investment and foreign currency from South Korea. From 
2000, however, the Korean economy recovered, leading to a resumption of 
growth in market shares of TTCs again. 
BAT was the leader among TTCs with 17 percent of the total cigarette 
market in 2007, followed by PM with 9.8 percent and JTI with 4 percent. (356) 
As shown in Figure 6.11, BAT expanded its market share tenfold from 1.7 
percent in 2000 to 17 percent in 2007. PM more than doubled its market 
share during the same period. In contrast, KT&G, which held 100 percent of 
market share prior to liberalisation, dropped to 69.2 percent by 2007, 
although it remains by far the market leader in South Korea. (356) This 
growth suggests that, following market liberalisation, the varied marketing 
strategies described in this chapter had a positive impact on increasing market 
share for TTCs. 
173 
. ". ý 
Nz 
0, cýd 
ý 
`. , 
"0 Ö 
O ti NE 
. a3 ý 
.^ a "-- 
0'ý¢3 öN°ýÖ+ 
ýO 
ý 
bg ,C y 
.ý 
Op 
ýGý 
_ýý o a+ 
z .ý 
,e "ä 
ýC oo ý+ O ý 
v1 ö Cd 
N 
Q*Zý zý ä^ý ý 
... d 0 >. ~OE-v 
ý°ýý 
.-C 
U 
2Oý-=~ 
O iz 
9 
öýä202 
sý Q te2z 
ý 'rJ a bA ztJ ý m 4ý C 
ýy 
.. r ý;, ý 
Imzý- 
N'd. vi+ý. n ,M 
;: ö 
^ 
' u1? ýý" ^. ti3 
--ý ýo'_i0 P b. ^ -4) n9 
9 .0 ýýý02 ä 
r- 
öäv 
E oý 
ý. 
ýö 
Co e. öý 
aý"ýý'ý. c 
". 
ý. + 
m vý ü0 %ýý TH 
ý. ý-I" eýCý 
4=,. 
e 
"Iýb 
cýAo 
, um 
:E °- ý wäý 
nÖö O 
N. r- 
Of 
Vi 
cý 
ý Oý 
hyw ýý 
ÖdýX 
00 ý. - -c, 4äý 
cý9 5'ý1ý-j-. -d 
N 
ý 
N 
O 
ýD NN 
'4 o >, 
oý 
00 oo NN 
   
:ý 
ý ý 
aý ý. 
ý 
au 
... Gi, 
\° ý O 
ý 
V 
06 
F- 
Y 
00 0 
N lo 
JD 
N 
LL. 
ýRm IP I60 Lno 
m 
\ 
aý 
a O 
1ý 
ý 
0 ý cl-i 
C C 
0 
ý ý 
b a ý ý ý 
U 
.ý 
N 
ý 
O 
.b 
w 
O 
aý 
cla ý 
ý 
ý 
ý 
ýý 
ý .ý 
as 
ä 
Iu I. 
Iý 
Iý 
6.7 Summary 
This chapter describes the varied marketing tactics of TTCs to 
stimulate demand for their brands among the Korean people. Importantly, the 
practices TTCs used, however, were not simply what were declared to the 
public, namely those compliant with the restrictions under the TBA. As time 
went on, given the adoption of stricter regulations, this research found that 
TTCs increasingly used "below-the-line" tactics in order to circumvent a more 
restrictive marketing environment. This was effectively achieved by TTCs 
first studying the market and identifying target groups, and then developing 
strategies which were similar to the strategies they had used during the 
previous market access to Latin America and other Asian countries. 
As analysed by Shepherd, who argued that consumer preference is the 
most powerful entry barrier to new entrants in the tobacco industry, TTCs' 
marketing practices and promotional campaigns in South Korea paid particular 
attention to creating demand, by creating favourable brand imagery to appeal 
not only to existing but also potential smokers. However, given the hostility 
towards imported cigarettes among Korean people after market liberalisation, 
and legal restrictions on cigarette marketing activities, the communication of 
such messages to target groups to build brand image posed challenges. To 
overcome this, it was alleged that TTCs attempted to circumvent existing 
regulations and resistance through engaging in "illegal" strategies and indirect 
forms of marketing. CSR was also an important component of such below- 
the-line tactics. Based on the growth in TTCs' market share in Korea from 
market liberalisation to the present, these tactics have successfully achieved 
their goals. As discussed in Chapter 9, these findings offers lessons for other 
countries facing increased market liberalisation, notably developing countries 
yet to be targeted by TTCs. 
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CHAPTER 7 MARKET LIBERALISATION & KOREA'S 
TOBACCO INDUSTRY 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter will describe in detail how the domestic company and 
tobacco-related regulations have changed in Korea since the late 1980s as a 
result of market liberalisation. As described in Chapter 5, the government 
expected the increased market access by transnational tobacco companies 
(TTC) to the South Korean tobacco industry to lead to greater competition. In 
anticipation of this, the Office of Monopoly (OOM) was reformed into a state- 
run corporation to make it more competitive with TTCs, including greater 
responsiveness to anticipated changes in the liberalised market. Tobacco- 
related regulations were also revised to comply with the Record of 
Understanding (ROU) between the US and South Korea. 
This chapter will begin by analysing how market liberalisation and the 
consequent activities by TTCs have impacted upon the Korean tobacco market 
and the domestic tobacco company. This will be followed by an examination 
of the marketing tactics that the domestic company carried out in order to 
preserve its market share following liberalisation. The current competitive 
activities of KT&G22 will then be reviewed and, finally, the current role of 
KT&G in the global tobacco market. 
The findings of this chapter suggest that, in response to competition 
from TTCs, the reformed Korea Tobacco and Ginseng Corporation (KTGC) 
attempted to draw on influence achieved under its former monopoly status to 
hinder the sale and distribution of imported cigarettes. KTGC also appealed 
to nationalist feelings held by Korean consumers, playing on the company's 
status as a public corporation and major contributor to national revenues. 
Additionally, the company pursued various competitive strategies, such as 
upgrading the quality and image of its brands, advertising brands in innovative 
ways, and substantially increasing the level of marketing spend overall in order 
22 KT&G stands for Korea Tomorrow & Global and is the current name of the privatised 
Korean tobacco company. 
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to compete with foreign competition. All of these developments transformed 
the Korean market. 
As a result of this more competitive market environment, the total 
volume of cigarette sales in Korea increased, from 81.4 billion in 1991 to 101.7 
billion sticks in 1992, the highest level in Korean history. With this rapid 
increase in tobacco consumption, South Korea became the 8`h largest tobacco 
market in the world in 1992. (225,292) The consequent impact on public 
health will be discussed in Chapter 8. 
7.2 Transformation of Korea's domestic tobacco company 
7.2.1 Restructuring and privatisation of the domestic industry 
In direct response to greater market competition, the OOM underwent 
several reforms. First, following the decision in 1986 to allow TTCs to sell 
their brands to Korean consumers within limited import quotas, the 
government decided to transform the OOM into the state-owned company, 
Korea Monopoly Corporation (KOMOCO) in 1987. This decision was the 
result of a prediction by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) that, given a more 
competitive market, the OOM needed to improve efficiency and behave more 
aggressively. (357) 
After South Korea and the US signed the ROU in 1988, which more 
fully opened the Korean tobacco market, the word `monopoly' in the name of 
KOMOCO ceased to be used. In 1989, KOMOCO was renamed KTGC 
under the newly enacted Tobacco Business Act (TBA, 1989) which replaced 
the Tobacco Monopoly Act (TMA). With this change, KTGC lost some of its 
monopoly status and consequently initiated its own activities to compete with 
foreign companies. KTGC's detailed marketing practices to preserve its 
market share are discussed in section 7.5. 
Amid the Asian economic crisis in 1997, KTGC found itself subject to 
further reform, with the government initiating a process to privatise the state- 
run corporation. As discussed in Chapter 3, during the 1980s and 1990s, the 
Korean economy experienced rapid growth under an export-oriented economic 
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strategy. However, global financial volatility adversely impacted on the 
country's macroeconomic climate, highlighting structural weaknesses, such as 
corporate over-investment, a vulnerable financial structure, and mismatch of 
foreign assets and liabilities by the banking sector. The resultant crisis led the 
Korean government to request assistance from the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and, on 3rd October 1997, a recovery programme was agreed. The 
programme required comprehensive structural adjustment in the corporate and 
financial sectors. (358) As part of this programme, the IMF also suggested 
privatisation of state-run corporations including KTGC. This policy was 
consistent with IMF policy to support privatisation of state-run tobacco 
companies in Bulgaria, Mali, Moldova, Thailand, Turkey, and South Korea. 
In contrast, by this period the World Bank had recognised "tobacco use is an 
impediment to development" because the economic costs of tobacco-related 
disease are enormous. (359,360) 
Under pressure from the IMF, the Governor of the Bank of Korea, 
Chol Hwan Chon, and the Minister of Finance and Economy, Kyu Sung Lee, 
sent a `Korea Letter of Intent and Memorandum on Economic and Financial 
Policies' to the IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus in March 1999. 
In this letter, the Korean government reported that "Public sector reform has 
been advanced through privatizing and restructuring public enterprises and 
downsizing government bodies"(361). It was promised that: 
[fJull privatization of four other state-owned enterprises (Korea 
Ginseng and Tobacco, Korea Gas, Daehan Oil Pipeline, Korea District 
Heating) will occur in phases over the next four years. (361) 
A November 1999 Letter of Intent and a July 2000 letter further 
clarified the March letter, explaining that "Korea Tobacco and Ginseng 
[KTGC] was publicly listed and an 18 percent stake in the company has been 
sold"(362). It was stated that "The government plans to reduce its shares in 
the company including by issuing depository receipts in foreign stock 
markets". (363) These changes came in 2002 when the government 
179 
transformed KTGC into a joint stock company, despite strong anti-privatisation 
sentiments among the public. (261) 
From 1999 to 2002, KTGC stocks owned by the government were 
listed on the Korean Stock Market, as well as various international stock 
markets. By December 2002, KTGC was completely privatised, changing its 
name to KT&G. Since privatisation, KT&G can no longer be described as a 
Korean company, with more than half of the company's stocks now held by 
non-Korean shareholders. (364) 
The documents suggest that some TTCs attempted to participate in 
KTGC's privatisation. Philip Morris (PM) stated an intention to take over 
KTGC in 1998. In particular, the company highly prized KTGC's national 
distribution network. In October 1998, PM President Geoffrey Bible met 
President Dae Jong Kim at the Blue House23 (Cheng-Wa-Dae), stating that PM 
was ready to participate in KTGC's privatisation. PM's strategy to take over 
KTGC was, firstly, to push the government to divide the state-run company 
into several privatised companies, and, secondly, to buy each company. (261, 
365) A 1997 British American Tobacco (BAT) market overview was also 
keen to take advantage of the business opportunities arising from KTGC's 
privatisation: 
Changes in this organization [KTGC] are expected due to the 
privatization discussed for 1998. We are continuing to liaise closely 
with them [the Korean government] to ensure that we are the "first 
contact "for any business opportunities which may arise. (321) 
However, these attempts by TTCs failed because the government preferred to 
sell KTGC to domestic companies rather than foreign investors. The 
government still believed that the contribution of the tobacco industry to 
Korea's economy was significant. Although most national industries, 
including private and public companies, experienced difficulties, KTGC was 
still profitable at the time. In addition, negative public opinion on selling 
domestic companies to foreign companies was widespread. (366) 
23 The Blue House or "Cheong-Wa-Dae" is the executive office and official residence of the President of Republic of Korea. 
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Given the severity of the economic crisis, however, the government 
inevitably had to change its policies on the tobacco industry. As part of the 
IMF's programme, the government enacted a new regulation, `Act on The 
Improvement of Managerial Structure and Privatisation of Public Enterprises 
24 
in 1997. (367) The government planned to privatise the core state-run 
companies including KTGC under the Act, while limiting the holding of stock 
by foreign investors to 7 percent. However, since the completion of 
privatisation in 2002, the company has no longer been regulated by the Act. 
This means that there has been no ceiling on foreigners' possession of KT&G 
shares since 2002. Thereafter, foreign ownership of shares in KT&G 
significantly increased, as shown in Table 7.1. 
Table 7.1: Foreign ownership of KT&G shares 
Year Percentage of foreign ownership 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
27.7 
38.0 
63.1 
55.9 
52.5 
52.5 
Source: KT&G's annual reports (Available at httL//www. ktnR. com/kor/ir/irbrief. isp, accessed 
1 0th October 2010) 
Since privatisation, the biggest foreign shareholder has been Franklin 
Mutual Advisers, LLC, which is a subsidiary of Franklin Resources, Inc, a 
global investment organisation operating as Franklin Templeton Investments. 
Franklin Mutual Advisers, LLC, began purchasing KT&G's stocks through the 
24 The purpose of the Act for public enterprises was to improve the efficiency of business 
management and promoting expedited privatisation, while preventing the concentration of 
economic power in the course of the promotion of privatisation". Four corporations - KTGC, 
the Korea Telecommunications Corporation, the Korea Gas Corporation, and the Korea Heavy 
Industry and Construction - were governed by the Act. 
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Franklin Mutual Global Discovery Fund from late 2000 (368), and became the 
biggest shareholder among foreign investors with more than 8 percent in 2005 
and 10 percent in 2006 (369). The Franklin Mutual Global Discovery Fund 
has basically invested in undervalued companies from around the world of any 
size or sector that they believe have the potential to deliver long-term capital 
growth. Thus, KT&G, which experienced a 50 percent decrease of its stock 
price due to the Asian Economic Crisis, was an attractive target for the Fund. 
The top investment sectors which the Fund currently invests in are food, 
beverages, and tobacco. Among the top ten holdings of the fund were three 
tobacco companies: BAT, Imperial Tobacco and Lorillard. (370) 
7.2.2 End of monopoly over manufacturing 
The privatisation of KTGC brought many changes to Korea's tobacco 
industry. First, the MOF eliminated KTGC's monopoly over cigarette 
manufacturing. Since 2001, any company having relevant capital and 
manufacturing capabilities could obtain a cigarette manufacturing license from 
the MOF. (371) Second, the notification but not approval of the MOF on 
cigarette pricing was required in advance. Third, the government abolished 
KTGC's mandatory quota to purchase tobacco leaves, provide subsidies and 
compensate Korean tobacco farmers for bad weather factors. (371) 
Once the monopoly of cigarette manufacturing was abolished, both 
PM and BAT established their own local subsidiaries, PM Korea and BAT 
Korea, respectively and successfully built local manufacturing facilities as they 
had long hoped to do. (372) BAT Korea established its factory at Yangsan 
City in Gyungnam Province. According to key informants, the provincial 
governor of Gyungnam Province was keen on inviting foreign tobacco 
manufacturers to his Province in order to improve public revenues. (BKL, 
Anonymous 5) To win over the local community and achieve planning 
approval from the local authority, BAT offered several benefits such as 
employment of local people and use of Korean tobacco leaf. Thus, despite 
protests from tobacco control advocates, BAT won approval to build its factory. 
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During the same period, PM also contacted the local government of Gyungnam 
Province, and was given permission for its factory at Sachun City. As a result 
of BAT's and PM's local production facilities, total cigarettes manufactured in 
South Korea sharply increased in 2002 by around 20 percent. (See Table 7.2) 
Table 7.2: Cigarette production in South Korea, 1986 to 2004 
Year Million sticks manufactured Key event 
1986 78,490 
Market liberalisation with import 
quotas 
1987 81,433 
1988 86,244 Complete market liberalisation 
1989 86,796 
1990 92,000 
1991 94,376 
1992 96,662 
1993 96,900 
1994 90,679 
1995 87,509 
1996 93,001 
1997 94,252 Beginning of KTGC's privatisation 
1998 103,586 
1999 97,135 
2000 98,286 
2001 97,700 
2002 93,750 Complete privatisation of KTGC and 
abolition of manufacturing monopoly 
2003 122,341 
2004 123,700 
Sources: 
1) United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service. (Available at 
httt : //www. fas. usda. ov/psdonline/psdDownload aspx, accessed 15 June 2010) 
2) United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service. Tobacco: World 
Markets and Trade. September 2002. 
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As described above, while PM and BAT attempted to participate in 
KTGC's privatisation in the late 1990s, after privatisation in 2002, there is no 
evidence of TTCs holding KT&G shares, although the Franklin Mutual Global 
Discovery Fund also holds shares in BAT, Imperial and Lorillard. Why have 
TTCs not been interested in holding KT&G shares since privatisation? One 
reason is likely to have been the establishment of local manufacturing capacity. 
Another may have been TTCs' concerns over public hostility to foreign 
cigarette companies. As one PM Korea manager (Anonymous 4) described, 
"If PM buy KT&G's shares, the company would face strong anti-PM sentiment 
from Korean nationals". (Anonymous 4) Similarly, a former BAT Korea 
employee believes that BAT would not buy KT&G's shares, because the 
company recognised that such action would cause hostility towards BAT 
among Korean people. (Anonymous 4 and Anonymous 5) 
7.3 The revision of tobacco-related regulations in Korea 
The first tobacco-related regulation adopted in South Korea was the 
TMA, enacted in 1956 under the OOM to regulate the tobacco industry as a 
national business. Subsequently the Act was totally amended in 1972, and 
following economic development, it was revised three times in 1981,1983, and 
1987 before its abolition on 1 January 1989. While there were relatively 
small amendments in 1981 and 1983, the major reform was carried out in 1987 
following TTCs' initial market entry in 1986. The key changes during the 
amendment in 1987 are as follows. 
First, the possession and use of foreign cigarettes was a criminal 
offence under Article 49 which stated: "It is not permitted to sell, buy, or 
possess cigarettes which are not manufactured and distributed by the 
OOM". (373) As discussed above, during negotiations on market 
liberalisation, this provision caused TTCs to complain strongly. Thus, 
following the trade agreement, the revised TMA (1987) eliminated Article 49 
and Koreans have since been permitted to sell, buy, and smoke foreign 
cigarettes. 
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Second, from limited market liberalisation in 1986, the government 
was concerned about TTCs' marketing and advertising practices as the key 
means to build brand awareness for their products. (357) Thus, the TMA 
(1987) and its Enforcement Ordinance added new provisions, Article 29 and 30 
respectively, which restricted almost all forms of cigarette advertising and 
promotion. The detailed restrictions on cigarette advertisements were as 
follows: 
Prohibited cigarette advertising and promotions: 
a) by using broadcast media, such as TV, radio; 
b) by using printed media, such as newspapers, magazines, but print 
media in foreign languages are excepted; 
c) by using public transportation, such as buses, trains, but airplanes 
and ships travelling on international routes are permitted; 
d) by using outdoor signs, such as billboards, placards, posters, neon 
signs; 
e) in public places such as cinemas, sports centres; and 
f) by distributing free cigarettes or promotional materials to retailers 
and consumers. (374) 
Third, prior to the limited market liberalisation, the OOM monopolised 
the country's tobacco industry, including manufacturing, distribution pricing, 
as well as tobacco leaf cultivation and licensing of cigarette retailers. Under 
the revised TMA (1987), the authority of the OOM was given to the state-run 
company, KOMOCO. The tobacco business remained monopolised. 
As briefly described in Chapter 5, during trade negotiations, the US 
Trade Representative (USTR) on behalf of the US Cigarette Export 
Association (USCEA) pressured the Korean government to lift restrictions on 
all forms of cigarette advertising and promotion. (215) Following completed 
market liberalisation, the MOF further amended the TMA Enforcement 
Ordinance in July 1988 based on the provisions in the ROU, and allowed 
selective forms of cigarette advertising and promotion as follows: (336) 
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a) cigarette promotion (by free sampling or displaying advertising 
posters, stickers, and signboards) in the retail shops. 
b) placement of 120 advertisements per brand family annually in 
magazines except magazines specifically directed at women or 
youth. 
c) sponsorship of social, cultural, musical, athletic, and other specific 
events except events directed at women or youth. 
d) advertising on airplanes and ships, operating in international routes, 
at international airports or waiting rooms of international 
piers. (336,375) 
The TMA (1987) was abrogated on 1 January 1989 and the TBA came 
into effect on the same day. However, it is argued here that the TBA (1989), 
like the TMA, primarily addressed economic and industrial concerns, and paid 
limited attention to public health. The purpose of the TBA was "to contribute 
to the national economy and to ensure the sound development of the tobacco 
industry. " (314) 
Under the newly enacted TBA (1989), KTGC still monopolised 
cigarette manufacturing. However, cigarette imports and sales were 
liberalised. In order to protect tobacco leaf farmers, KTGC continued to 
support leaf cultivation. The state-run company no longer had authority over 
cigarette distribution, with cigarette retailers needing permission from the MOF. 
However, the MOF committed licensing cigarette retailers to KTGC, thus, the 
company practically had the same power on licensing retailers after market 
liberalisation. While the price of domestic cigarettes was determined by 
KTGC, imported cigarette prices were determined by the importer and needed 
only to be declared to the MOF in advance. In addition, KTGC was no longer 
able to give instructions to licensed retailers. (314) In terms of restrictions on 
tobacco marketing, advertising, and promotional activities, there was no 
change from the TMA (1987) and its Enforcement Ordinance 1988. (290,314) 
Following government policy to privatise state-run companies, 
including KTGC, to address the economic crisis, the TBA was significantly 
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amended in 2001. As discussed above, KTGC's manufacturing monopoly 
was abolished and its interventions on tobacco leaf cultivation and cigarette 
sales/distribution were also eliminated. However, licensing cigarette retailers 
has still been committed to KTGC. (371) In terms of cigarette advertising, 
there was a slight change, with the contents of cigarette promotional materials 
not permitted outside retail outlets, and the amount of annual magazine 
advertisements was reduced from 120 to 60. (376) In addition, the TBA 
(2001) inserted a new provision: "All manufacturers, import, and sale business 
operators and wholesalers shall be prohibited from giving out money and other 
promotional materials to retailers in order to enhance their tobacco sales". (37 1) 
As discussed in Chapter 6, these practices were previously widely used by 
TTCs and KTGC in competing for market share. 
Since the amendment of the TBA in 2001, the Act has been 
continually revised in accordance with changes in tobacco policy and the 
market environment. At the time of writing, it has been amended 15 times 
since its enactment in 1988. 
7.4 Undermining tobacco control policy 
As well as creating demand and building brand awareness following 
market liberalisation, TTCs attempted to protect the tobacco industry from 
increasing concerns about the health impacts of tobacco use and the growth of 
the tobacco control movement. For this common purpose, this research 
argues that TTCs and KTGC made collective efforts to circumvent and 
undermine emerging tobacco control policies, which in their view transformed 
the environment into a "dark" market. 
Previous analysis has shown that the tobacco industry has used a 
variety of tactics to impede tobacco control policies and regulations. These 
include conducting public relations campaigns, paying scientific experts to 
create controversy about established facts, funding political parties, using front 
groups and allied industries, and pre-empting strong legislation by adopting 
voluntary codes or weaker laws, and so on. (377) 
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7.4.1 Voluntary self-regulatory Code 
In response to the USTR's pressure on Korea's restrictions on all 
forms of tobacco marketing, advertising, and promotional practices, the MOF 
allowed limited forms of marketing practices for the tobacco industry by 
amending the TMA in 1987. At the same time, the MOF also added a new 
provision that suggested that the tobacco industry organise a consultative group 
and make efforts to observe the limitations on marketing. (336) 
Following the MOF's suggestion, KTGC, PM, R. J. Reynolds (RJR), 
and Brown &Williamson (B&W) formed the Korean Tobacco Association 
(KTA) in 1988 as a forum to address issues of importance to the tobacco 
industry. (238) However, the Association was ineffective until 1990 because 
of competition between the member companies. The main activity of the 
KTA in the beginning was just to support the Korean Cigarette Consumer 
Association as an indirect way to communicate with existing consumers. 
Later, however, the Association turned its role to an organisation to protect the 
industry from a "dark" market environment. 
The member companies of KTA signed a Voluntary Self-regulatory 
Code for their marketing, advertising, and promotional activities on 12th 
January 1991. The Code reflected the need to agree on the scope of tobacco 
marketing, advertising, and promotional activities, and cooperation among the 
signatories. The detailed contents of the Code are as below: 
Advertising is to be directed at existing adult smokers and shall be 
intended solely to encourage brand loyalty, and not to increase 
consumption or increase the number of smokers. It shall not be 
specifically directed at women and youths. Cigarettes shall not be 
advertised via cinema, television, radio, newspapers or publications 
directed at women or youths. Each member of the KTA shall not place 
more than 120 cigarette advertisements per brand family in magazines 
per calendar year. The creative content of magazines is restricted 
concerning the representation of persons smoking, health claims, the 
depiction of physical activity and testimonials of sports or popular 
celebrities. Health warnings shall be displayed on cigarette packets 
in accordance with the requirements of the Roll [Rule] and Article 13 
of the Enforcement Decree of the Tobacco Business Act. Health 
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warnings shall also appear in magazine cigarette advertisements, and 
on other advertising media, such as illuminated signs, umbrellas and 
vending machines. Point-of-sale promotional material may only be 
situated inside retail outlets or in their immediate vicinity. Entry 
forms and advertising materials for all cigarette sales promotions must 
state that persons who are minors are ineligible. Free samples are 
restricted to one cigarette only, given to adult smokers who also 
purchase cigarettes at licensed retail outlets. Members of the KTA 
may sponsor social, cultural, musical, sports or similar events which 
are not specifically directed at women or youths. Members shall 
respect the marketing activities, materials and property of other 
members and shall refrain from unfair practices and respect the 
integrity of cigarette retailers. (378) 
The Code was ostensibly formulated in consonance with the MOF's 
suggestion under the TMA (1987), and limited the member companies' 
marketing practices based on the regulation. Yet, as discussed in Chapter 6, 
the member companies had undertaken varied marketing tactics, which were 
allegedly "illegal" and should not have been done under the Code. The Code 
therefore appears to have just been used to mitigate growing health concerns on 
smoking and increased tobacco control policies/regulations. 
7.4.2 Weakening the National Health Promotion Act 
Before the enactment of the National Health Promotion Act (NHPA) 
(1995), Korea's tobacco-related regulations were administered by the MOF. 
This reflected the focus of tobacco policy upon its economic rather than health 
aspects. In this context, tobacco control policies remained insufficient, 
leading the Ministry of Health (MOH), Korea Association of Smoking and 
Health (KASH), and other tobacco control advocates to press for the enactment 
of a new tobacco law under the MOH in the early 1990s. With the enactment 
of the NHPA in 1995, tobacco regulation under the responsibility of the MOH 
finally emerged. 
The NHPA restricted cigarette advertising and promotional activities 
in the same way as the TBA and, in addition, prohibited the sale of cigarettes to 
youths aged under 19 and regulated possible locations for the installation of 
cigarette vending machines. Moreover, since the enactment of NHPA, a 
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National Health Promotion Fund has been introduced, funded by the sale of 
each pack of cigarettes. (379) It was evaluated as the most unique 
achievement of the new regulations by Korea's tobacco control and health 
advocates. (BKL, ISK) 
However, TTCs and KTGC collectively sought to influence the 
passage of the Act by using the KTA to oppose it, sending an official opinion 
letter signed by all the member companies of KTA to the MOH registering 
their disagreement with the new bill issued in September 1994. (380) A KTA 
document, titled "Opinions on the Legislation Proposal of the Public Health 
Promotion Law(Draft)", set out the company's objections: 
The purpose of the enactment of this law lies in promoting national 
health by changing the national health education policy from passively 
detecting diseases in their early stages and treating them to actively 
conducting health education, improving nutrition and advocating a 
healthy lifestyle. 
This law overlooks air pollution caused by automobile exhaust fumes, 
cancer causing pollutants in tap water, pesticides and environmental 
pollution which directly cause harm to national health and only 
restricts cigarettes (alcohol). It therefore violates the purpose of the 
enactment and lacks equity. (381) 
In addition, in the document, the Association even claimed that: 
There is no such precedent because there is no objective and scientific 
proof that smoking is harmful to one's health and because such 
restrictions would infringe upon the personal right to smoke. Also, 
proceeds from the sales of cigarettes contribute a great deal to the 
nation's economy. (381) 
The KTA strongly argued against the proposed regulation, suggesting 
the rewriting of some of its provisions along the lines recommended by tobacco 
companies. As a result, the Act proposed by MOH and the actual Act finally 
enacted differed in significant ways. The KTA claimed disagreement on 
every line in the draft related to the tobacco industry. On Article 11 in the 
proposed draft, the role of the central and local governments on education and 
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anti-smoking campaigns to inform the public that smoking was harmful to their 
health was described. In addition, the Article regulated the need of health 
warnings on the front and back of cigarette packs. To these provisions, the 
KTA argued that: 
" To choose whether to smoke or not smoke is a fundamental right. 
Therefore, it is an infringement upon a person's fundamental right 
for the government to restrict smoking... 
" There is no precedent whereby the government, through legislative 
means, advocates anti-smoking campaigns or supports anti- 
smoking groups... 
" The "Korea-US Record of Understanding on the Tobacco Market" 
concluded by the Korean and US governments on July 1 of 1988, 
stipulates that health warnings should be placed on the side of 
cigarettes packs (Paragraph 6-E) and also that there should be 
consultations prior to the amendment of the law (Paragraph 7-A). 
Therefore, the two governments need to discuss the Record of 
Understanding beforehand. (381) 
Whilst the arguments by the KTA on Article 11 did not lead to any change to 
the final draft (379), the KTA's disagreements with Article 12 did impact on 
the final draft. Article 12 in the proposed draft included restrictions as 
follows: 
1) No one shall hand out free cigarettes or offer premiums to promote 
the sale of cigarettes. 
2) Cigarette manufacturers, distributors, wholesale and retail dealers 
as designated by the Tobacco Business Law shall not hand out 
money to promote the sale of cigarettes 
3) No one shall be allowed to set up cigarette vending machine. 
4) Retail dealers and other distributors shall be forbidden to sell 
cigarettes to anyone under 19. (381) 
On the third provision of Article 12, the KTA argued that: 
This provision is clearly unconstitutional since it excessively and 
fundamentally violates the right to choose an occupation and the 
right to commerce guaranteed by Article 15 of the Constitution. 
The final aim of prohibiting cigarette vending machines to be set 
up is probably to prevent teenagers from smoking. However, "the 
principle of prohibiting excessiveness " stipulated in the 
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Constitution should be applied in this case. There also needs to 
be a clear justification that prohibiting the installation of vending 
machines will prevent teenagers from smoking. However the 
following two reasons are not mentioned at all in this Draft. 
" It will not be possible to prevent teenagers from smoking 
solely by prohibiting the setting up of vending machines.... 
" It may be possible to prevent teenagers from smoking through 
anti-smoking education and guidance without outlawing 
vending machines 
The all-out prohibition of vending machines is excessively 
restrictive since there already exist law[s] (School Health Law and 
Tobacco Business Law) to prevent teenagers from smoking. (381) 
In relation to the fourth provision, the KTA complained that: 
This provision is realistically impossible to enforce. 
This is because there are no means by which retail dealers may 
check to see if those wanting to buy cigarettes are indeed over 19. 
In other words, it is impossible to tell if a person is over 19 simply 
by their outward appearance. Furthermore, retail dealers have 
no right to request IDs or other documents that may state an 
individual's age and those wanting to buy cigarettes have no 
obligation to provide such documents. (381) 
The opinion of KTA on Article 12 was generally accepted into the final draft. 
Thus, whilst the provision to prohibit the selling of cigarettes to anyone aged 
under 19 was retained, Sections 1,2, and 3 were removed or amended based on 
the opinion of KTA. (379) TTCs and KTGC thus collectively attempted to 
weaken tobacco control policies, with some success. 
7.4.3 Downward pressure on prices 
As discussed in Section 7.3, before TTCs' market entrance, cigarette 
prices were determined by the Monopoly. When the market was partly 
opened to foreign companies in 1986, the price was still monopolised by the 
state-run company, KOMOCO. Due to this, the price of imported cigarettes 
was almost three times higher than domestic cigarettes. (234) According to 
the former OOM manager (Anonymous 1) interviewed for this research, given 
that cigarette price was one of the important factors to influence consumers' 
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decisions at that time, the government strategically controlled the price of 
imported cigarettes. (Anonymous 1) 
After the signing of the ROU, however, the price of imported 
cigarettes was determined by the importer of those cigarettes. They just 
needed to declare the determined price to the MOF. The government and 
state-run company, KTGC, were no longer able to raise the price of imported 
cigarettes, hinder the entry of new competitors, and interfere with competitors' 
business or otherwise restrict competition. Through this, TTCs were better 
able to compete with the domestic brands. 
The Korean government also eliminated the remaining tariff on 
imports in July 1988. According to a former manager of KOMOCO 
(Anonymous 2), because KTGC still monopolised cigarette manufacturing 
although the tobacco market was fully opened (206,215,258), the zero percent 
tariff was acceptable. (206,215,258) In addition, under the ROU, only 
specific excise tax could be levied on cigarettes, thus, the educational and sales 
taxes on cigarettes were removed, and the excise tax, 360 won, equally applied 
to all cigarettes, both imported and domestic ones. (261,296) 
After this change, imported cigarettes became cheaper than the 
previous prices. In 1986, the price range of imported cigarettes was from 
1,400 won to 1,600 won (382), but the price after the change, went down to 
800-1,000 won. (296,308,383) For example, the price of PM's premium 
brand, Marlboro, declined from 1,400 won in 1986 to 800 won in 1988. (See 
Table 7.3) In the same period, the price of domestic brands slightly increased 
from 500 won in 1986 to 600-800 won in 1988. (308) 
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Table 7.3: Price change of PM's Marlboro after complete market 
liberalisation 
Limited liberalisation in 1986 (won) 
Manufacturer cost 327.15 
Tariff and clearance 410.01 
fee 
Educational tax 124.55 
Sales tax 74.73 
Retail margin 30 
Importer margin 433.56 
(KOMOCO) 
Complete liberalisation in 1988 (won) 
Manufacturer cost 
Excise tax 
Retail margin 
Distributor margin 
Importer margin 
Price per pack 1,400 
300 
360 
80 
45 
15 
Price per pack 800 
Source: 
1) Imported cigarettes on sales from Ist September. Seoul-Sinmoon. 13 August 1986. 
2) Philip Morris Asia Plan. Philip Morris. Bates No. 2500066295 (Available at 
http: //legacy. library. ucsf. edu/tid/iwe42eOO) 
Given the importance of price for sales, TTCs have continually raised 
issues on cigarette price and taxation following the change of market 
environment. When the government proposed to raise the cigarette price by 
increasing the excise tax in the early 1990s, TTCs attempted to hinder the 
proposal. A 1992 BAT letter from Richard Davies to Mike Baker describes 
how TTCs responded to the proposed tax increases of the Korean government 
as follows: 
I have talked to Brown & Williamson who are aware of this 
development. They have advised me that RJ Reynolds is taking this 
up with the U. S. Embassy in Seoul on the basis that such a tax increase 
is a violation of the Record of Understanding between the Korean 
Government and the USTR. If the Koreans proceed with this 
proposal it could envoke[evoke] the consultation procedure within the 
above Agreement. (384) 
Despite of the efforts of TTCs in recruiting the US Embassy in Seoul 
and working collectively, the tax went up 120 won per pack from 360 to 480 
won (excise tax, 460 won and public fund, 20 won) in 1994. As a result, 
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cigarette prices followed the increase in the range of 100 won (domestic 
brands) - 200 won (imported brands). (308) Subsequently, since 2002, due to 
the privatisation of KTGC, the domestic cigarette prices have been also 
determined by the privatised company, KT&G. Since then, the price of all 
cigarettes in Korea is decided by the manufacturers under market conditions. 
In 2001, when the monopoly of cigarette manufacturing was removed, 
any foreign tobacco company could manufacture their own brands in Korea. 
Following this change, the Korean government has levied a 40 percent tariff on 
imported cigarettes again. However, this has not impacted on the sales of 
Korea's leading TTCs, PM and BAT, because they have their own 
manufacturing factories in Korea. (206,215,258) 
7.5 The response of KTGC to market liberalisation 
7.5.1 Increase of marketing activities in a competitive market 
environment 
Prior to market opening, the OOM controlled the industry, including 
production, distribution, and sale of cigarettes. In this context, the Monopoly 
advertised very little, if any, because there was no competition in the market. 
An internal document of RJR describes advertising in the Korean market 
before market liberalisation as follows: "Prior to liberalisation, there was no 
advertising or very limited in the case of Korea because the government 
monopoly didn't need to advertise. " (295) PM's employee, Jung Hoon Kim 
(Marketing Service) also noted that there was little cigarette advertising and 
promotional activities by the government monopoly before liberalisation: 
The OOM does not advertise on radio, TV, cinema, billboards, and 
rarely advertise on newspapers or magazines. There are no coupons, 
sublets, POS [point of sale] & sampling. Only a small number of 
stickers for retail outlets. In fact, there is no need for the OOM to 
advertise nor promote their products. It's a monopoly market. When 
a new brand is launched, the public medium will let the public know, 
and it will sell. There are only 15 OOM cigarette brands in the 
market, and people know which brand is what. (207) 
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In addition, there is little evidence that the OOM's marketing targeted specific 
population groups, such as women, prior to market opening. (38) 
Documents suggest, however, that following TTCs' entry into the 
market, the domestic tobacco company's marketing, advertising, and 
promotional activities dramatically increased. (9) What factors contributed to 
these changes? First, as discussed in Section 7.2.1, the Korean government 
predicted increased competition once the market was opened to foreign 
companies in 1986. This expectation led KTGC to give greater attention to 
marketing oriented activities, such as developing and upgrading their brands to 
preserve customer loyalty and target females, and increasing sales promotions, 
etc. 
Second, during the early stage of market liberalisation, KTGC still 
retained a monopoly on cigarette manufacturing and strong influence over 
sales/distribution, and the government's tobacco policies. However, this 
power became rapidly weaker in the early 1990s due to TTCs' intensive 
marketing activities and their strong complaints about these remaining 
elements of monopoly. KTGC quickly realised that the company needed to 
concentrate more on marketing oriented strategies. 
Third, there were changes in Korean consumers' behaviour related to 
cigarette purchasing/smoking and social attitudes towards imported cigarettes 
from the early 1990s. At the beginning of market liberalisation, the Korean 
public avoided imported cigarettes because they were not manufactured by a 
Korean company. This nationalism towards imported cigarettes was 
significantly useful for KTGC to protect its market position from TTCs. Yet, 
Korean nationalism, which effectively hindered TTCs' activities as a major 
barrier, weakened with the country's rapid economic development, leading to 
changes in culture and social attitudes towards western countries, and an 
increasing desire for better quality imported products. According to market 
research conducted by PM in 1993, there was a downward trend in nationalist 
attitudes among Korean consumers towards foreign cigarette brands, from 85 
percent in 1991 to 78 percent in 1993. (291) Furthermore, the higher prices of 
TTCs' brands became less of a problem to Korean people. A 1993 PM 
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General Consumer Tracking Study found that a prejudice - "Imported 
cigarettes are too expensive" - among Korean smokers significantly decreased 
from 61 percent in 1991 to 28 percent in 1993. (291) This change can be 
explained by not only the falling prices of imported cigarettes after market 
liberalisation, but also increased income among Koreans following the 
country's economic growth. 
As a result of the above factors, KTGC which used to not market, 
advertise, and promote their brands through particular strategies intensively 
focused more attention on marketing oriented tactics. 
7.5.2 KTGC's tactics to preserve market share 
During the early phase of market liberalisation, when KTGC had no 
experience of market competition, it focused on thwarting TTCs' activities and 
strategies by using its remaining monopoly power rather than compete through 
marketing oriented strategies. As discussed in the previous chapters, there 
were strong anti-imported cigarettes sentiments among Koreans once the 
market was opened to imports. According to the interview with the former 
OOM manager (Anonymous 1) and KTGC's former executive (Anonymous 3), 
KTGC used this to protect its market share. Thus, the company frequently 
sent official letters to all the registered cigarette retailers urging them not to sell 
imported cigarettes by appealing to their patriotism. (Anonymous 1) KTGC 
even ordered the licensed cigarette retailers not to display imported cigarettes 
in their shops. Given its previous role in the market as the government 
monopoly division, KTGC easily utilised its strong influence over cigarette 
retailers, which used to be legally available under the TMA (1972) before the 
market liberalisation, to thwart TTCs' activities and solidify its dominant 
position. (292)(Anonymous 1 and 3) 
Sometimes, KTGC acted more aggressively to hinder TTCs' 
marketing activities. A RJR document addresses how KTGC behaved in 
response to TTCs' market access in 1988: 
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KT&G[KTGC] personnel tore down, defaced, and covered point-of- 
sale posters, shop signs, and awnings of importers. In some 
instances, they falsely told retailers that the placement of signboards is 
illegal and threatened to take them down. Threats were made against 
retailers regarding license renewal if they continued to allow import 
point-of-sale (POS) materials at their establishments. (221). 
A 1989 PM document also claimed: 
[T]he Monopoly [KTGC] has initiated harassment campaigns against 
imported cigarettes on several fronts. It has done everything possible 
to discourage retailers from selling imports, including threatening 
them with fines or loss of license for displaying point of sale material 
and defacing store front signs. The Monopoly has also appealed to 
retailers' sense of national pride, by claiming that they are hurting 
local farmers through the sale of imported cigarettes. The Monopoly 
has supported the efforts of its union to discourage the public from 
purchasing imported cigarettes.... This atmosphere persists today and, 
we believe, contributes to the performance of U. S. brands in Korea 
compared to the Japanese and Taiwanese markets. (233) 
Yet, as discussed before, these tactics of KTGC did not last long because of the 
rapid change of market environment and the attitudes of Korean nationals. 
A BAT document forecasted that KTGC would seek marketing 
oriented tactics to compete with TTCs: 
KT&GC has realized that their traditional marketing strategies were 
no longer as powerful as before and they were gradually losing control 
over the nationalistic consumer. . 
Both above the line and below the 
line activity was intensified in an effort to restrict the growth of 
imports. (308) 
The document also notes KTGC's short term strategies to maintain its market 
presence as follows: 
" Increase focus on the consumer 
" Continue to diversify their product ranges, particularly into higher 
price segments 
" Maintain their distribution strength 
" Increase marketing spend level (sales promotion) 
" Develop export business 
" Upgrade quality and image of quality (308) 
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Most of the things listed above are about new product development. In fact, 
KTGC moved quickly to preserve customer loyalty by developing and 
upgrading products as the initial activity to protect itself from TTCs' market 
penetration. 
To do this, first, KTGC undertook to develop new products that were 
of similar quality to imported cigarettes and could therefore more easily 
compete with them. The company introduced a high-quality blended cigarette, 
88 (Eighty-eight), that contained US tobacco leaf, and also upgraded the 
quality of other existing brands. Due to the improvement of quality, the 
manufacturing costs were, of course, increased but KTGC held down the prices 
of it brands. Thus, high-quality Korean cigarettes sold for 700 won (US$1) 
per pack, while their foreign counterparts fetched 1,000 won(US$1.60) in the 
early 1990s. (288) Furthermore, KTGC attempted to develop similar brands to 
TTCs' leading products, notably Mild Seven, Virginia Slims, Marlboro, 
Finesse, Kent, Vantage and Yves St. Laurent (YSL), which accounted for 89.2 
percent of imports. (308) In a PM document, this change of tactic by KTGC 
was anticipated: 
Korea remains primarily a soft pack, 85mm, low tar market. A 
combined share of 72% is held by three Monopoly brands, Pine Tree, 
88, and new Mount Halla, priced respectively at 500,600, and 700 
Won per pack. During the Plan period, we anticipate KT&G will 
launch products to match imports in every segment, with concentration 
on higher priced entries. (296) 
As a result, the 88 family brands, 88 Gold, 88 Light, and 88 Menthol were 
introduced soon in the market and replaced the former domestic mainstream, 
Pine Tree and 88. 
Second, in response to TTCs' marketing tactics to target females by 
introducing new brands, Finesse and Virginia Slim, KTGC similarly developed 
and marketed new brands with feminine names, such as Lilac, Jade, and Rose 
to reach out to Korean females. (38) This was a significant change in the 
domestic company's activities after market liberalisation. KTGC also made 
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efforts to provide similar packaging styles and length of cigarettes as those of 
imported ones. (215) 
Third, along with developing new high quality and designed brands, 
KTGC's strategies to improve their margins were to encourage consumers to 
switch to more expensive brands (i. e. "trade up") rather than increase product 
prices themselves. This was the reason why KTGC tended to introduce new 
and improved brands in the higher price category. This strategy was quite 
successful as evidenced by the successful launch of 88 which was priced 20 
percent higher than Pine Tree, the dominant brand at that time (about 55 
percent share of market). In its first full year in the market, 88 attained almost 
a 50 percent share of the market. (292) KTGC continued to remain extremely 
focused in terms of new product offerings and resources behind them. Given 
the success of 88, the company introduced other new brands such as Hallasan, 
Expo and Glory. (385) In addition, a PM document predicted that "KT&G's 
interest in co-operating with a competitor, to gain either international 
trademarks or advanced technology, is likely to increase as imports penetrate 
further into the market". (296) As predicted, KTGC sought joint development 
with foreign companies, such as Japan Tobacco International (JTI) in 
2000. (386) 
Fourth, during the early 1990s, KTGC continued to use its strengths in 
distribution, sales force support, and lobbying influence to protect the 
company's market share, and at the same time, became more marketing 
oriented, according to a BAT document. (283) KTGC aimed to effectively 
transform and develop from a manufacturer/distributor to a 
manufacturer/marketer. As a marketer, KTGC increased marketing activities, 
particularly in trade and retail promotions. As a result, KTGC's advertising 
and promotional expenditures skyrocketed 641 percent between 1987 and 
1990. (9,113) According to the former KTGC executive interviewed 
(Anonymous 3), KTGC's promotional practices focused on young people (He 
did not mention the exact age of the young people. However, when Korean 
people mention young people, they are generally university students. ). He 
mentions that: 
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As you know, there have been strong regulations on cigarette 
advertising and promotional activities in the Korean market. The 
restrictions apply equally on domestic and imported cigarettes. 
There were nothing the tobacco companies could do to promote sales. 
TV and radio were prohibited for cigarette advertising. Hence, we 
[KTGC] usually carried out various programmes, such as running a 
sports team [KTGC Volley Ball Team] and providing scholarships to 
young people, to approach the target group, young people. You know, 
these are indirect advertising strategies. (Anonymous 3) 
Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 6, following the increase in the use of 
cigarette vending machines by TTCs, KTGC also invested in vending 
machines in order to compete effectively, establishing its own cigarette 
vending machine company. 
7.6 KT&G's tactics in a competitive and "dark" market 
Since KTGC was privatised in 2002, the newly named KT&G has 
been highly focused on marketing, advertising, and promotional activities for 
their brands. 
As TTCs, particularly PM and BAT, have continued to increase market 
share since 2002, KT&G has resorted to ever more creative tactics, employing 
increasingly similar marketing tactics to stay one step ahead of the competition. 
However, regulations continue to restrict tobacco companies' marketing 
activities and, furthermore, these have been getting stricter. Therefore, 
KT&G's current advertising and promotional activities are mostly focusing on 
sophisticated "below-the-line"' tactics as TTCs have done, and broader CSR 
programmes have become an increasingly important way of both promoting the 
company and winning the hearts and minds of the South Korean public. 
These days, the CSR activities are common and leading tactics not only for 
KT&G but also TTCs, as shown in Chapter 6. 
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7.6.1 Transforming image 
In order to prepare effective marketing tactics, KT&G initially 
conducted company image advertising through TV, radio, newspapers, and 
magazines just after privatisation. Although cigarette advertising in these 
media has been strictly prohibited, KT&G skirted the regulation by advertising 
its company image for several years from 2003 to 2007, until KT&G's image 
advertising in TV, radio, and print media became a social issue by the efforts of 
tobacco control advocates. (387) By employing famous actors, a singer, a 
magician, and a young movie director in its advertising, the company initially 
let people know its new name and the company's vision with the catch phrase 
"We are imagining a better tomorrow". Subsequently, the advertising 
emphasised "imagination" by using the term "Sang-Sang-Ye-Chan" (meaning 
"Praise imagination"). There was nothing showing what KT&G 
manufactured and sold in any form of KT&G's advertising. As a result, 
KT&G was able to raise awareness by the public and successfully build a good 
image, in particular, among the younger generation. (See Figure 7.1) 
According to a tobacco control activist, Bok Kun Lee (BKL), currently many 
young people in fact do not realise that KT&G is a tobacco company. (BKL) 
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Figure 7.1: Examples of KT&G's image advertising in magazines and 
newspapers 
<,; i ý-,, 
1,1 1 t_> 
Source: Youth No Smoking Association 
Note: In this image, a young couple visit an old woman who lives alone for their weekend date. 
The title of the advertisement is "Imagining a better tomorrow". The message KT&G 
emphasises is the need to take care of a neglected class of people for a better tomorrow. 
,,, öi o1a11X4 KTZ)G 
Source: Youth No Smoking Association 
Note: In this image, the nation's famous film producer says "My movie starts from 
imagination". Through the poster, KT&G addresses "KT&G is supporting young 
imagination". 
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To undertake this strategy to transform the company's image through 
the mass media, KT&G spent substantial sums, as shown in Table 7.4. 
Table 7.4: KT&G's advertising expenditure on TV, radio, newspapers 
and magazines (US$) 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005* 
Brand 
image 955,212 620,282 764,131 16,313,614 14,170,651 7,561,445 
cost 
Total 
cost 2,204,902 894,994 3,536,982 19,254,243 17,741,504 8,727,013 
of ads 
Sour : Youth No Smoking Association 
Note: 
1) Brand image cost: Advertising expenses for company image promotion 
2) Total cost of advertising: Cost for all kinds of promotion including products promotion 
3) 1,000 won is equivalent with US$1 
4) *: data from January to August 2005 
This notable increase in KT&G's advertising expenditure between 2002 and 
2003 was not unusual for a tobacco company first entering a new market. It 
was a similar pattern for the TTCs when they first entered the Korean market, 
as described in Chapter 6. Although KT&G was the established domestic 
company, in order to re-establish itself, maintain significant market share and 
compete effectively following liberalisation, privatisation and its change of 
name, KT&G needed to spend a lot of money on advertising. After 
privatisation in 2002, the company therefore behaved similarly to a new firm 
entering a competitive market for the first time, despite starting with a much 
larger market share than the TTCs. 
7.6.2 "Below-the-line" tactics 
With a more positive company image among the people, KT&G has 
also found ways to compete with TTCs through subtle "below-the-line" 
activities. From 2003 to 2005, KT&G intensively focused on advertising and 
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sponsoring sporting and music events and so on. In addition, KT&G 
introduced new attractive package designs and new products based on the most 
developed manufacturing technology. In an attempt to build good 
relationships with retail outlets, the company also sponsored retailers by 
providing subsidies, which is prohibited under the law. 
Through various sponsorships of music festivals, TV entertainment 
programmes, and sports events, the company tried to approach young people 
who could be the future customers for the company. With the catch phrase, 
"KT&G supports fresh imagination of Tae-Ji Seo", the company sponsored 
Seo, the most famous singer in South Korea, also known as "Culture President 
of Korea" in 2004. (See Figure 7.2) The sponsorship programmes included 
Seo's comeback music concerts and his overseas travelling with a group of 800 
young people, called "KT&G's Imagination Tour Team". For KT&G, these 
programmes offered interaction between young people and the company, and 
attempted to establish a brand image that was fresh, energetic, and young. 
Figure 7.2: Advertising for Tae-Ji Seo's overseas trip with 800 members 
of "KT&G's Imagination tour team" 
Source: Youth No Smoking Association 
Note: In this advertisement, KT&G introduces its sponsorship programme for the country's 
most famous singer, Tae-Ji Seo and his tour with KT&G's Imagination Tour 
Team". (advertised in May 2004) 
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KT&G also sponsored a TV entertainment programme, titled "Sang- 
Sang-Won-Jung-Dae", which means `adventurers for imagination', in 2005. 
In the programme, several popular comedians travelled around the world to 
experience extreme rides in the world most famous amusement parks. The 
main target audience of the programme was children, youths, and young adults. 
KT&G's logo was not shown during the programme, but KT&G's logo as a 
sponsor for the programme was broadcast prior to its airing. KT&G's image 
advertising emphasising "Sang-Sang-Ye-Chan" and the name of programme 
"Sang-Sang-Won-Jung-Dae" matched each other. 
As well as sponsoring sports events, KT&G owned and run four sports 
teams, notably Volleyball team, Basketball team, Table tennis team, and 
Badminton team. Until October 2010, these four teams had been run directly 
by KT&G, but now have been handed over to KT&G's subsidiary, Korea 
Ginseng Corporation (KGC). The most popular team among the four is 
KT&G Basketball Team (currently KGC Basketball Team). Basketball is one 
of the most popular sports and recognised as a national sport in Korea. Thus, 
a majority of children love basketball and KT&G's team has a huge number of 
young supporters. However, the important problem is that those children who 
support KT&G's team do not recognise what KT&G is and what it actually 
manufactures. (BKL) In 2005, KT&G sponsored the 2005 Korea National 
Volleyball League as the main sponsor. Through this sponsorship, as shown 
in Figures 7.4, the KT&G logo was prominently displayed during TV 
broadcasting. 
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Figure 7.3: KT&G's four sports teams before October 2010 
Source: Youth No Smoking Association 
Figure 7.4: Display of KT&G's logo through sponsorship of the 2005 
Korean National Volleyball League 
Sow-cc: ti outh No Snwl. iuq; Auciation 
Meanwhile, in order to obtain a better position in the market, KT&G 
has managed cigarette distribution, just as the previous forms of the company 
did by using monopoly power. KT&G has supported cigarette retailers by 
offering monthly subsidies and discounted rates on wholesale prices of KT&G 
brands. (388)(BKL) This activity of tobacco companies, however, has been 
restricted under the TBA as previously discussed. This is intended to build 
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good relationships between the retailers and the company, so that KT&G can 
control cigarette displays in the shops so that they only show or sell KT&G 
brands. As well as subsidies, KT&G has provided various convenient 
facilities to retail outlets for free. In particular, Korean motorway service 
stations are a good example of KT&G's tactics to control retail outlets. The 
convenient facilities KT&G offers include TVs, ashtrays, benches, and sun 
shades etc. (See Figure 7.5) Through these donations, the company has 
secured the right to sell its cigarette brands exclusively to motorway service 
users. The arrangement ensures competing brands are excluded from a large 
number of distribution outlets. (BKL)(389) An article on KT&G's tactics on 
motorway service stations has been published in the academic journal Tobacco 
Control as News item in 2008. (Appendix D) KT&G was fined by the Fair 
Trade Commission (FTC) in June 2008 for these activities. (388,390) BAT 
Korea reported to the FTC in 2007 that KT&G offered incentives to cigarette 
retailers not to display BAT's brands. This was thought at first a rumour, but 
an investigation of the FTC proved it true. (390) 
Figure 7.5: KT&G logoed umbrellas and ashtrays in one of Korea's 
motorway service stations 
Source: Y outti NU Smoking rAuciaUUo 
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Furthermore, in order to target young adults, mainly young females, 
and research their smoking habits and lifestyle, KT&G has run special smoking 
cafes in the capital city and also conducted focus group studies. In KT&G's 
smoking cafes, there are various facilities for study/business meetings, games, 
and movies for customers. Although these are smoking cafes, many non- 
smokers also visit them, to take advantage of the comfortable facilities and 
cheaper beverage/food prices they offer. In addition, the cafes are used for 
new brand launching events and other marketing activities. KT&G's focus 
group studies are quite popular with college students due to relatively high 
payments. Bok Kun Lee says: 
KT&G also conduct focus group research for their new products. 
Before launching a new cigarette, the company recruits young adults 
aged 20-25 and conducts their studies. In this case, the female 
participants get paid more than the males. (BKL) 
As a tactic to retain current smokers who are loyal to KT&G's brands 
and to attract new customers, KT&G has adopted unique, colourful, and eye- 
catching cigarette package designs. This contrasts with the growing debates 
in many countries about the adoption of plain cigarette packaging. While 
many countries have adopted regulations on cigarette package design requiring 
larger warning messages or graphic images, and prohibiting the use of cartoons 
(on the grounds that they appeal to children), KT&G has been developing new 
designs. The company has even worked on this in collaboration with one of 
Korea's most famous fashion designers. The results are a cartoon cat 
character for the brand, Raison; the use of different designs following the four 
seasons for the brand, Seasons; and rendering warning messages less effective, 
by making them the same colour as the package itself. (See Figure 7.6) 
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Figure 7.6: Examples of KT&G's cigarette package designs 
44 
Source: Youlli No 'Smoking Assuciatitm 
Note: KT&G's cartoon character, Raison cat 
I 
I 
TC213 
ÖO$ A IýILh ! -1 -1 
RAISON BLACK mg 
i 
ý. 
I 
Source: Youth No Smoking Association 
Note: Both package designs are for one of KT&G's current brands, Seasons. As the four 
seasons of nature, spring, summer, fall and winter, there are four different designs which 
illustrate each season's colours and mood. The left one is the spring version of Seasons 
cigarette package and the other is the summer version. 
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Source: Youth No Smoking Association 
Note: The package design for KT&G's international leading brand, Esse Special Gold. To 
evoke an image of luxury, the advertisement for the brand shows the most precious diamond, 
yellow diamond. The main target group for Esse Special Gold is leaders and older people. 
7.6.3 Corporate social responsibility activities 
Given the growth of tobacco control activities and tightened 
regulations against smoking and the tobacco industry's activities in South 
Korea, KT&G have turned their marketing activities from direct and aggressive 
to indirect styles since the mid 2000s, in a similar way to TTCs. KT&G has 
adopted `corporate social responsibility' (CSR) tactics, just as the TTCs have 
done, but according to Bok Kun Lee, these days KT&G leads the industry in 
these type of activities: 
The current marketing tactics of the tobacco companies in Korea are 
CSR activities. They use these unique strategies as a loophole from 
tobacco control policies and stronger regulations. KT&G is the best 
at this. BAT Korea and PM Korea also employ CSR activities as the 
main marketing strategies, however, perhaps due to several 
experiences of lawsuits around the world, foreign companies are 
playing very carefully. (BKL) 
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Although PM Korea and BAT Korea have invested in CSR activities 
in order to communicate with the Korean people and to project an image of a 
sustainable company, actual expenditure on these programmes is quite low. 
According to a newspaper article, in 2009 PM Korea and BAT Korea spent no 
more than 0.01 percent of their cigarette sales in Korea on such activities. (39I ) 
In contrast, KT&G has spent more than 1 percent of its cigarette sales in both 
the domestic and international markets on CSR activities. The former 
President of KASH, 11 Soon Kim, comments on the tobacco industry's CSR 
programmes: 
Foreign tobacco companies pretend that they care about social issues, 
so they carry out various CSR activities, but in fact, the purposes of 
these activities are to change their companies' image from companies 
manufacturing death to companies making a better world. Virtually 
they spend a small budget on CSR activities, but they focus on 
advertising their activities through various media. (ISK) 
Analyses of CSR activities in the tobacco industry to date have tended 
to focus on their role in mitigating anti-tobacco sentiment and maintaining 
credibility or regaining lost legitimacy. (353) However, CSR may also play a 
role in marketing, since company logos are widely emblazoned in ways that do 
not directly advertise particular cigarette brands, but which promote the 
company and its products generally. Such activities thus effectively 
circumvent current restrictions on direct tobacco advertising. CSR may thus 
be seen, in part, as a response to stronger tobacco control measures. (353,354) 
KT&G launched its CSR activities in earnest in 2003. During its 
transformation of company image after privatisation, KT&G focused on 
"sustainability management" and established the KT&G Welfare Foundation in 
July 2003. The company has determined four main areas in its CSR activities, 
notably, social welfare, social responsibility, social value creation, and 
environment protection. (392) In July 2007, KT&G officially announced that 
the company would spend more than US$216 million for CSR activities until 
2010 (See Table 7.5), and this was widely reported in the media. 
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Table 7.5: KT&G's planned budgets for CSR, 2007-2010 (US$ million) 
Area Item Budget 
Direct Indirect 
expense expense 
Financial and medical 
Social welfare 
supports for 
neglected or old 
61.8 61.8 
people 
Public campaigns, 
social 
non-smoking 
responsibility 
programmes for 8.5 4.7 3.8 
youths, improving 
smoking areas 
Supporting academic 
social value research, cultural 137.9 113.5 24.4 
creation activities, and 
students 
Supporting academic 
research on 
environment environment issue 1.2 1.2 
protection and environment 
organisations 
Social 
Others communication and 6.8 2.8 4.0 
donation 
Total 216.2 182.8 34.4 
Source: Youth No Smoking Association 
Note: 
1) Direct expense for KT&G's direct programmes 
2) Indirect expense for other organisations committed by KT&G 
3) The Korean currency won is converted to US dollars. (1,000 won= approximately US$1) 
KT&G's CSR has particularly targeted neglected and vulnerable 
groups, such as elders who live alone and social care organisations. It even 
targets children. There are a number of examples of KT&G's CSR. First, 
KT&G attempts to interact with younger people by supporting various 
scholarships and holding exhibit competitions for them. The company 
frequently holds or sponsors open exhibits with cultural and academic topics to 
target college students and young office workers. The prizes for these 
competitions are usually much higher than for others, thus, thousands of 
students participate. Through this, KT&G aims to communicate with young 
people, their target group for the tobacco business. 
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Second, KT&G has donated 100 cars to social care organisations every 
year since 2004. The cars clearly bear the KT&G logo and are the same 
colour as the company's cigarette delivery vehicles. (See Figure 7.7) This 
programme has successfully built good relationships between KT&G and 
social care experts and their clients, and allowed KT&G to promote its public 
image. Thus, when the government and tobacco control advocates attempt to 
reinforce tobacco related regulation, this activity can act as an 
`umbrella'. (BKL) To date, there are 700 cars with KT&G logos being driven 
by social care workers. This not only allows KT&G to promote a socially 
responsible image, but ensures that its logo is widely displayed. 
Third, there has been the `Love Kimchi' (traditional Korean side dish 
made of cabbage) project since 2004. This activity has ostensibly aimed at 
helping low-income households stock up for winter. KT&G pays for the 
ingredients and recruits volunteers to make kimchi, which is then donated to 
low-income households and older people. The volunteers at kimchi-making 
events wear aprons and hair bands displaying the KT&G logo, providing 
valuable publicity for the company. (See Figure 7.7) 
Finally, perhaps the most pernicious example is the `Dream in 
Painting' project. By drawing murals on wall of elementary schools, KT&G 
attempts to project a good brand image to children, who might be its future 
customers. This project recruits university students or parents as volunteers to 
paint the murals. During the first event in May 2007, three hundred students 
were recruited to participate in the project. Although KT&G's logo cannot be 
included in the mural, all participants wear KT&G's aprons. This programme 
has been carried out increasingly regularly, 3 times in 2007,5 times in 2008, 
and 6 times in 2009. (See Figure 7.7) 
These CSR programmes have built an important constituency of 
support for KT&G. According to tobacco control advocates, the beneficiaries 
of KT&G's CSR activities have repeatedly complained about anti-smoking 
activities. The beneficiaries, simply and clearly, say that "KT&G helps us 
who are neglected by the government, communities and even families. We 
need continued help from KT&G, thus, do not disturb their business". (BKL) 
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Figure 7.7: Examples of KT&G's CSR programmes 
Source: ' uuth No Smoking r\ssoCI ttwii 
Note: The car in the right picture is a KT&G Welfare Foundation car. The ostensible purpose 
of the car is to help neglected people. The car in the left picture is KT&G's cigarette delivery 
van. The similarity between the two in terms of the prominence of KT&G's logo can clearly 
be seen. 
Source: Edaily website (Available at 
http//www. edaily. co. kr/news'NewsRead. edy'? SCD=DC' I4&newsid =02440.326589884408&D 
CD--A00204&OutLnkC'hk=Y, accessed 20`h December 2009) 
Note: "Love Kimchi" project which has begun in 2004 and ostensibly aimed at helping low- 
income households stock up for winter. The volunteers at kimchi making events wear aprons 
and hair bands displaying the KT&G logo, providing valuable publicity for the company. 
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Source: Hankook i. com website (Available at 
htip: //kids. hankooki. coin/lpatte/news/20071 I /kd2007110415270577120. htm, accessed 201h 
December 2009) 
Note: "Dream in Painting" project which recruits university students, parents and volunteers 
to paint murals on the walls of elementary schools. Three hundred students were recruited to 
participate in the project in May 2007. Although KT&G's logo cannot be included in the 
mural, all participants wear KT&G aprons. 
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Source: Youth No Smoking Association 
i 
Note: The poster show KT&G's various CSR activities which have been discussed above. 
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7.7 Emergence of a new TTC 
As the South Korean market became more competitive, there is 
evidence that the domestic industry has attempted to develop its own export 
markets in order to overcome volume losses in the domestic market. (308) 
This was significantly similar to what US-based TTCs did in response to 
increasing tobacco control activities in the domestic market in the 1960s. 
However, unlike the US tobacco companies, KOMOCO/KTGC, as the state- 
owned company and the joint stock company, were initially limited in their 
ability to access other countries due to low quality and thus less competitive 
products. Therefore, before privatisation, the Korean tobacco company's 
efforts to expand overseas markets were relatively slow, but after market 
liberalisation, KTGC's exports steadily rose from 2 percent of the total 
production in 1989, to 6 percent in 1991. (308) Since 1996, KTGC has in 
earnest started overseas sales and the target markets reached 35 countries, 
mainly in Central Asian and Middle Eastern countries. However, their initial 
exports were carried out by export brokers rather than direct exports. (261) 
Once KTGC was privatised in December 2002, the newly named 
KT&G officially announced its vision including plans to intensify its focus on 
expanding overseas markets. On the KT&G website, the company noted that 
its profits would rise dramatically until 2010 through increasing exports. 
Following privatisation, KT&G started direct exports of its brands to the target 
markets. (393) Evidence suggests, KT&G has successfully expanded abroad, 
potentially becoming another TTC active in the world market since 2002. (261, 
394-401) (See Table 7.6 and Table 7.7) 
Table 7.6: Cigarette exports by KT&G (Billion sticks of cigarettes) 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Export 6.1 16.4 21.4 30.9 31.1 28.5 31.2 37.3 38.9 36.9 
Source: 1) Joongang Daily. Overseas sales keep KT&G growing. (2000) 
2) Parker J. A Look at The Far East. South Korea was the leading Far East Cigarette Exporter 
During 2002-2005. Tobacco International. November 2007 (2001) 
3) KT&G Annual Report (2002-2009) (Available at http: //www. ktne. com/kor/, accessed 15`b 
April 2010) 
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Table 7.7: Cigarette exports by KT&G, 1996-2008 
Year Exports (million US$) 
1996 8.1 
1997 9.9 
1998 13.1 
1999 17.5 
2000 41.9 
2001 98.3 
2002 (privatisation) 189.7 
2003 273.7 
2004 302.8 
2005 272.9 
2006 333.8 
2007 379.3 
2008 501.5 
Source: Song Y. The Impact after Tobacco Market Opening in Korea. Seoul: Yeonsei 
University; 2009, KT&G Annual Report (Available at http: //www. ktng. com/kor/, accessed 15`h 
April 2010) 
Note: The Korean currency, won is diverted to US dollar. (1,000 won= US$1) 
KT&G's exports of cigarettes recorded impressive growth after 
privatisation. Compared to 2001, before privatisation, the total export 
revenue soared by more than 93 percent in 2002. Central Asia and the Middle 
East remained KT&G's most important international markets, and the company 
expected that exports to the US, Southeast Asia, and China, would also be 
potential opportunities at the time. (394) In 2003, the total export sales 
volume represented more than 30 percent of KT&G's total cigarettes sales, and 
the company began its market expansion to Eastern Europe and Russia. (395) 
While reinforcing its status in the Middle East and Central Asia, KT&G 
diversified its target countries to the US, Southeast Asia, China, and Russia in 
2004. Due to aggressive market expansion in new target countries, the 
increase of exports was solid at the time. (396) Although there was a slight 
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decline in exports in 2005, from 2006 onwards, the total overseas sales volume 
increased again. (397,398) Since 2006, KT&G has intensively focused on 
Russia, Uzbekistan, Iran, Iraq, and China. (398) From 2007, the company 
began to target Turkey, the 7a' largest tobacco consuming nation in the world, 
in anticipation that Turkey could become a gateway to the European Union 
(EU) region. Market access and local production in Turkey will allow KT&G 
to export its brands to the EU without paying tariffs, if Turkey's application to 
join the EU is successful. Hence, KT&G attempted to set up subsidiary 
companies in Turkey. (399,400) In 2008, KT&G completed construction of 
its first overseas cigarette manufacturing facility in Turkey. KT&G plans for 
the new factory to sell 4 billion cigarettes annually by 2012. (402) 
As a result of KT&G's efforts, Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Iran, Iraq, 
and other Former Soviet Union (FSU) countries have imported large amounts 
of high quality blended cigarettes from KT&G. The market share of KT&G's 
brands in Iraq was 41 percent and its share in Afghanistan was 25 percent in 
2006. (403) Recently, KT&G has been newly targeting India. In addition, 
the company achieved new manufacturing factories in Iran under a joint 
venture (JV) agreement with Iran's government, and in Russia. Through 
establishing local companies in Turkey, Iran, and Russia, KT&G has obtained 
a stable market presence in the Middle East and the FSU. Furthermore, the 
company is also preparing to approach the US. (404) 
The fact that KT&G appears to be turning into a new TTC is consistent 
with supports the conceptual framework of this research regarding the 
behaviour of tobacco companies vis-ä-vis economic development models. 
Under the development model of export led growth, although the Korean 
government could not resist imports into Korea when faced with US trade 
pressures, its privatisation of the domestic tobacco monopoly has been 
consistent with a strategy to become a more competitive company capable of 
competing with TTCs, not just in Korea but abroad. The increasing export 
orientation of KT&G is entirely in keeping with the wider Korean development 
model, which supports the interests of national firms which can earn foreign 
currency through exports. This is similar to Japan, where the cigarette 
219 
monopoly was also partly privatised and became a world leading TTC itself, 
following the entry of western TTCs into the market. (41) 
7.8 Summary 
This research finds that TTCs' greater access to the Korean market 
from the late 1980s transformed the cigarette market into an extremely 
competitive one. This, in turn, spurred the transformation of the domestic 
company, KTGC, which used to enjoy monopoly status, and existed without 
any real marketing activities, into a marketing-oriented competitive company. 
KTGC undertook varied marketing activities following TTCs' entry to the 
market in order to preserve its market share. 
Following the rapid change of the market environment, and the 
country's economic circumstances after the financial crisis of 1997, the Korean 
government decided to privatise KTGC. Since privatisation, KT&G has not 
only developed more sophisticated marketing practices, such as "below-the- 
line" tactics and CSR programmes to preserve its domestic market share, but 
has looked to expand throughout the world. This is similar to TTCs during an 
earlier period in order to offset their losses in the domestic market. The 
company it is argued, is thus in the process of becoming a new TTC in the 
world tobacco market. KT&G's current efforts at market expansion into other 
countries is likely to increase competition within the global tobacco market, 
and based on evidence elsewhere, will contribute to an increase in tobacco 
consumption in the targeted countries. In short, TTCs' entry into the Korean 
market about 20 years ago appears to have prompted the emergence of a new 
TTC, which threatens public health in both South Korea and a number of other 
countries worldwide. 
220 
CHAPTER 8 DISCUSSION 
8.1 Introduction 
The findings presented in Chapter 5-7, based on detailed analysis of 
the tobacco industry's internal documents, and supported by semi-structured 
interviews with key informants, and other additional primary and secondary 
sources, are drawn together in this chapter in relation to the first four objectives 
of the research. This chapter also discusses the implications raised for public 
health in South Korea and other emerging markets, arising from the research 
findings. 
The final objective of this research, to draw lessons for strengthening 
tobacco control in South Korea and other emerging markets, in the context of 
the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), will be addressed in 
Chapter 9. 
As discussed in Chapter 4 (Section 4.5), there were limitations on the 
availability of data for this research. The primary data source for this research, 
industry internal documents, by their nature as described previously, proved to 
pose limitations and challenges regarding their interpretation. While 
substantial in volume, the limited time period covered by currently available 
documents (up to 2004), the non-comprehensive nature of the collection, and 
the fact that the documents are those of TTCs and not Korean domestic 
companies, all had to be taken into account when used in this research. To 
overcome these limitations, interviews and other primary and secondary 
sources were used to supplement and triangulate available documents. 
Both, in turn, proved to pose their own methodological challenges. 
It was sometimes difficult, in particular, to gain access to certain key 
informants for interviews. When former employees within the tobacco 
industry were approached, they declined to be interviewed. Government 
officials in the Ministry of Finance (MOF), which used to control the Korean 
tobacco monopoly, also did not want to participate in the research. The close 
links between the domestic tobacco industry, KT&G and the Korean 
government thus proved an obstacle to the collection of industry-related data 
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and accessing key informants. In other cases, it was also sometimes difficult 
to verify the accounts given by some interview respondents because there was 
no corroboration through available primary source documents. In such cases, 
care was taken to consider whether respondents' accounts were consistent with 
secondary sources, and whether respondents had particular interests that might 
have a bearing on how they chose to portray events or explain issues. 
In order to analyse the impact of market liberalisation on the domestic 
tobacco market, evidence of KT&G's activities was required. At the present 
time, access to KT&G's internal documents is not available, and the research 
needed to rely on publicly available documentation and key informants from 
the Korean tobacco control community. This somewhat he results relating to 
the fourth objective of the research were limited. 
Finally, discussion of the direct causal relationship between public 
health outcomes and market liberalisation was limited by the nature of Korean 
data on tobacco use over time. Detailed and comparable data by population 
cohort on smoking prevalence over time does not exist in South Korea. The 
research has thus taken care in drawing conclusions regarding the public health 
consequences of TTC activity, instead demonstrating how market liberalisation 
has led to intensified competition, more aggressive and targeted marketing, and 
ultimately a sharp increase in total sales of tobacco products. 
8.2 Understanding the broader context of the liberalisation 
of the South Korean market 
The first objective of this research was "to review the historical events 
leading to the opening of the Korean tobacco market in the late 1980s". The 
conceptual framework developed for this research, as presented in Chapter 3, 
argues that transnational tobacco companies' (TTCs) expansion worldwide, 
from the 1960s onwards, was shaped by the type of economic development 
model adopted by targeted countries and regions, including the respective 
governments' attitudes towards foreign investment. It is argued that this 
linking of economic development models with TTC strategies, within a broader 
context of an emerging global political and economic, has not been previously 
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applied to analyse tobacco industry activities. This approach offers a fuller 
understanding of TTC activities in South Korea, as well as potential insights 
into the expansion of TTCs into other emerging markets. 
8.2.1 Government policy on tobacco industry under export- 
oriented economic development model 
The findings of this research confirm the close relationship between 
the economic development model adopted in South Korea, and the changing 
nature of the country's tobacco industry. Beginning in the early 1960s, the 
Korean government focused attention on rapid economic development. As 
described in Chapter 3, following Japanese colonisation and the Korean War, 
much of the country was destroyed including key industries and infrastructure, 
and there were limited domestic resources available for recovery from these 
difficult circumstances. Moreover, political instability added to this 
precarious situation, prompting the government to focus its efforts on 
economic development as the country's highest priority. Thus, under General 
Park, who became President through a military coup in 1961, there was a 
strong emphasis on the reconstruction of the economy, and the need to foster 
an industrialisation movement among Koreans. For example, one policy 
introduced by President Park to change people's perceptions of economic 
development was the "New Village Movement". (405,406) The Movement 
initially pursued modernisation of rural areas in 1970, but was eventually 
extended throughout the country. The purpose of the movement was to 
change people's thinking and behaviour towards economic development. 
Through the creation of this mass social movement, the government and 
population became strongly unified in focus on economic development as the 
country's top priority. 
In this context, the Park regime gave particular attention to exports as a 
key driver of economic growth and development. Unlike North Korea with 
its considerable mineral resources, South Korea possessed limited natural 
resources. The government thus decided to adopt a development model 
focused on earning foreign currency via export-oriented manufacturing. The 
223 
Korean government's third Five-Year Economic Development Plan from 1972 
consequently invested in heavy industries, such as the steel, automobiles, and 
shipbuilding industries, along with the chemical industry, in order to transform 
the economy. Along with these exports, President Park also encouraged the 
export of human resources. For example, he dispatched personnel to the war 
in Vietnam during the 1960s, initially as non-combatants (i. e. trainers, medical 
personnel) but later as combat troops numbering over 300,000 soldiers. 
Similarly, miners and nurses were sent to Germany, as part of the 
government's economic development policy, to earn South Korea much needed 
foreign currency. In return, the government received more aid from the US, 
and the country benefitted from the remittance of foreign currencies to families 
back home. As described in Chapter 3, this state-led export-led economic 
development model was successful at enabling South Korea to become one of 
the "Asian Tiger" of the 1980s onwards. 
In this context, the tobacco industry in South Korea was not seen as a 
key industry, in terms of the government's economic development strategy. 
Exports of tobacco leaf and products before market liberalisation were limited 
due to their lower quality compared to international tobacco leaf and brands. 
Nevertheless, the government adopted trade policy measures to protect the 
industry because the sector was a significant source of tax revenue dating from 
the Korean War, and thus seen as a significant contributor to the government's 
economic development goals. As a former Office of Monopoly (OOM) 
manager stated, "To the government, the sale of tobacco was probably the only 
source of income just after the Korea War in the 1960s. "(Anonymous 1) In 
addition, in order to generate a trade surplus from exports, and prevent the 
outflow of foreign currency to pay for imports, the government did not want to 
liberalise the industry until it became competitive in the international market. 
Therefore, measures to protect the tobacco industry in South Korea from 
foreign competition were deemed to be economically justified from the 1950s 
onwards. The most important consideration by the government in regulating 
the tobacco sector was thus domestic economic development, with the industry 
treated as a key sector to promote growth within the national economy. As 
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will be discussed in Chapter 9, these economic goals were deemed of higher 
priority than protecting public health from the adverse effects of tobacco use. 
Moreover, this research confirms that the Korean government strictly 
controlled foreign direct investment (FDI) within the tobacco sector, as part of 
its economic development model. As part of a state-led and export-oriented 
economic development model, until the early 1980s, South Korea relied 
heavily on borrowing and maintained a somewhat restrictive policy towards 
FDI. As described in Chapter 5, the government thus firmly resisted TTCs' 
initial efforts to gain market access via joint venture (JV) agreements to enable 
local manufacturing with the Korea Monopoly Company (KOMOCO) in the 
early 1980s. Foreign ownership, which TTCs successfully achieved in Latin 
America and the Former Soviet Union (FSU), for example, which enabled 
them to gain footholds in those regions, was not possible in South Korea. 
Given this different policy stance by the South Korean government, TTCs were 
required to find alternative strategies to gain market access. 
8.2.2 The impact of the restructuring of the world trading system 
and global political economy on South Korea's tobacco 
industry 
Although the Korean government protected the tobacco industry from 
foreign competition until the 1980s, and adopted policies accordingly designed 
foremost to support economic development, this research shows that structural 
change in the global political economy (GPE) from the 1980s influenced the 
Korean government to eventually liberalise its closed tobacco market. 
The Uruguay Round of trade negotiations under the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) commenced in 1986, with 123 
participating countries and a mandate of unprecedented breadth of fifteen 
subjects. The seven and a half year process eventually led to the biggest 
reform of the world trading system since 1945. (9,407) Under an umbrella 
agreement creating the World Trade Organisation (WTO), agreements were 
reached on the renegotiation of the GATT (including agriculture), trade in 
services and intellectual property rights. (408) Additional measures for 
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dispute settlement and the conduct of trade policy reviews were agreed. 
While a proposed Multilateral Investment Agreement was not adopted during 
this period, and would remain controversial, the financial sector was 
extensively liberalised from the 1980s onwards, leading to a marked increase in 
trade and investment flows worldwide. The globalisation of the financial 
sector, in turn, underpinned the restructuring of the world economy into an 
increasingly globalised entity. The US government, under the Reagan 
Administration, was a leading player in the Uruguay Round. As described by 
Griswold, "Reagan's heart and head were clearly on the side of free 
trade". (409) President Reagan declared in 1986: 
Our trade policy rests firmly on the foundation of free and open 
markets. I recognize ... the inescapable conclusion that all of 
history 
has taught: The freer the flow of world trade, the stronger the tides of 
human progress and peace among nations. (409) 
This research confirms that the transformation of the world trading 
system, towards increased liberalisation and globalisation, strongly advocated 
by the US government, had a direct influence on South Korea's decision to 
liberalise the tobacco industry. While the Uruguay Round of the GATT did 
not directly pressure the Korean government to liberalise its closed tobacco 
market, changes to the world trading system affected the global political 
economy underpinning the bilateral relationship between South Korea and the 
US. This, in turn, had profound implications for the scope of Korean policy 
making during this period. 
The US, the leading player in this restructuring of the world trading 
system in the 1980s, was the largest and most important ally to South Korea in 
terms of political, economic, as well as military links. From the 1950s 
onwards, the US was the main aid donor to the South Korean government, 
helping fuel the reconstruction of its broken economy. However, the success 
of the Korean economic miracle, driven by substantial levels of exports, much 
of it to the US as Korea's largest trading partner, in time created a substantial 
trade deficit. The US government, faced with its own economic woes 
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domestically, began raising the issue of the trade deficit between Korea and the 
US, citing unfair trading practices by Korea and other Asian countries. 
The findings of this research confirm that an understanding of Korea's 
decision to liberalise the tobacco industry must be located within this broader 
GPE context. This context offers a fuller account of the pressures faced by 
the Korean government as it gave primacy to its pursuit of economic growth 
and development. As described in Chapter 5, this link between trade and 
tobacco was clearly apparent. During bilateral negotiations between South 
Korea and the US, the US government pointed repeatedly to the substantial and 
growing trade surplus by South Korea with the US. It was alleged that, 
although the US imported plenty of products manufactured by South Korea, the 
Korean government denied access to US products including tobacco products. 
Tobacco industry documents reveal that Michael Deaver was recruited by 
Philip Morris (PM) to assert pressure on President Chun by emphasising that 
market liberalisation of Korea's tobacco industry was tied to Korean textile 
exports to the US. Further pressure was exerted by several US Senators 
warning the Korean government that the failure to reach an agreement would 
seriously erode broader trade relations between the two countries. The 
findings of this research confirm that the decision of the Korean government on 
market liberalisation was thus a direct trade off between the tobacco industry 
and other key industries under the government's export-led economic 
development model. 
In conclusion, a fuller understanding of the government's changing 
policies on the tobacco sector in South Korea since the Korean War must be 
located within the historical context of a changing global political economy. 
The conceptual framework of this research, linking economic development 
models to TTC strategies on market access and expansion, shows that the 
Korean government succumbed to these broader pressures. This research 
finds that, when faced with industry-led and US government expressed 
pressures to liberalise cigarette imports, Korean policy debates focused on the 
economic importance of continued access by Korean exports to US markets. 
This research shows that, it was this interaction between the domestic priority 
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to maintain the momentum of economic development through export-led 
growth, and structural changes in the world trading system and the GPE, which 
can explain the liberalisation of the tobacco sector by South Korea in the late 
1980s. The public health consequence of this important decision of the South 
Korean government, as will be summarised in Chapter 9, was of limited if any 
concern in policy debates during this period. 
8.3 Understanding of TTC market access and expansion 
strategies 
The second objective of this research was "to understand the market 
entry strategies and the activities used by TTCs, focusing on Philip Morris 
(PM), R. J. Reynolds (RJR), Brown & Williamson (B&W), and British 
American Tobacco (BAT), to gain access and expand their market share to the 
Korean tobacco market". 
8.3.1 TTCs' threat to South Korea through trade pressure 
Within the context of an export-led economic development model and 
the changing world trading system described above, how did TTCs seek to gain 
access to the Korean market? As identified through the literature review of 
Chapter 2, TTCs had a variety of strategies available to access new markets. 
The evidence presented in Chapter 5 shows that early tactics used by TTCs to 
gain a foothold in the Korean tobacco market were similar to those deployed 
elsewhere, notably in Latin America. TTCs initially sought exclusivity in 
negotiating JVs and licensing agreements with the domestic monopoly to 
circumvent measures to keep the market firmly closed to foreign companies. 
Such tactics led to the successful acquisition of local tobacco companies, and 
complete market access in Latin America during the 1960s and 1970s. 
However, when TTCs similarly suggested JVs and licensing agreement to the 
Korean government, these options were quickly rejected given the 
governments strong emphasis on strong Korean-owned industries and limited 
foreign direct investment. As described above, the government thus did not 
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accept FDI or any form of foreign ownership within the industry. Therefore, 
TTCs focused their attention on lobbying the US government to exert trade 
pressure in the 1980s. During this lobbying process, industry documents 
reveal how the US Cigarette Export Association (USCEA) cited repeatedly the 
trade imbalance between the two countries and claims of "discriminatory trade 
restrictions" in the Korean tobacco market. Lobbyists emphasised the trade 
off between the tobacco industry and access to the US market by Korean 
export. This research shows that, TTCs not only benefitted from changes in 
the GPE as described above, but actively pursued market access through the 
active engagement in trade policy debates between South Korea and the US. 
Far from being passive players in the process of trade negotiations, it is 
confirmed that TTCs effectively harnessed the power of the US government to 
open Korea's tobacco market. While the role of the TTCs in pressuring for 
market access by the US Trade Representative (USTR) is well-known, how 
this was achieved within the context of Korea's domestic policies has not been 
previously analysed. 
8.3.2 TTCs' responses to regulation of the Korean tobacco 
industry after market liberalisation 
The Korean government anticipated an increase in TTCs' marketing 
activities once the domestic market was partly liberalised in 1986, and moved 
to revise the existing tobacco-related regulations to address this. As described 
in Chapter 6, the new regulation thus prohibited all forms of tobacco marketing, 
advertising, and promotional practices in 1987. However, as part of further 
pressure from the US government under bilateral trade negotiations, which 
successfully pushed for complete liberalisation of the tobacco market, both 
countries agreed to certain forms of tobacco marketing under the Record of 
Understanding (ROU) in 1988. 
On the surface, permitted marketing activities seemed highly restricted. 
However, as described in Chapter 7, TTCs responded by deploying varied 
marketing tactics which enabled their products to achieve increased market 
presence. Following initial liberalisation, TTCs' tactics focused on 
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addressing the lack of "social acceptability" of their brands due to negative 
perceptions of imported, notably US manufactured, cigarettes. Thus, TTCs 
tried to build a more positive image among Korean people, and targeted young 
people in particular because they had less nationalistic attitudes compared to 
older Korean people. At the same time, TTCs sought to improve distribution 
routes hitherto strongly controlled by KT&G, and undertook "below-the-line" 
marketing tactics to increase awareness of, and stimulate demand for, foreign 
brands. As stated in Chapter 7, these tactics of TTCs achieved successful 
market expansion in the Korean market during the short period after market 
liberalisation. Consequently, the limited tobacco control measures, providing 
exceptions of tobacco marketing activities to TTCs, were proven to be 
insufficient and ineffective at controlling TTCs' marketing activities. 
Importantly, these findings show that the tobacco control measures, adopted by 
the government during and after market liberalisation, were shaped by 
economic rather than public health considerations. As will be discussed in 
Chapter 9, it was this feature that subsequently enabled them to be so readily 
circumvented by TTCs. In addition, lessons can be drawn that governments, 
engaged in market liberalisation or not yet targeted, should adopt strong and 
appropriate tobacco control measures as part of the negotiation of the 
conditions of market liberalisation. This will be discussed in detail in Chapter 
9. 
In South Korea, the research shows that over time, further and stricter 
tobacco control measures were adopted. (See Table 8.1) Nevertheless, TTCs 
met these with increased efforts to circumvent a more restrictive marketing 
environment. Public health concerns about tobacco use, within and outside of 
the country, led the Korean government to introduce additional legislation that 
set out stronger restrictions on the types and content of tobacco advertising, 
promotion, and sponsorship. While tobacco control advocates had begun to 
consolidate and strengthen their efforts by the 1990s, so too did the tobacco 
industry continue to evolve its tactics, from a focus on mitigating social 
opposition to active demand creation. This research finds that, as TTCs 
recognised that the Korean market was beginning to become a "dark" market, 
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they pursued more indirect tactics to exploit legislative loopholes alongside 
"below-the-line" activities, and changed their marketing framework. Such 
combined tactics were effectively used to circumvent Korean regulations. 
Table 8.1: Key tobacco control policies in South Korea since market 
liberalisation 
Year Tobacco control policy 
1995 Enactment of the National Health Promotion Act 
1998 Introduction of school based anti-smoking campaign and 
education 
2003 Expansion of smoke free areas (Internet cafes and larger 
restaurants) 
2004 Increase of cigarette consumption tax (500 won) 
2005 Introduction of smoking cessation clinic and quit-line in local 
health centre. 
2006 Expansion of smoke 
free areas (Large buildings, small offices, 
theatre, indoor gym, schools, nurseries, medical facilities, and 
transportation facilities etc. ) 
2008 Adding health warning labels of 6 cancer causing substances 
2009 National campaign for `Smoke Free Healthy Korea' 
Source: EJ Choi. Measures for Tobacco Control. International Seminar on Tobacco Price and 
Tax Measures; Seoul: Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs; June 2010. 
By the 2000s, TTCs were giving particular attention to Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) activities. CSR programmes quickly emerged as 
a means used by TTCs worldwide to enable their corporate image and related 
brands to maintain a positive public presence. This was especially important 
in light of substantial public approbation from the 1990s. CSR was 
potentially more effective than promotional activities because, unlike 
traditional marketing activities through television, radio, and print media, CSR 
activities are interactive and seek to build broader relationships with the 
public. (410) Through CSR programmes, tobacco companies are able to 
transform their image from manufacturers of a lethal product to that of socially 
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responsible companies. CSR programmes thus play multiple roles for 
tobacco companies: they potentially legitimise them in the eyes of those who 
benefit from such programmes, the wider public and policy-makers; they are 
used to bolster arguments against further effective regulation; and they allow 
companies to promote their company image and, by extension, their products, 
even where advertising is prohibited. In addition, although tobacco 
regulations have banned some "below-the-line" activities of the industry, 
authorities have not appeared willing to regulate CSR activities, or at least to 
enforce restrictions on CSR activities as violations of tobacco control policies. 
Policy-makers, regulators and tobacco control advocates need to be clear about 
the real purposes of CSR programmes by the tobacco industry, and ensure that 
this understanding is disseminated widely. Recommendations concerning the 
effective control and surveillance of tobacco industry CSR programmes are 
made in Chapter 9 (Section 9.4). 
The research finds that sponsorship programmes in South Korea have 
been also effectively used by TTCs to create greater demand for their brands. 
This is a well-known form of indirect marketing. Although sponsorship does 
not advertise tobacco products directly, sponsorship by TTCs undermines 
tobacco control policies and regulations by functioning like advertising; 
enables the targeting of specific populations notably youth; and misleads by 
associating smoking with certain desired attributes, such as a healthy and active 
lifestyle, or glamorous and exciting activities. (328) The research has shown 
that, through sponsorship, the tobacco industry in South Korea has been able to 
maintain its visibility. It has been shown that this has been an important area 
of competition among TTCs and the domestic company as they have sought to 
protect and expand their market shares. 
In conclusion, once the Korean market was opened, TTCs' marketing 
tactics have continually evolved to effectively circumvent existing and 
emerging tobacco control measures. Although TTCs' strategies for market 
access in South Korea were shaped by the country's economic development 
model, resulting in different market access strategies from Latin America and 
the FSU, once access was gained, the tactics to create and expand demand for 
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TTCs' brands among the Korean people proved similar with other countries 
and regions. The findings of this research, above all, offer lessons that strong 
and comprehensive tobacco control policies and regulations, which affect 
domestic and imported brands equally, should ideally be developed before and 
after the adoption of market liberalisation. In addition, this research suggests 
that governments need to carefully design tobacco control measures, as will be 
discussed in Chapter 9, to take account of a more competitive market 
environment, supported by strong enforcement of such measures and close 
monitoring by the government and public health communities in ways that 
effectively address changes in TTC tactics. 
8.4 Theory of TTCs behaviour on market access and 
expansion 
The third objective of this research is "to draw broader theoretical 
conclusions about the behaviour of TTCs in seeking market access and 
expansion". To date, there have been limited attempts to theorise the 
behaviour of tobacco companies more generally amid economic globalisation. 
This research has attempted to seek theoretical insights into how TTCs have 
pursued market expansion globally by examining TTC strategies and activities 
in relation to different economic development models. As informed by the 
literature review in Chapter 2, it is argued that the global expansion of TTCs 
from the 1960s onwards can be seen as broadly influenced by the economic 
development model adopted by the targeted country or region. This provided 
the conceptual framework for this research on South Korea and, as described 
above, is supported by the findings of this research. The research suggests, in 
short, that there are generalisable patterns in the behaviour of TTCs in seeking 
market entry and expansion into emerging markets across the three regions 
reviewed. This is a significant advance on previous work in that, whilst a 
number of authors have conducted rigorous research on various countries and 
regions, no attempt has previously been made to identify such patterns of TTC 
behaviour and relate them across countries to their economic development 
models. The research also confirms Shepherd's previous work (4) in 
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emphasising the importance of demand creation to TTCs' strategies once 
market access has been gained. 
For South Korea, as described in 8.3.1, TTCs mainly used lobbying 
and other political pressure tactics, in cooperation with the US government, to 
gain a foothold in South Korea. As shown in existing literature, this strategy 
was similarly used in other Asian countries during this period, namely Japan, 
Taiwan and Thailand. These tactics were clearly influenced by these 
countries' pursuit of an export-oriented and state-led economic development 
model which made them exceptionally dependent on the US as a key export 
market, and closely integrated their economies into an increasingly globalised 
world economy. In three of the four countries (i. e. South Korea, Japan and 
Taiwan), the US was of additional geopolitical importance. The industry 
documents reviewed suggest that these factors directly influenced the decisions 
of these governments to liberalise their tobacco markets. 
In contrast, Latin American countries adopted import substitution as an 
economic development model from the 1950s. As described in Chapter 2, 
given the natural resources in the region, and in contrast with South Korea, 
Japan and Taiwan, these countries focused attention on the development of 
their domestic industries to better provide for domestic needs. The tobacco 
industry was a key target of this import substitution model of development. 
In order to improve the productivity and quality of outputs of local tobacco 
companies, governments in Latin America sought technical support from 
foreign companies and had an open attitude towards foreign direct investment. 
Within this context, TTCs provided technical knowhow and new machinery to 
local companies, and successfully signed JVs including local manufacturing 
agreements. Over time, TTCs then found it relatively easy to acquire local 
companies in the region which became fully owned subsidiaries. 
The former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe faced much political and 
economic upheaval after the collapse of the Soviet Union. State-owned 
enterprises, already highly inefficient and producing poor quality goods, were 
obsolete and faced a dire lack of new capital. Overall, many decades of 
central planning had failed to produce economic growth comparable to other 
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regions, with major shortages of essential commodities and consumer goods. 
Amid the transition of these economies towards a more market-based system, 
which led to the large-scale privatisation of major industries, governments 
sought FDI to reform and rejuvenate formerly state-owned enterprises. This 
policy was supported by the IMF and World Bank. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
for the tobacco industry, in many former Soviet bloc countries, domestic 
tobacco companies were sold off to TTCs in whole or in part. TTCs became a 
leading source of foreign investment and, with this status, were able to 
profoundly influence the structure of the tobacco sector and its regulation. 
In conclusion, while this research focuses on the case of TTCs' market 
access and expansion in South Korea, its findings support broader theorising 
about TTCs' varying strategies in other regions and worldwide. Bringing 
together the limited existing theory of tobacco industry and corporate strategy 
in seeking new markets (4), and new analysis of internal industry documents 
and other data on South Korea, this research explains more fully variations in 
how TTCs act in different markets. This contribution to the theory of TTC 
strategies and activities offer new insights for the strengthening of tobacco 
control policies in emerging markets as will be discussed in Chapter 9. 
8.5 Impact of market access by TTCs on the domestic 
tobacco industry in South Korea 
The fourth objective of this research is "to describe the impact of 
market opening on the domestic tobacco industry" in South Korea. The 
limited analyses available to date on trade and tobacco shows that the opening 
of tobacco markets through trade liberalisation has increased competition, 
resulting a higher level of consumption of tobacco products and, ultimately, 
adverse impacts on public health. (9,14) The findings of this research are 
largely supportive of such conclusions but suggest that there is need to 
understand this process more fully, including the impacts on domestic tobacco 
industries. 
This research confirms that, due to the increased access by TTCs to the 
Korean market, and TTC engagement in effective marketing practices, the 
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domestic tobacco industry adapted in response and changed its own behaviour 
accordingly. The Korea Tobacco Ginseng and Corporation (KTGC), most 
importantly, needed to compete with TTCs to preserve its dominant market 
share. Initially following market liberalisation, the company had limited 
marketing experience given its previous status as a monopoly supplier, and 
thus sought mainly to hinder the marketing, advertising, and promotional 
activities of TTCs rather than to compete using its own similar marketing 
tactics. Over time, however, KTGC transformed itself into a more 
competitive and market-oriented company. KTGC quickly learnt from TTCs' 
marketing practices, as discussed in Chapter 6 and 7, and adopted similar 
strategies. This change, in turn, created more competition in the Korean 
market. 
On price, market liberalisation did not lead to a reduction in all 
cigarette prices on the market, but it did reduce the prices of imported 
cigarettes. When foreign cigarettes were initially imported to Korea under 
permitted import quotas in 1986, the price per pack of 20 cigarettes of imported 
brands was between 1,400 won (US$1.80) and 1,600 won (US$2.00) due to the 
40 percent import tax. Although imported brands were of better quality, and 
had reportedly more flavour than domestic brands, Korean people generally 
felt that imports were too expensive (at least three times more expensive than 
Korea's domestic brands at 500 won or 600 won). Thus, relatively high price 
was one of the key barriers to expanding market share for TTCs. However, 
once the market was more fully liberalised in 1988, the price of imported 
brands declined to 800 won (US$1.00), on average, due to the elimination of 
the import tax. In addition, the price of cigarettes became determined by 
TTCs themselves, instead of the Ministry of Finance (MOF). TTCs were thus 
free to compete with domestic brands on price, while offering a product seen as 
superior in quality and flavour. This price change of imported cigarettes thus 
accelerated market competition, and gradually resulted in an increase in market 
share for TTCs. 
TTCs also developed and introduced new brands distinguished by taste, 
ingredients, and package design to appeal to particular local market segments. 
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This led to much greater brand diversification in the Korean market. Before 
market liberalisation, there were only a few brands manufactured by the 
monopoly. In 1986, when one percent of the market was opened to foreign 
brands, a total of 25 brands were sold in South Korea. By the end of 1991, 
253 brands produced by 44 manufacturers from 15 foreign countries were 
registered with the Korean MOF (261). In addition, the domestic company 
introduced new brands of cigarettes to compete with those of TTCs. As a 
result, Korean people became exposed to a far greater diversity of brands 
distinguished by taste, design and marketing after liberalisation. 
Another important finding of this research concerns the implications of 
tobacco privatisation for public health. KTGC was privatised under pressure 
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as discussed in Chapter 7. On 
the one hand, previous analyses argue that privatisation of monopolised 
tobacco companies threaten tobacco control because privatised companies 
place greater emphasis on profit making by using varied marketing tactics 
compared to state monopolies. (63,359,411) Thus, privatisation is believed 
to likely increase cigarette consumption and has adverse impacts on public 
health. On the other hand, privatisation may benefit tobacco control because 
governments may feel more compelled to regulate the industry if it is not itself 
directly involved in its ownership or operation. This research finds that, in 
Korea, privatisation of KTGC resulted in the further stimulation of market 
competition. Since privatisation, KT&G has been more active in its 
marketing activities in order to preserve its market share from TTCs. Its 
focus has been on transforming its operations and image, from an inefficient 
government monopoly to a competitive private company, using for example 
"below-the-line" tactics, such as sponsorship programmes and CSR activities. 
The privatisation of KTGC also brought dramatic change to the Korean 
tobacco market as a whole via foreign investment. The consequent revision 
of tobacco-related business regulations enabled PM and BAT to finally 
establish their own local subsidiaries and cigarette manufacturing facilities in 
South Korea. 
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In other words, market liberalisation followed by privatisation led to a 
restructuring of the Korean tobacco industry from an inward-looking and 
highly protected domestic monopoly into a more competitive and outward 
looking sector. Indeed, these changes have even led to KT&G seeking 
expansion into foreign markets itself, notably where there are emerging 
markets and relatively weak tobacco control policies. Having developed its 
own marketing expertise, and new brands, initially to compete with TTCs and 
avoid with a loss of market share at home, KT&G today finds itself an aspiring 
TTC. In 2006, KT&G held more than 40 percent of market share in Iraq, the 
biggest company in this market based on total sales, and a 25 percent of market 
share in Afghanistan, the second largest company in this market after 
BAT. (403) In addition, given the intensive efforts of KT&G to increase 
exports of its brands internationally, the largest agricultural crop exported from 
South Korea since 2005 is tobacco leaf and products. Although other 
companies, including, BAT Korea, PM Korea, and Woori Tobacco25 also 
export their brands, exports are a relatively small proportion of their sales, and 
a small proportion of Korea's total tobacco exports. In contrast, in 2009 
KT&G contributed 93 percent of total tobacco exports from South Korea. (412) 
KT&G plans to increase its exports in future to the Middle East, Central Asia, 
and Russia as existing markets, and South East Asia and India as new markets 
according to the company's vision statement of 2010. (412) 
In conclusion, this research provides a fuller account of the impact of 
TTCs on the domestic tobacco industry in South Korea following market 
liberalisation. TTCs stimulated the domestic tobacco company to adapt 
accordingly, resulting in a more competitive environment domestically and, in 
turn, globally. This supports the economic theory that trade liberalisation 
leads to greater competition. In relation to the tobacco industry, this has been 
in the form of reducing cigarette prices, increasing tobacco advertising and 
25 Woorl Tobacco: Since 2001, when the MOF eliminated KTGC's monopoly over cigarette 
manufacturing, any company having relevant capital (more than US$ 30 million) and 
manufacturing capabilities (an annual production capacity of at least five billion cigarette 
sticks) could obtain a cigarette manufacturing license from the MOF. Although this has 
proven an effective barrier to controlling access of smaller tobacco manufacturers including 
local and foreign companies, in early 2008, a local tobacco company, Woori Tobacco won a 
license to manufacture and started selling cigarettes. 
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promotional activities, and increased export activities. (9) As will be 
discussed below, these developments have profound implications for public 
health in South Korea and globally. 
8.6 Implications of market liberalisation for tobacco control 
and public health 
As well as leading to a restructuring of the Korean tobacco industry, 
and a consequent increase in competition-driven activities, a key finding of this 
research is that increased TTC market access in South Korea has had public 
health impacts domestically and, if KT&G continues to expand its market 
presence abroad, globally. This section discusses the impact of TTC activities 
on public health. 
8.6.1 Increase of cigarette consumption by volume 
As described in Chapter 6, once market access was achieved, TTCs 
actively pursued strategies to increase their market share. While TTCs 
publically insisted that they were only informing existing smokers of the 
increased availability of imported brands on the market, and thus were seeking 
to convince these smokers to switch brands rather than encourage new 
smokers, (413) the findings of this research suggest otherwise. Analysis of 
available evidence on tobacco use in South Korea, before and after market 
liberalisation, suggests that increased competition led to an upward trend in 
tobacco use in certain population groups. While limited in detail and period 
of time covered, this data raises important public health implications. 
As mentioned above in Chapter 7, several industry documents on the 
South Korean market report that the total volume of cigarette sales in Korea 
increased sharply from 81.4 billion in 1991 to 101.7 billion sticks in 1992 
(around 25%) after market liberalisation. (225,292) Correspondingly, 
alongside this increase in total volume of cigarette sales, the limited data on 
total cigarette consumption in South Korea from 1981 onwards suggests that 
there is a clear trend of increasing total consumption. (See Table 8.2) From 
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1981 to 1985, the period before market liberalisation, total cigarette 
consumption slightly increased. However, there was a high level of growth of 
tobacco use between 1986 and 2000 after market opening. In 1988, when the 
market was completely liberalised, and in the early 1990s when market 
competition between TTCs and KTGC began to intensify, this upward trend in 
cigarette consumption by volume was especially significant. Based on this 
trend, South Korea was ranked the 5th largest cigarette market in the world in 
1996, in terms of number of cigarettes consumed, an increase from 13th place 
in 1985. (414,415) Since 2001, the upward trend of tobacco use has slowed, 
apparently due to the increase in health concerns on towards smoking among 
Koreans and stronger tobacco control efforts, although this has not been the 
case for all population groups. 
Table 8.2: Total cigarette consumption among Koreans, 1981-2007 
Million sticks of Year 
cigarette consumption 
Key Event 
1981 73,112 
1982 73,986 
1983 74,751 
1984 76,575 
1985 77,557 
1986 78,303 - Limited market liberalisation with 
import quotas 
1987 81,712 
1988 87,329 - Completed market liberalisation 
1989 92,133 
1990 95,475 
1991 98,235 
1992 101,438 
1993 105,337 
1994 96,140 - First cigarette tax increase (120 won 
per pack) 
1995 97,348 - The National Health Promotion Act 
was enacted. 
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1996 102,738 
1997 99,668 
1998 106,550 
1999 95,670 
2000 104,945 
2001 98,917 
2002 91,956 
2003 96,925 
2004 106,511 
2005 82,322 
2006 87,724 
2007 91,855 
Cigarette tax increase (168 won per 
pack) 
The government initiated the process 
of KTGC's privatisation 
Cigarette tax increase (2 won per 
pack) 
- Add 10 percent of Value Added Tax 
on each cigarette pack 
Cigarette tax increase (121 won per 
pack) 
Complete privatisation of KTGC and 
abolition of manufacturing monopoly 
Cigarette tax increase (158 won per 
pack) 
Cigarette tax increase (409 won per 
pack) 
Source: Kim WN. A Study of the Tobacco Pricing Effect on National Health. Korea 
University. 2002 (1981-1989), Ann JB. Reformation of Tobacco Tax. International Seminar on 
Tobacco Price and Tax Measures; Seoul: Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs; June 
2010 (1990-2007) 
Note: Cigarette consumption in the table reflects official trade. 
Given population growth (38 million in 1980 to 47 million in 2000) 
(416), the rising trends in total cigarette consumption described above might be 
explained by a proportionate growth in the number of smokers, rather than the 
impact of any TTC marketing activities. Analysis by per capita cigarette 
consumption confirms, however, that the increased consumption after market 
liberalisation was not only due to population growth. (See Table 8.3) Prior to 
market liberalisation, the amount of tobacco use per person slightly fluctuated, 
but the change was not significant. After market liberalisation, however, per 
capita consumption steadily increased until the early 1990s. This data 
suggests that smokers also smoked more per capita (200 cigarettes per capita 
more by 1999) on average. This finding, thus, confirms that Korean smokers 
were not simply switching brands from domestic cigarettes to imports, but 
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were also smoking more on average per person following market liberalisation. 
This increase in volume of consumption per smoker, in turn, suggests a 
corresponding increase in risk to health from tobacco use. 
Table 8.3: Per capita cigarette consumption among Koreans aged over 
19 years, 1981-1999 
Year Per capita consumption 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
1,888 
1,882 
1,873 
1,895 
1,901 
1,900 
1,964 
1,873 
1,895 
1,901 
1,900 
1,964 
2,405 
2,163 
2,230 
2,342 
2,271 
2,303 
2,052 
Source: Kim WN. A Study of the Tobacco Pricing Effect on National Health. Korea 
University. 2002 
The research also compared the amount of cigarette consumption 
between domestic brands and imported brands. Given limited data, this 
comparison can only be undertaken from 1990. As shown in Table 8.4, it is 
clear that in the period that per capita consumption increased, the consumption 
of imported brands dramatically increased, compared to domestic brands. 
This suggests that, although there were strong feelings towards imported 
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cigarettes, and the US more generally, among many Koreans at the beginning 
of market liberalisation, many existing smokers switched from domestic to 
imported brands, or new smokers choose to smoke imported brands. Without 
the intensive marketing activities and competitive practices of new market 
entrants against the domestic brands, it is unlikely this would have been 
achieved within this short period. 
Table 8.4: Comparison of consumption between domestic and imported 
brands among Koreans 
Domestic brand Imported brand 
Year 
Consumption The rate of Consumption The rate of 
(Million sticks) growth (%) (Million sticks) growth (%) 
1990 91,274 3.91 4,201 -0.83 
1991 93,323 2.24 4,912 16.92 
1992 95,960 2.83 5,478 11.52 
1993 98,384 2.53 6,953 26.93 
1994 87,581 -10.98 8,559 23.10 
1995 84,877 -3.09 12,471 45.71 
1996 91,299 7.57 11,439 -8.28 
1997 88,069 -3.54 11,599 1.40 
1998 101,289 15.01 5,261 -54.64 
1999 89,457 -11.68 6,213 18.10 
2000 95,076 6.28 9,869 58.84 
2001 83,416 -12.26 15,501 57.07 
2002 72,486 -13.10 19,470 25.60 
2003 74,386 2.62 22,540 15.77 
2004 82,305 10.65 24,207 7.40 
2005 60,072 -17.01 22,250 -8.08 
2006 62,587 4.19 25,137 12.98 
2007 63,582 1.59 28,273 12.48 
Source: Ann JB. Reformation of Tobacco Tax. International Seminar on Tobacco Price and 
Tax Measures; Seoul: Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs; June 2010 
Note: The decrease of consumption in 1998 was due to Asian economic crisis which led 
significant outflows of foreign capital. 
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8.6.2 Increase of smoking prevalence 
As described in Chapter 6, this research shows that TTCs particularly 
targeted Korea's young adults and females in order to create demand for their 
brands via marketing, advertising, and promotional activities. Analysis of 
changes in smoking prevalence among these groups can improve 
understanding of the public health impact of TTCs' market access in South 
Korea. Table 8.5 shows smoking prevalence according to age group between 
1980 and 2008. The smoking prevalence rate in the groups aged 20-29 years 
and 30-39 years in both males and females significantly increased from 1985 to 
1996, while the rate in other age groups mostly decreased. A possible 
explanation of the reduction in smoking prevalence among older age groups is 
that such groups were more receptive to public health arguments on tobacco 
use, or they may be less targeted by the industry given their lower likelihood of 
brand switching. Moreover, due to rapid economic development in South 
Korea and the introduction of a new social trend focusing on "well-being in 
life", which put greater priority on health rather than material things, the 
overall trend of smoking prevalence in Table 8.5 shows a steady and 
considerable decrease. In particular, implementation of the National Health 
Promotion Act (NHPA) in 1995, enforcement of stronger tobacco control 
policies, and the tobacco-related death of Korea's most famous comedian, 3u-il 
Lee also strongly influenced this decreasing trend in tobacco use. The data, in 
contrast, shows an increase of smoking prevalence among Korean young adults. 
This trend, along with the above data on the increase in per capita cigarette 
consumption and use of imported cigarettes after market liberalisation mainly 
by young adults, suggests that this has been the result of intensive targeting by 
tobacco companies. This trend is also observed in an industry document: 
Smoking incidence in Korea increased since market liberalisation with 
73% of males smoking and roughly 5% of all adult females smoking. 
Fuelling this growth is the increasing number of female and younger 
adult smokers. (417) 
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Among Korean youth, in principle those legally protected from 
tobacco marketing, 23 percent of males aged 16-18 years smoked in 1988. 
(Table 8.6) This rate increased to 32 percent in 1991 after market 
liberalisation, peaking at 35.3 percent in 1997. (12) The smoking rate of 
female youths aged 16-18 years increased from 2.4 percent in 1991 to 10.7 
percent by 2000. Among youths aged 13-15 years, the proportion of male 
smokers increased from 1.8 percent in 1988 to 7.4 percent in 2000, and the 
smoking prevalence among females increased from 1.2 percent in 1991 to 3.2 
percent in 2000. (12) The data of youth smoking prevalence, before and after 
market liberalisation, therefore appears to suggest that, within a more 
competitive market environment, where both TTCs and the domestic tobacco 
industry more actively marketed their respective brands, there appears to have 
been an increase in tobacco use and, ultimately, on public health in South 
Korea. Importantly, this analysis directly challenges industry claims that only 
existing smokers are targeted. Particularly important is the increase in the 
uptake of smoking among youth. This finding has clear implications for 
public health practice and will be discussed in Chapter 9. 
It is important to recognise that the female and youth prevalence data 
this research analysed may not be reliable because of the methodology used for 
data collection. The most common way to study smoking prevalence in South 
Korea has been a self-administrative questionnaire. Apart from male smokers, 
female and youth smokers usually do not provide true answers to the 
questionnaire given that female smoking used to be taboo and youth smoking is 
not allowed under the law. Thus, the data in Table 8.6 below are likely to be 
an underestimate. Given this, there is limitation to analyse and interpret the 
impact of TTCs' market access and marketing activities on youth and female 
smoking in South Korea. In order to overcome this, the methodology for 
smoking prevalence of youths and females has to be improved to obtain more 
reliable data. For example, urine test can be one of the most reliable methods 
to examine practical smoking prevalence among youths and females. This 
effort is essential to implement strong tobacco control policies on female and 
youth smoking. 
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Table 8.6: Smoking rates among Korean youth by gender and age 
Middle school students (%) High school students (%) 
Gender Year 13 14 15 Total 16 17 18 Total 
years years years years years years 
1988 0.4 2.1 2.7 1.8 9.5 19.1 40.4 23.0 
1989 1.8 1.6 2.0 1.5 17.3 26.8 50.0 32.0 
1991 1.9 3.8 3.6 3.2 14.3 38.2 44.8 32.2 
1993 1.6 2.5 2.7 2.2 13.6 24.9 40.2 25.5 
1995 1.0 4.2 1.9 3.8 15.2 30.3 33.2 26.1 
1997 1.5 3.8 6.3 3.9 21.6 41.0 41.6 35.3 
1999 1.1 8.7 7.0 5.6 24.7 31.1 41.0 32.3 
Male 2000 2.7 6.3 10.6 7.4 19.9 29.8 37.9 27.6 
2001 2.2 5.5 8.5 6.0 10.1 32.6 29.6 24.8 
2002 2.0 1.4 7.8 3.5 15.8 24.2 30.2 23.6 
2003 1.6 0.7 5.6 2.8 21.4 20.0 25.2 22.1 
2004 0.5 2.9 4.4 2.4 10.8 17.3 21.5 15.9 
2005 3.8 3.5 5.7 4.2 12.6 22.1 13.2 15.7 
2006 3.1 4.9 8.2 5.3 18.1 21.9 22.4 20.7 
2007 2.1 3.4 9.4 4.8 19.1 15.3 13.3 16.2 
1991 0.8 1.0 1.8 1.2 1.3 1.9 4.3 2.4 
1993 1.4 1.5 1.1 1.4 1.2 2.7 2.6 2.2 
1995 1.2 2.8 3.6 2.6 3.8 5.1 5.6 4.7 
1997 3.2 4.4 3.7 3.9 9.9 7.2 7.3 8.1 
1999 2.2 3.2 3.5 3.1 10.5 7.4 5.3 7.5 
2000 0.9 1.0 6.6 3.2 12.2 10.0 10.5 10.7 
Female 2001 0.6 1.8 3.3 2.0 9.6 6.1 7.3 7.5 
2002 0.0 1.6 0.8 0.9 8.5 9.6 3.5 7.3 
2003 0.0 2.0 4.2 2.3 6.8 7.6 5.3 6.8 
2004 2.1 1.3 1.7 1.7 9.2 8.5 4.9 7.5 
2005 2.9 2.7 3.5 3.3 5.2 8.1 5.9 6.5 
2006 1.9 3.2 4.7 3.3 6.3 4.7 4.8 5.2 
2007 1.8 3.9 2.5 2.6 6.6 3.9 5.4 5.2 
Source: Korean Association of Smoking and Health. A National Survey on Smoking among 
Middle and High School Students, 1998-2007. Seoul, September 2007 
Note: Standardised to 1988 population 
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8.6.3 Public health implications of a more competitive market since 
2005 
Competition in the tobacco industry continues to impact on tobacco 
use, especially among Korean youth and young adults. Although KT&G has 
expanded its efforts, by using direct and indirect forms of marketing in order to 
preserve its domestic market share, international brands of TTCs have 
increasingly dominated this market segment. The images to market 
international brands used elsewhere, and in South Korea since the early 1990s, 
continue to strongly influence brand choice among these population groups. 
According to a report published in 2008,9 out of 10 youth smokers aged 13-18 
years regularly smoke foreign brands, such as Dunhill and Marlboro (87.9 
percent among middle school students aged 13-15 years and 95.5 percent 
among high school students aged 16-18 years). (418) In addition, a survey 
carried out in 2009 by Korea Research (N=2,056, students from 22 colleges) 
reports that about 77 percent of Korea's college students smoke foreign brand 
cigarettes. (419,420) These figures indicate how TTCs have successfully 
positioned themselves in the Korean market since market liberalisation. It is 
expected that KT&G will respond by using comparable marketing tactics in 
order to re-assert sales within these groups. 
The contemporary market environment in South Korea is described in 
the Global Youth Tobacco Survey (GYTS), conducted by the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) and the US Centres for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) as part of the Global Tobacco Surveillance System. In 2005, South 
Korea conducted the GYTS which was a school-based survey of middle school 
students aged 13-15 years. A total of 6,234 students from 75 schools 
participated in the survey. (421) The percentage of students who never 
smoked, but were likely to initiate smoking within the next year, was 17.1 
percent and within the five years was 28.2 percent. In other words, Korean 
youths aged 13-15 years appear to have had a high intention to smoke in their 
future time. There was also a high level of awareness of cigarette marketing 
and promotion. A total of 50.8 percent of youths saw pro-cigarette ads in 
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newspapers or magazines, and 14.5 percent were offered free cigarettes, 
despite sampling being forbidden by law to those below 19 years of age. 
Moreover, cigarette remains accessible to the young, with 26.3 percent of 
participants able to buy their own cigarettes without being refused by retailers 
on the basis of their age. (421) 
Table 8.7: Fact sheet of South Korea's Global Youth Tobacco Survey 
2005 
Prevalence 
28.0% of students had ever smoked cigarettes 
(Male = 31.0%, Female = 22.9%) 
7.0% currently smoke cigarettes (Male = 7.4%, 
Female = 5.0%) 
17.1% of never smokers are likely to initiate 
smoking next year 
28.2% of ever smokers first tried smoking at 
less than 10 years of age 
Knowledee and Attitude 
13.4% think boys and 8.9% think girls who 
smoke have more friends 
9.3% think boys and 4.1% think girls who 
smoke look more attractive 
Access and Availability-Current Smokers 
11.4% usually smoke at home 
34.0% buy cigarettes in a store 
26.3% who bought cigarettes in a store were 
NOT refused purchase because of their age 
Environmental Tobacco Smoke 
39.9% live in homes where others smoke in 
their presence 
64.5% are around others who smoke in places 
outside their home 
83.9% think smoking should be banned from 
public places 
82.1 % think smoke from others is harmful to 
them 
55.7% have one or more parents who smoke 
6.7% have most or all friends who smoke 
Cessation-Current Smokers 
Highlights 
" 7% currently smoke 
cigarettes; 
approximately 3 in 10 
the students who have 
ever tried smoking 
first tried before 10 
years of age. 
" ETS exposure is 
high-four in 10 
students live in 
homes where others 
smoke in their 
presence; two thirds 
are exposed to smoke 
in places outside their 
home; over half have 
at least one parent 
who smokes. 
"8 in 10 students think 
smoke from others is 
harmful to them. 
" Over 8 in 10 students 
think smoking in 
public places should 
be banned. 
" Approximately 7 in 
10 smokers want to 
quit. 
" Over 8 in 10 students 
saw antismoking 
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69.3% want to stop smoking 
74.6% tried to stop smoking during the past year 
69.7% have ever received help to stop smoking 
Media and Advertising 
87.5% saw antismoking media messages, in the 
past 30 days 
50.8% saw pro-cigarette ads in newspapers or 
magazines, in the past 30 days 
8.1% have an object with a cigarette brand logo 
14.5% were offered free cigarettes by a tobacco 
company representative 
School 
66.2% had been taught in class, during the past 
year, about the dangers of smoking 
19.4% had discussed in class, during the past 
year, reasons why people their age smoke 
44.7% had been taught in class, during the past 
year, the effects of tobacco used 
media messages in 
the past 30 days; half 
of the students saw 
pro-cigarette ads in 
newspapers and 
magazines 
Source: Adapted from US Centres for Disease Control and Prevention. Global Youth Tobacco 
Survey, South Korea Fact Sheet. (available from 
http: //www. edc. jzov/tobacco/tlobal/GYTS/factsheets/wnro/2004/southkorea factsheet htm 
accessed 6'h June 2008) 
Of particular concern, in relation to youth smoking, are the CSR 
programmes by TTCs and KT&G. TTCs and KT&G have developed their 
own youth smoking prevention programmes which have been widely 
advertised in newspapers, magazines, internet, and other places. The industry 
claims these programmes delay smoking by youths. Analysis of such 
initiatives elsewhere have shown them to be ineffective at preventing smoking 
(422) and, indeed, it has been argued that they have been used by the tobacco 
industry to indirectly encourage youth smoking, or at least to improve 
corporate image. (423,424) Independent research on industry-sponsored 
youth prevention programmes in South Korea, their motives and real impact on 
youth smoking prevalence, is urgently needed. 
Although public health challenges from the industry's activities and 
tobacco use remain and increase, there are several omissions in tobacco control 
measures in South Korea, particularly, compared to those specified in the 
FCTC. Table 8.8 shows the current tobacco control measures in Korea. 
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Table 8.8: The infrastructure for tobacco control in South Korea 
Bans on Advertising, Promotion and Sponsorship 
National TV and radio Yes 
International TV and radio Yes 
Local magazines/newspapers No 
International magazines/newspapers No 
Billboards/outdoor advertising Yes 
Point of sale No 
Internet Yes 
Free distribution Yes 
Promotional discounts Yes 
Non-tobacco products with tobacco brand names No 
Non-tobacco brand used for tobacco product No 
Appearance of tobacco products in TV and /or films No 
Sponsored events No 
Smoking-Free Environment 
Health-care facilities Yes 
Educational facilities, except universities Yes 
Universities No 
Governmental facilities No 
Indoor offices No 
Restaurants No 
Pubs and bars No 
Health Warnings on Tobacco Packages 
Laws or regulations banning misleading terms No 
% of principal display areas covered by warnings 30% 
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Warnings are mandated and specific Yes 
Warnings appear in/on each package/label Yes 
Warnings describe harmful effects of tobacco use Yes 
Warnings are large, clear, visible and legible Yes 
Warnings rotate Yes 
Warnings are written in the principal language(s) Yes 
Warnings include a picture No 
Treatment of Tobacco Dependence 
Quit line Yes 
Nicotine replacement therapies sold Yes 
Counselling in health clinics Yes, in some 
Counselling in hospitals Yes, in some 
Counselling in offices of health professionals No 
Counselling in the community No 
Source: World Health Organization. WHO report on the Global Tobacco Epidemic-the 
MPOWER package 2008 (page 134-137) 
Industry advertising, promotion, and sponsorship need to be more 
firmly controlled. `Above-the-line' activities of tobacco companies are 
almost prohibited, however, any types of sponsorship programmes of tobacco 
companies are still allowed under the regulations, thus, the companies continue 
to sponsor social, cultural, and musical events and develop these programmes. 
This should be reconsidered and prohibited following the recommendations of 
the FCTC. 
Overall, the findings of this research raise important questions for the 
protection of public health in South Korea following liberalisation of the 
tobacco market. Chapter 5 shows that these trends have occurred within a 
liberalised and, consequently, more competitive market environment. The 
findings of Chapter 6 describe how tobacco companies have responded to 
greater competition by increasing, and strategically targeting, their marketing 
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efforts. Thus, despite the adoption of allegedly stronger tobacco control 
measures following market liberalisation, including decades of legal 
restrictions on tobacco marketing to Koreans under the age of 19 years, there 
has been an upward trend in smoking prevalence notably within these 
population groups. The creation of a new generation of smokers will have 
significant consequences for public health in future if not urgently addressed 
with more effective tobacco control measures. 
This research suggests that Korea, in liberalising its tobacco market as 
part of the government's broader strategy of economic development, must be 
far more proactive in adopting correspondingly strong tobacco control policies. 
Chapter 9 will examine the implications for strengthening tobacco control 
policy to address the problem of regulating the tobacco industry within a 
competitive market and, in particular, in the context of the implementation of 
the FCTC. 
8.7 Implications for global public health and tobacco control 
Through analysing TTCs' market access into South Korea and its' 
impacts on the domestic tobacco industry and public health, this research 
emphasises that the economic development policies of emerging markets 
should take account of TTCs' strategies for global market expansion. The 
research suggests that TTCs strategically approach emerging markets where 
there are relatively weaker tobacco control polices and measures, using a 
variety of market access strategies. These strategies threaten public health by 
both supply and demand creation tactics. Therefore, emerging markets have 
to put in place comprehensive tobacco control legislation prior to the adoption 
of market liberalisation policies. In short, in tradeliberalisation processes, 
health must be given much higher priority. 
As discussed in Chapter 7, there is evidence that KT&G is becoming a 
new TTC itself. KT&G increasingly focuses on market expansion abroad and 
is seeking to become a leading transnational company. It is argued here that 
KT&G has learnt how to compete with existing TTCs, and how to create 
demand in global markets, since the Korean domestic tobacco market was 
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liberalised. This suggests that KT&G must also now be closely monitored 
nationally and internationally by governments and tobacco control advocates. 
If not, its aggressive market access activities will further undermine global 
tobacco control, and thus add to existing threats to global public health. 
Overall, given continued and rapid globalisation of the world economy, 
global public health including tobacco control must be given greater priority. 
This must be seen as part of efforts to better manage the social and 
environmental consequences of globalisation. The FCTC offers 
comprehensive guidance to governments on the policies needed to achieve this 
goal, as well as a blueprint for collective action globally to tackle perhaps the 
most pressing public health threats worldwide. 
8.8 Summary 
Through analyses of internal industry documents supported by 
interviews with key informants and additional primary and secondary data 
sources in English and Korean, this research finds that TTCs adopted their 
market access strategies according to Korea's export-oriented economic 
development model and its attitudes towards foreign investment. Direct and 
indirect lobbying by TTCs of the US and Korean governments within the 
context of the transformation of world trading system in the beginning 1980s, 
pressured the South Korean government to liberalise its tobacco market. This 
finding supports the conceptual framework of this research, and extends further 
the limited theorising on the market access and expansion strategies of TTCs 
within a globalising world economy. At the same time, the research extends 
the existing literature on South Korea, in particular, by analysing the country's 
experience in substantial detail. This research offers a fuller account of TTC 
behaviour in one country, and raises implications for analysing how TTCs 
adopted to the conditions faced in other countries and regions. 
Once the market was opened, this research offers fuller understanding 
of the various tactics used by TTCs to create demand for their brands. It is 
confirmed that TTCs targeted particular population groups, such as young 
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adults and females, and smoking patterns changed accordingly. As a result, 
the tobacco market in South Korea has become extremely competitive 
domestically. Furthermore, the previously monopolised domestic company 
KT&G is predicted to assume a role as a new TTC in the world tobacco market 
seeking its own access, to other emerging markets. This research supports the 
limited previous studies which describe that tobacco market liberalisation leads 
to greater competition. In addition, although the data on public health impacts 
of market liberalisation were limited, the findings suggest there are important 
public health implications in the way in which TTCs gained market access. 
The implications of the findings of this research, and the corresponding 
response required by the public health community, especially within the 
context of the implementation of the FCTC, are addressed in Chapter 9. 
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CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
9.1 Introduction 
The overarching rationale for this research, from the perspective of 
public health, is to contribute to efforts to better address the rising health risks 
and impacts from the global tobacco pandemic. It is now widely recognised, 
by the World Health Organisation (WHO) and many others, that this increasing 
trend in tobacco use can be attributed to the worldwide expansion of 
transnational tobacco companies (TTCs). As traditional markets have 
declined, TTCs have actively and aggressively pursued emerging markets, 
especially in developing countries. 
As discussed in Chapter 8, the research confirms that TTCs' market 
access and expansion into South Korea from the mid to late 1980s has been 
part of this global expansion, resulting in an increase in tobacco use within the 
country by both total volume and smoking prevalence among young adults and 
females during the early period of market liberalisation. The entry of TTCs 
into the Korean market has stimulated increased competition, with the formerly 
state-protected domestic monopoly required to respond accordingly, even 
leading it to aspire to become a new TTC. Consequently, KT&G now seeks 
to expand into other emerging markets, further contributing to the globalisation 
of the tobacco pandemic. This research, in short, offers a fuller and more 
detailed account of how trade liberalisation and the tobacco industry impacts 
on public health in emerging markets and globally. 
These findings raise important implications for strengthening tobacco 
control to deal with TTCs within an increasing globalised industry and world 
economy. Based on these findings, this chapter addresses the final objective 
of the research, namely "to draw lessons for strengthening tobacco control in 
South Korea and other emerging markets in the context of the Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC)". 
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9.2 Balancing the goals of economic development and public 
health policy 
The findings of this research shows that Korea's tobacco industry has 
been shaped foremost by government policies focused on economic 
development and growth. The tobacco industry, prior to and immediately 
after liberalisation, was regulated by the government according to the 
economic development model. In other words, the tobacco industry has been 
shaped by an economic logic rather than by public health policy goals. As 
well as influencing the domestic tobacco industry, how TTCs have been able to 
access and expand within South Korea has also been driven by this economic 
logic. Hence, the government believed that strict tobacco control measures 
might lead to harmful economic consequences, slowing the country's rapid 
progress. Public health considerations were not given due consideration until 
long after liberalisation occurred. 
Based on the findings of this research, however, it is recommended 
that a more balanced consideration of both economic and public health policy 
goals is needed in the regulation of the tobacco industry in South Korea. 
Many governments in the developing world, including South Korea, believe 
that tobacco control efforts are juxtaposed with economic policy, with public 
health gains achieved through negative impacts on economic development and 
growth. Reducing tobacco use, it is often argued, leads to a loss of 
employment, and government revenues from taxation. However, there is 
substantial and growing evidence that tobacco control has net economic 
benefits. The World Bank, for example, argues that government policies to 
increase tobacco taxes (with the aim of improving public health rather than 
increasing tax revenues) would not lead to long-term job losses. Rather, 
World Bank evidence suggests that national revenues would increase in the 
medium and long term from higher taxation and, through stronger tobacco 
control measures, public health gains with additional associated economic 
benefits would also be achieved. (360) In other words, there is a clear 
economic and public health logic for governments to adopt stronger tobacco 
control. 
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The economic cost of tobacco use, notably in developing countries, is 
also increasingly recognised. There is evidence that tobacco industry 
contributes to a circle of poverty in developing countries. Individually, as a 
strong addition, there is substantial evidence that a large proportion of family 
income can be spent on tobacco, sometimes at the expense of other basic 
needs. (425) On a macroeconomic level, higher investment in the tobacco 
industry, within countries with limited resources, seeking to foster the goals of 
economic development, ultimately results in a higher economic burden created 
by the cost of treating tobacco-related illnesses and the consequent loss of 
productivity from tobacco use. In other words, for emerging markets, 
investment in the tobacco sector can be argued to worsen the poverty of 
individuals and be a net drain on precious resources. (403) While the tobacco 
industry in developing countries may provide economic benefits in the short 
term, but it is more likely to be offset by longer-term costs to deal with 
tobacco-related diseases. (426) This is especially so where there is a failure to 
address the public health impacts of market liberalisation of the tobacco 
industry. For this reason, it is essential that the full costs of tobacco 
production and consumption, including the public health consequences of 
tobacco use, be integrated into the regulation of the sector by governments. 
In order to achieve this, health impact assessment (HIA), for example, may be 
a means of assessing the broader impacts of economic development policies, 
and thus reconciling what are seen as separate policy spheres. 
9.3 Adopting strong and comprehensive tobacco control 
measures before market liberalisation 
The WHO warns that only 5 percent of the world's population live in 
countries that have adopted comprehensive measures to fully protect their 
populations from the harms of tobacco use. (1) This means that 95 percent of 
the world's population remain exposed to these risks. In this context, TTCs 
continue to readily employ a varied range of tactics to create new demand for 
their brands in emerging markets around the world. The findings of this 
research also support the analysis of other countries which show that the 
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tobacco industry has actively and strategically attempted to undermine and 
circumvent existing and anticipated tobacco control policies and measures. 
Where there has been a lack of preparation for market access by TTCs, many 
countries have attempted to introduce restrictions retrospectively. This 
research has shown that, in the Korean case like other Asian countries, it was 
much harder to introduce and implement restrictions on the tobacco industry 
after market liberalisation because of such efforts by TTCs to hinder regulation. 
Those tobacco control policies were already in place, as described in Section 
9.2, were so focused on the economic goals of protecting the domestic industry, 
rather than the protection of public health, that there has been limited attention 
to the latter. The lessons to be drawn from this research is that emerging 
markets should develop and adopt comprehensive tobacco control policies and 
measures, with public health goals firmly in mind, before market liberalisation 
is adopted. Indeed, tobacco control should be an integral part of the 
conditions negotiated for market liberalisation, with measures apply equally to 
both domestic and foreign tobacco companies. If the measures adopted are 
used as veiled means of protecting the domestic industry from foreign 
competition, as argued by US companies in the case of Thailand, this would 
open them to challenge within the WTO as discriminatory. In the case of 
South Korea, where the government's banning of imports of foreign cigarettes 
in order to protect domestic tobacco industry was argued to be discriminatory 
by the US government, equal consideration needed to be given to the wider 
public health impacts on Korean society by policies to address these claims. 
What kinds of tobacco control measures should be adopted prior to 
market liberalisation? For governments engaged in trade liberalisation, there 
is a need to ensure that the measures introduced are comprehensive and 
difficult to circumvent. The findings of this research suggest, not only that 
TTCs circumvented existing tobacco control measures in various ways, as 
described in Chapter 6, in order to build market share, but the domestic 
company, KTGC was also able to engage in a wide range of marketing 
activities in an effort to protect its market share from TTC competition despite 
the adoption of new regulations. As a result of the lack of strong and 
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comprehensive tobacco control measures before market liberalisation, tobacco 
use among young adults and, in particular, young females rapidly increased. 
The FCTC lists comprehensive measures to guide effective tobacco 
control, as listed in Table 9.1, which should serve as an ideal standard for 
emerging markets to aspire. There are broadly two parts in the FCTC to 
minimise public health impact of tobacco use, demand-side measures and 
supply-side measure. In this section, the former will be emphasised. 
Table 9.1: Summary of FCTC provisions (Part 3 and 4) 
Part 3: Measures relating to the reduction of demand for tobacco 
Price and tax measures to reduce the demand for tobacco (Article 6) 
Non-price measures to reduce the demand for tobacco (Article 7) 
Protection from exposure to tobacco smoke (Article 8) 
Regulation of the contents of tobacco products (Article 9) 
Regulation of tobacco product disclosures (Article 10) 
Packaging and labelling of tobacco products (Article 11) 
Education, communication, training and public awareness (Article 12) 
Tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship (Article 13) 
Demand reduction measures concerning tobacco dependence and cessation 
(Article 14) 
Part 4: Measures relating to the reduction of supply for tobacco 
Illicit trade in tobacco products (Article 15) 
Sales to and by minors (Article 16) 
Provision of support for economically viable alternative activities (Article 
17) 
Note: see Appendix G for detailed provisions. 
As suggested under the FCTC, it is recommended that governments 
adopt the following measures in tandem: (a) higher prices on tobacco through 
regular excise tax increases; (b) prohibitions on all tobacco advertising and 
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promotion; (c) bans on smoking in public and work places to achieve smoke 
free environments; (d) support and help for current smokers who wish to quit; 
(e) information on the risks of tobacco use and benefits of quitting; (f) large 
and clear warnings on tobacco packages, preferably with pictures; and (g) bans 
on using "light", "slim", and "super light". The FCTC requires states which 
are signatories to the agreement to implement the above provisions within a 
fixed period of time (e. g. strong health warnings on tobacco packaging within 
three years, and the establishment of comprehensive bans on all tobacco 
advertising, promotional sponsorships within five years upon entering the 
treaty). 
To date, there remain concerns that implementing the FCTC, 
particularly in developing world, remains challenged by the absence of 
appropriate legal frameworks within many countries, a lack of adequate 
resources, and most importantly insufficient political support for tobacco 
control as a public policy priority. (427) Based on the Korean case of market 
liberalisation, this research recommends certain measures could be given 
priority prior to market liberalisation by emerging markets. It is strongly 
recommended that all forms of marketing (in the form of direct and indirect 
advertising, promotion and sponsorship activities) be banned before market 
opening. South Korea, once the tobacco market was partially opened in 1986, 
prohibited almost all forms of tobacco marketing under the revising regulations 
of 1988. However, during negotiations for complete market liberalisation, 
due to strong pressure by the US government, the Korean government agreed 
to allow some marketing activities such as at the point of sale, in selected print 
media up to a certain number of times (e. g. magazines and newspapers). This 
led to a complex and, to some extent, ill-defined list of "do's" and "don'ts" 
which left the onus on the public health community to interpret the regulations, 
monitor the industry, and argue the existence of violations. This research 
concludes that this policy, in practice, opened the door to TTCs to circumvent 
the existing limited restrictions as described in Chapter 6. The lack of official 
monitoring and enforcement of existing restrictions further rendered the 
adopted measures ineffective. 
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Given the problematic nature of Korean restrictions on tobacco 
marketing, it is recommended that each provision of tobacco control measures 
be clearly enforceable in practice. In Korea, for example, a provision 
prohibiting tobacco sponsorship of events for youths and females has been 
difficult to enforce because it is impossible, in many cases, to argue that an 
event is attended exclusively by these population groups. As such, the 
restriction becomes meaningless. Most social, cultural, musical, and sporting 
events are supported by a mixture of population groups, and thus separating 
legal and illegal tobacco sponsorship cannot be determined. Such 
sponsorship programmes have thus continued to be widely used by tobacco 
companies and, indeed has become a highly effective form of "below-the-line" 
marketing activity. Once again, the unclear provisions stipulated under the 
existing law have resulted in ineffective tobacco control and enforcement in 
South Korea. 
It is also recommended that voluntary codes on tobacco marketing not 
be adopted, and that restrictions should carry binding legal authority. This 
research has shown that TTCs and Korea's domestic tobacco company has 
supported voluntary codes as a further means of circumventing stronger 
tobacco control measures. As informed in Chapter 7, when the government 
reinforced tobacco control through implementing a new bill, TTCs and KTGC 
collectively attempted to weaken the proposed legislation by adopting and 
applying a voluntary code. The industry argued that it could regulate its own 
activities, thus saving the government undue cost and effort. However, this 
research has shown that, similar to other countries (428-432), this has been a 
strategic move to prevent the adoption of stronger and binding regulation. 
Such efforts to have a voluntary code adopted in lieu of binding legislation 
may be made during negotiations to achieve market liberalisation. Existing 
evidence, however, shows that voluntary codes by industry are ineffective at 
restricting tobacco marketing (62,433-435), and that such efforts should be 
strongly resisted. 
A further lesson from the case of South Korea is the absence of the 
Ministry of Health (MOH) from negotiating with the US government on 
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market liberalisation despite the profound public health consequences 
concerned. As a former MOH official Dae Kyu Oh (DKO) stated: 
The MOH was neither involved nor invited in the process of trade 
negotiation between South Korea and the US. There was no chance 
to inform the government of the health concerns of tobacco use, 
although the department recognised the harmfulness of cigarette 
smoking. (DKO) 
Within this context, it is perhaps unsurprising that the government found it 
difficult to implement strong and effective tobacco control measures during, or 
even after negotiation, and that the government was not able to argue 
convincingly with the US government on the public health impact of tobacco 
market liberalisation in Korea due to a lack of relevant expertise. In contrast, 
the Thai government acted differently during its trade negotiations with the US 
government. Two of the most prominent Thai anti-smoking activists joined 
the three-member Thai delegation to the US Trade Representative (USTR) 
hearings, providing key evidence to support the government's arguments in 
favour of strong tobacco control measures. (81) Ensuring similar 
representation of expertise, in the case of South Korea, might have led to a 
different result. It is thus recommended that the involvement of public health 
experts during trade negotiations be encouraged, where public health impacts 
are relevant, to enable effective responses to efforts by TTCs to use trade 
liberalisation to circumvent tobacco control measures. 
9.4 Enforcement of tobacco control in South Korea 
As stated in Chapter 8, not only is the introduction of strong tobacco 
control measures important, but full and effective enforcement of those 
measures over time are equally essential in emerging markets. Even where 
strong measures have been adopted, governments must anticipate and respond 
to tobacco industry's attempts to circumvent such measures. Therefore, 
governments must closely monitor tobacco industry compliance with the 
measures and enforce strict penalties for non-compliance. The findings of 
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this research show that this was far from the case in South Korea and remains a 
challenge to the present day. 
As discussed in Section 8.3.2 in Chapter 8, following the increased 
adoption of tobacco control measures in South Korea since 2005, TTCs and 
KT&G deployed indirect marketing methods to expand their respective market 
shares. In addition, Section 8.6.3 emphasises that Korea's youth and young 
adult smokers were actively targeted by the tobacco industry. Despite the 
government's efforts, and the tremendous contribution of non-state anti- 
smoking organisations, the public health risk from tobacco use in South Korea 
remains substantial. The fuller understanding of tobacco industry activities 
provided by this research suggests a number of recommendations for 
strengthening the enforcement of tobacco control in South Korea. 
First, as described in Chapters 6 and 7, the tobacco industry in South 
Korea has been regulated under two different sets of regulations and, in turn, 
two separate government bodies since market liberalisation. These are the 
Tobacco Business Act (TBA), under the jurisdiction of Ministry of Finance 
(MOF), and the National Health Promotion Act (NHPA) under the jurisdiction 
of MOH. With different public policy goals, they coexist and represent 
potential conflicts in how the industry should be regulated. While the TBA 
addresses the financial and economic aspects of the industry's operation, 
regulating the tobacco industry as a profit-seeking business, the NHPA deals 
with measures to minimise the harmful public health effects of, and ultimately 
to reduce the level of, tobacco use. These two policy goals are fundamentally 
incompatible. Prior to the privatisation of KT&G, the government was the 
main producer of tobacco products, seeking to maximise revenues through 
sales and taxation. At the same time, the government held a responsibility to 
protect and promote population health through a decrease in tobacco use. To 
date, the government continues to demonstrate a duality in its approach to the 
regulation of the tobacco industry, seeking to reconcile perceived economic 
benefits with public health costs. Based on the findings of this research, it is 
recommended that a unified approach to tobacco control be adopted in terms of 
the legal framework and enforcement as set out under the FCTC. 
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Second, more effective control and surveillance of TTCs' indirect 
activities, such as corporate social responsibility (CSR) programmes, is needed 
as part of effective enforcement measures by the Korean government and 
tobacco control advocates. The main tobacco manufacturers in Korea, British 
America Tobacco (BAT) Korea, Philip Morris (PM) Korea and KT&G 
collectively, and individually, began manoeuvring to protect their dominant 
market positions by employing a wide range of CSR activities. As discussed 
in Chapter 6 and 7, under a so-called "dark" marketing environment, as South 
Korea has gradually become over time, CSR activities have become 
increasingly important to both promote the industry and individual company's 
image, thus winning back the "hearts and minds" of the public, as well as a key 
tactic within a broader marketing strategy. However, as stipulated under the 
FCTC, it is recommended that the government recognise that CSR should be 
more closely regulated. For example, the government should require the 
industry to report expenditure on CSR programmes to the public under Article 
5.3. It is also recommended that the government and public health advocates 
work to raise public awareness of CSR activities by the tobacco industry in 
South Korea. Overall, the government and tobacco control advocates must 
remain wary of efforts, such as CSR, which circumvent tobacco control 
policies. Increased monitoring and public disclosure of the industry's use of 
CSR, and other indirect/underground marketing tactics, should for a core part 
of tobacco control enforcement efforts. 
9.5 Reinforcement of the FCTC and additional protocols 
The higher priority given to economic development over the protection 
and promotion of public health has resulted from partial, weak and 
inadequately enforced policies and regulations on tobacco control, and a lack 
of experience in dealing with TTCs' market access and expansion strategies in 
emerging markets leave many countries and regions, particularly, developing 
countries, vulnerable to further penetration by TTCs. These factors threaten 
global health, underlining WHO's warning that 80 percent of tobacco-related 
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deaths worldwide will occur in developing countries by 2030. The findings 
of this research on South Korea thus offer important lessons to other countries. 
Along with the above recommendations, a further recommendation of this 
research is that the FCTC, as an historic treaty, requires further reinforcement 
given the global nature of the tobacco pandemic. The treaty offers a unique 
and valuable framework for enabling collective action across countries to 
tackle the significant, and growing, public health threat from tobacco use 
worldwide. 
Importantly, the current FCTC does not contain any provisions to 
regulate or ban TTC investments in developing countries, and minimal 
reference to the links between trade and tobacco. However, this research 
finds that TTCs can resort to a range of strategies, including joint ventures (JV), 
licensing agreements, privatisation, foreign direct investment, and illicit trade 
to gain access and expand into emerging markets, notably developing countries. 
It is thus recommended that additional measures are still needed, under the 
auspices of the FCTC, to deal with the full range of tobacco industry strategies 
and activities. The FCTC Secretariat may also provide States Parties with 
support on how to deal with market access strategies in order to improve 
awareness and strengthen the representation of public health interests in 
negotiations. 
Although this research finds that FDI, privatisation, and other 
economic factors are integral parts of the story behind the TTCs successful 
efforts to gain market access in South Korea, the FCTC gives little attention to 
supply-side measures. This includes provisions on the illicit trade in tobacco 
products, and the provision of support for economically viable alternative 
activities. (See Table 9.1) This lack of emphasis on supply-side measures in 
the FCTC appears to be in keeping with the advice of the World Bank that 
tobacco control should be based on demand-side measures. The World Bank 
acknowledges that tobacco is a historically attractive crop to farmers because it 
provides a higher net income yield per unit of land than most cash crops. In 
addition, its global price is relatively stable compared with other cash corps. 
Given these benefits of tobacco production, the Bank argues that supply-side 
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tobacco control measures, such as the prohibition of tobacco or crop 
substitution and diversification, have less evidence of success tobacco 
control. (360) The Bank stresses that, if one supplier were to shut down, an 
alternative supplier is likely to emerge quickly. (360) On trade liberalisation 
of tobacco, the World Bank argues that, although trade liberalisation has 
contributed to an increase in the consumption of tobacco in low- and middle- 
income countries, due to its strong tie with economic growth and incomes, such 
supply-side restriction would have an undesirable action for tobacco control. 
However, the Bank agrees that one supply-side measure, action against 
smuggling, is a key to an effective strategy to control tobacco use. Based on 
this, the World Bank argues that reduced demand for tobacco would be better 
effective approaches to curb tobacco use. 
The FCTC was influenced by this World Bank analysis which was 
conducted two decades ago. The adoption of a protocol on the illicit trade in 
tobacco products will be an important development. This research supports 
the view that further attention to other supply-side aspects of tobacco control 
under the FCTC is warranted. It is thus recommended, based on the findings 
of this research, that the FCTC should be strengthened further with new 
supply-side measures. The research concludes that there is a need to re-visit 
the relative neglect of supply-side measures, with further research undertaken 
on how such provisions might be defined and adopted to further global tobacco 
control. 
Finally, in terms of improving supply-side tobacco control measures, 
this research concludes that there is a need for greater coherence among 
multilateral institutions, namely the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World 
Trade Organisation (WTO), WHO, and the World Bank, so that these 
institutions do not work contrary to each other in tackling the complex policy 
challenge of tobacco control. This research finds the contrasting, and at times 
contradictory, positions that different multilateral institutions play, in relation 
to tobacco has been a detriment to efforts by individual countries, notably 
developing countries, to forge comprehensive and unified policies at the 
national level. After market liberalisation, with South Korea struggling with 
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the Asian economic crisis, the IMF pressured the Korean government to 
privatise the Korea Tobacco & Ginseng Corporation (KTGC). The IMF and 
WTO also advocated an economic rationale, in effect supporting the tobacco 
industry's global expansion. Therefore, the roles of IMF and WTO, unlike 
the WHO and World Bank, are likely to increase tobacco epidemic by 
supporting TTCs' market expansion abroad. 
There has been limited analyses of these multilateral institutions' roles 
to date in relation to the tobacco sector. (359,436) The principle aim of WTO 
includes: a commitment to achieving free trade and fair competition; limits on 
and eventual elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade; non- 
discriminatory treatment of all trading partners; the non-discriminatory 
treatment of domestically produced and foreign products; predictability by 
ensuring that trade barriers are not erected arbitrarily; negotiated elimination of 
trade barriers; the settlement of disputed; and opposition to retaliatory 
sanctions. (9,437,438) Under the principle, WTO's multilateral agreements 
significantly expanded global trade in tobacco products by mandating sizable 
reductions in tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in tobacco products. (439) 
In addition, similar to South Korea, several countries, notably, Bulgaria, Mali, 
Moldova, Thailand, and Turkey, have been pressured for privatisation of their 
tobacco monopolies by the IMF in order to overcome economic crisis. (359) 
However, in most cases, there were no public health considerations involved, 
influencing governments' decision on privatisation. Rather, the countries 
made efforts to delay privatisation due to fiscal policy and unpopularity of 
foreign ownership. (429,440,441) There are currently more than 20 countries 
in the world where they still monopolise their tobacco industry by government 
divisions. These countries should be paid particular and further attention and 
supports by multilateral institutions to protect people from tobacco epidemic. 
In addition, cross agency collaboration between multilateral institutions on 
tobacco control such as the WHO initiates during the negotiation of the FCTC. 
Related to the above recommendation, it is also suggested that the US 
and other home governments where TTCs are based should cease to act on 
behalf of tobacco companies abroad. The promotion of tobacco industry 
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interests abroad, when strong tobacco control is practiced at home, must be 
recognised as a direct contradiction. In the case of South Korea, the bilateral 
relationship between South Korea and the US during negotiations to open the 
tobacco market was critical. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix A Key informants for semi-structured interviews 
Informant Interview date 
Government 
officials 
Lawyer 
Tobacco 
control 
advocates 
Dae Kyu Oh, former manager of the Ministry 29 May 2009 
of Health (DKO) 
Anonymous 8, current officer in the Ministry 31 Aug 2010 
of Finance (Anonymous 8) 
Anonymous 9, current officer in the Ministry 31 Aug 2010 
of Finance (Anonymous 9) 
Kung Kun Lee, lawyer and medical doctor 29 May 2009 
(KKL) 
11 Soon Kim, former President of the Korean 16 Apr 2009 
Association of Smoking and Health (ISK) 7 Oct 2010 
Bok Kun Lee, Secretary Director of the Youth 14 Apr 2009 
No Smoking Association (BKL) 25 Aug 2010 
Kang Mo Chung, President of the Korean 15 June 2009 
Consumer Union (KMC) 
Jin Sook Choi, former Secretary Director of 
the Korean Association of Smoking and 17 Apr 2009 
Health (JSC) 
Researcher Eun Jin Choi, researcher of MOH (EJC) 31 Aug 2010 
Tobacco 
industry 
employees 
Anonymous 4, employee of Philip Morris 24 June 2009 
Korea (Anonymous 4) 
Anonymous 5, former employee of British 
American Tobacco Korea (Anonymous 5) I Sep 2010 
Anonymous 1, former manager of the Office 23 Aug 2010 
of Monopoly (Anonymous 1) 
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Anonymous 6, former manager of the Korea 23 Aug 2010 
Monopoly Office (Anonymous 6) 
Anonymous 2, former manager of the Korea 24 Aug 2010 
Monopoly Office (Anonymous 2) 
Anonymous 3, former executive of the Korea 24 Aug 2010 
Tobacco and Ginseng Corporation 
(Anonymous 3) 
Anonymous 7, KT&G (Anonymous 7) 27 Aug 2010 
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Appendix B Interview topic guide 
Tobacco industry (OOM, KOMOCO, KTGC, KT&G) 
- How did TTCs try to access South Korea's monopolised tobacco 
market in the early and mid 1980s? 
How did OOM respond to TTCs' proposals, such as joint ventures and 
licensing manufacturing? 
What effects has Korean domestic tobacco industry had since market 
liberalisation? 
Can you tell me about the background of privatisation of KOMOCO? 
Since KOMOCO was privatised, PM and BAT opened local 
manufacturing facilities in South Korea. How has this affected 
KTGC? 
- JTI and KT&G agreed on licensing manufacturing, unlike PM and 
BAT. Why? Were there any different factors in relation to JTI? 
How does KT&G evaluate the smuggled segment of the market in 
South Korea? 
- What do you think of TTCs' marketing practices in South Korea? 
- What is the future plan for the next decade and how will KT&G 
respond to TTCs' growing market penetration? 
- Which strategies do you focus on in order to maintain market share? 
Tobacco industry (TTCs in Korea) 
What opportunities were/are there in Korea's tobacco market? 
What is your approach to Korean tobacco policy? 
What do you think of other competitors' marketing activities? 
Which strategies do you focus on in order to maintain market share? 
Tobacco control advocates 
- Political and economic situation in South Korea before market 
liberalisation 
306 
- Which marketing strategies did TTCs employ during the 1988 Seoul 
Olympic Games? 
- How has the tobacco market changed since market liberalisation? 
- What was the purpose of President Chun's Washington visit in 1985? 
- After President Chun's meeting with the US President Reagan, what 
changes took place in the tobacco market? 
- What was the textile petition of the US in 1985? 
- What did the Korea Consumer Union do against TTCs' market access? 
- Which marketing strategies were employed by TTCs at the beginning 
of market opening in order to promote their brands? 
- Current marketing strategies of BAT, PM, JTI, and KT&G 
Government officers 
When the tobacco market opened, what did the Department of Health 
do in order to prevent people from smoking? 
- Were licensing manufacturing, joint ventures, and foreign investment 
prohibited in the Korean tobacco industry by non-Korean private 
companies? 
What was the background of KTGC's privatisation in 2002? Was there 
any pressure to privatise? 
- What was the purpose of President Chun's Washington visit in 1985? 
And what happened during the meeting? 
What was the textile petition of the US in 1985 and how did it impact 
on Korea's tobacco market? 
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Appendix C Ethics approval form for interviews 
LONDON SCHOOL OF HYGIENE 
& TROPICAL MEDICINE 
ETHICS COMMITTEE 
APPROVAL FORM 
Application number: 5470 
Name of Pnncipal Investigator Sungkyu Lee 
Department Public Health and Policy 
Head of Department Professor Anne Mills 
Title: The tobacco industry in South Korea since market liberalisation: 
Implications for strengthening tobacco control 
This application is approved by the Committee. 
Chair of the Ethics Committee ....... 
Date ........... ........ ........... ..... ............. 
25 March 2009............................................. 
Approval is dependent on local ethical approval having been received. 
Any subsequent changes to the application must be submitted to the Committee 
via an E2 amendment form. 
308 
Appendix D Record of Understanding between South Korea and 
the US concerning market access for cigarettes 
RECORD OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE 
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND 
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
CONCERNING MARKET ACCESS FOR CIGARETTES 
The Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of the United 
States of America, recognizing the need to provide open and non- 
discriminatory access for imported cigarettes to the Korean market, have 
agreed as follows: 
I. BASIS OF THE UNDERSTANDING 
A. The Government of the Republic of Korea(hereinafter shall be referred to as 
"the Korean government") shall accord foreign cigarette manufacturers, their 
subsidiaries, affiliates, branch offices or agents(hereinafter shall be referred to 
as "foreign cigarette manufacturers") non-discriminatory access to the Korean 
market including the right to import, distribute, and sell imported cigarettes on 
terms consistent with this Record of Understanding. 
B. Except as otherwise provided in this Record of Understanding, importation, 
distribution, and sale of imported cigarettes shall occur independent of the 
authority of the Korean Monopoly Corporation(hereinafter shall be referred to 
as "KMC"). 
C. The Korean government shall ensure that the level and conditions of market 
access for imported cigarettes provided for in this Record of Understanding 
remain unimpaired by restrictions or requirements affecting directly or 
indirectly the importation, distribution or sale of imported cigarettes. 
309 
The Korean government shall accord full national treatment in the importation, 
distribution and sale of imported cigarettes. 
Any modification of the conditions of distribution or sale of cigarettes in the 
Korean market shall be applied equally to all classes and brands of cigarettes 
whether imported or national origin. 
H. CONDITIONS OF IMPORTATION 
A. The Korean government shall ensure that KMC automatically and 
immediately commission to any domestic or foreign-invested entity qualified 
to engage in import activities under the Korean Foreign Trade Act designated 
by any foreign cigarette manufacturer the authority to import, distribute, and 
sell imported cigarettes. Such commission shall be effective from July 1,1988 
to the effective date of the legislation enacted in connection with this Record of 
Understanding (hereinafter shall be referred to as "new legislation"). Any 
entity granted authority to import, distribute, or sell imported cigarettes shall 
be able to enter into agreements with wholesalers, distributors, or sub- 
distributors to engage in these same activities. 
Until the effective date of the new legislation, such entity shall provide KMC 
with a list of the parties to such agreements. 
Upon the effective date of the new legislation, cigarettes shall be placed on 
automatic import approval status, and the requirement for the commissioning 
by KMC of the authority to import, distribute, or sell imported cigarettes shall 
be rescinded in accordance with the new legislation. 
Effective January 1.1989. foreign cigarette manufacturers shall be permitted to 
import directly and sell cigarettes in Korea upon automatic and immediate 
commissioning of such authority by KMC. 
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B. Any foreign cigarette manufacturer shall be permitted to import cigarettes 
directly into Korea without restriction on product cost, retail margin, quantity, 
style, size, package configuration, or frequency of importation, except that the 
retail margin shall not exceed 10 percent of the retail price for a period not to 
extend beyond December 31,1988. 
C. The importing entity shall be solely responsible for all functions and 
activities related to the importation process and formal customs clearance and 
customs entry into the Republic of Korea. Imports of cigarettes shall be cleared 
through Korean customs expeditiously in accordance with applicable laws and 
standard procedures. 
D. Any foreign cigarette manufacturer shall be permitted to own bonded 
warehouses in accordance with relevant Korean laws. In addition, such entities 
shall be able to maintain, operate and manage bonded warehouses and to 
determine warehouse inventory levels. Such entities operating bonded 
warehouses shall be solely responsible for the flow of goods into and out of 
such warehouses, as well as the distribution of said goods through wholesalers, 
independent distributors, and directly to retail outlets. 
III. CONDITIONS OF DISTRIBUTION 
A. Any foreign cigarette manufacturer shall be permitted to distribute 
cigarettes through wholesalers, distributors and sub-distributors to licensed 
retail outlets. In addition, any foreign cigarette manufacturer shall be permitted 
to sell directly cigarettes to wholesalers, distributors, sub-distributors, and 
licensed retail outlets. Sales of cigarettes at retail prices may be offered only by 
licensed retail outlets or service businesses which purchase cigarettes from 
licensed retail outlets. 
B. Imported cigarettes may be sold directly to licensed duty-free outlets 
without payment of any fees duties or taxes. 
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C. All retailers currently designated by the KMC to sell cigarettes of national 
origin shall be permitted to sell imported cigarettes without imposition of any 
additional requirement. Applications for designation as cigarettes retailer shall 
be granted automatically and immediately by the appropriate Korean authority, 
provided that such applications satisfy the applicable laws and regulations. 
D. Any foreign cigarette manufacturer may retain the services of the KMC to 
distribute imported cigarettes under the terms to be mutually agreed upon 
between them. 
IV. PRICING 
A. Any foreign cigarette manufacturer shall determine the import price and 
retail price for each type style or brand of imported cigarettes. These prices 
may be adjusted at the discretion of the foreign cigarette manufacturer. 
Prior to the effective date of the new legislation, a foreign cigarette 
manufacturer should notify the KMC of the nation-wide uniform retail price at 
which each brand of cigarettes shall be sold, and after the effective date of the 
new legislation, should notify the Ministry of Finance of the retail price as 
determined by such foreign cigarette manufacturers. The effective date of such 
retail price shall be the sixth day following such notification. 
B. Commercial terms, fees, commissions, retail margins, credit and inventory 
terms, and prices to all classes of trade shall be determined solely by the 
foreign cigarette manufacturers, importers, wholesalers, distributors and other 
agents. 
C. The Korean government shall submit to the National Assembly at the 
opening of its Fall 1988 session all legislation necessary to establish a specific 
excise tax on all cigarettes, the rights of foreign cigarette manufacturers to 
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engage in all activities set forth in this Record of Understanding and a zero 
percent import tariff on cigarettes. Such excise tax shall be applied to all 
cigarettes whether imported or of national origin. The specific amount of tax 
shall be 18,000 won per thousand cigarettes. However, cigarettes with a retail 
price of 200 won or less may be subject to lower excise tax. 
The excise tax shall replace any and all other taxes and revenue measures, 
including local and regional taxes. The legislation establishing the excise tax 
shall specify that the terms and conditions of the payment of said tax shall be 
the same for cigarettes of national origin and imported cigarettes. The Korean 
government shall exert every effort to achieve prompt enactment of such 
legislation. On enactment of such legislation, the Korean government shall 
take all necessary steps to implement the law immediately. 
Prior to the effective date of the new legislation, the financial contribution 
payable by the foreign cigarette manufacturer to the KMC shall be 18,000 won 
per thousand cigarettes. This payment shall constitute all financial 
contributions imposed on imported cigarettes including tariffs, defense taxes, 
value-added taxes, education tax, tobacco sales taxes, monopoly payments, and 
any other assessments or charges. 
Upon payment by the foreign cigarette manufacturer to the KMC of 18,000 
won per thousand cigarettes, the KMC shall provide immediately to the foreign 
cigarette manufacturer a receipt of proof of payment. 
Presentation of such receipt at customs shall satisfy all requirements for 
payment of any tax burden needed to accomplish formal customs entry. Within 
thirty (30) days from the end of the month of custom entry, the foreign 
cigarette manufacturer shall pay to KMC 7,200 won per thousand cigarettes. 
Any and all liability for payment of each portion of the financial contribution 
shall cease immediately upon presentation of each payment. 
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D. Prior to the effective date of the new legislation, the Korean government 
shall ensure that KMC refunds to the foreign cigarette manufacturer the entire 
fiscal contribution paid by the foreign cigarette manufacturer in the event that 
imported cigarettes have been so damaged as to be unable to be sold to 
consumers, and such damaged cigarettes are re-exported within one year of 
customs clearance of such cigarettes. The portion of the fiscal contribution 
allocated by KMC to the education tax and tobacco sales taxes shall be 
refunded upon presentation of proof that such cigarettes have been physically 
destroyed. Upon the effective date of the new legislation, the Korean 
government shall ensure that the appropriate tax authority refunds the full 
excise tax if the damaged cigarettes are re-exported within one year of customs 
clearance or upon presentation of proof that the cigarettes were physically 
destroyed. 
V. INVESTMENT 
A. Any foreign cigarette manufacturer may negotiate technology transfer and 
enter into licensing agreements with the KMC. 
B. The zero percent import tariff to be established by the new legislation shall 
be maintained at zero percent until such time as the Korean government 
permits foreign investment in the manufacture of cigarettes in Korea without 
restriction on the form of such investment. 
VI. ADVERTISING AND PROMOTIONAL ACTIVITIES 
A. No later than July, 1,1988, the Korean government shall modify the 
relevant regulations to permit any foreign cigarette manufacturer to conduct 
temporary and permanent point of sale promotions independently or through 
retail outlets, provided that such promotions should be conducted in the 
immediate vicinity of retail outlets, and are intended to promote awareness of 
the availability of imported cigarettes and to facilitate brand experimentation 
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among smokers, and are not intended to stimulate new smokers. 
B The modified regulations shall permit each foreign cigarette manufacturer to 
place 120 advertisements per brand family in magazines annually, provided 
such magazines are not specifically directed at women or youth. Such 
magazines shall not be subject to restrictions in accepting such advertisements. 
In addition, such advertisements shall include Korean health warning in effect 
at the time of advertisement. 
C. Any foreign cigarette manufacturer may sponsor social, cultural, musical, 
athletic, or similar events or functions. Brand sponsorship of such events shall 
be permitted. Such events shall not be specifically directed at women or youth. 
D. Cigarette samples may be restricted to stick by stick distribution at licensed 
retail outlets. 
E. A health warming shall appear on each pack of cigarettes. The text shall be 
in the Korean language on the side of the package and shall be identical to that 
of Korean brands of national origin. The type size, type face, and format shall 
be essentially equivalent to the current health warning on Korean brands of 
national origin. In the event that health warning on Korean brands of national 
origins is modified, a minimum of six months advance notice shall be provided 
to each cigarette manufacturer, and all cigarettes in inventory or ordered prior 
to the modification shall be allowed to continue to be sold in Korea for a 
period of one year from the date of such advance notice. 
VII. CONSULTATIONS 
A. Both sides agree to consult promptly at the request of either party on any 
matter relating to this Record of Understanding. 
B. Initial consultations shall be held prior to the submission of the new 
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legislation to review and discuss its contents to ensure consistency with this 
Record of Understanding. 
C. Based on the commitments contained in this Record of Understanding, and 
in anticipation that successful implementation of these commitments will 
proceed as scheduled, the United States government shall terminate the 
investigation into Korea's policies and practices relating to market access for 
cigarettes conducted under section 301 of the U. S. Trade Act of 1974, as 
amended. 
VIII. EFFECTIVE DATE 
This Record of Understanding shall be effective on July 1,1988. 
Done at Washington. D. C. on this twenty-seventh day of May 1988. 
For the Government of 
the Republic of Korea 
America 
/Sgd. / Tong-Jin Park 
For the Government of 
the United States of 
/Sgd. / Claton Yeutter 
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Appendix E South Korea: Smoking on the roads 
Tobacco Control, 2008,17(5): 300-300 
Sungkyu Lee, Kelley Lee 
London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, UK 
NtNc: '-)UUlll huCCa. K I&(, 1)fulllulloll at a llkolut ý\a) x'r\ icc ýIUIUn. 
As transnational tobacco companies have continued to increase market 
share in South Korea, Korean Tomorrow & Global (formerly Korean Tobacco 
& Ginseng) has resorted to ever more creative tactics to stay one step ahead of 
the competition. 
The latest showdown has been on the nation's motorways where the 
former state monopoly has ensured its logo and colours are prominently 
displayed by donating umbrellas, tables, seating and bins to motorway service 
areas. The high-tech bins are a particular innovation, composed of ash tray and 
trashcan, as they light up at night to optimise visibility. 
For KT&G, the benefits are three-fold. While emblazoned with the 
KT&G logo, the facilities are not ostensibly advertising KT&G brands, and 
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thus effectively circumvent current restrictions on tobacco advertising using 
billboards and the print media. Second, in exchange for these donations, the 
company has secured the right to sell its cigarette brands exclusively to 
motorway service users. The arrangement ensures competing brands are 
excluded from a large number of distribution outlets. Third, KT&G's efforts to 
portray itself as a socially responsible company are given a substantial boost. 
Service area donations are part of the company's broader corporate social 
responsibility programme which supplies equipment to schools, public 
buildings and social welfare agencies. 
All donations have been eagerly received by the Korea Expressway 
Corporation ("people who build connections of happiness") which is 
responsible for maintaining the country's road and service amenities. Rapid 
growth of the economy since the 1980s has been accompanied by a major 
expansion of the country's transport system, with the development of 
motorways a key goal in recent years. Growth has also been fuelled by the 
increased availability of motor vehicles, which has contributed greatly to the 
mobility of an increasingly affluent population. The expressway company has 
thus welcomed KT&G's "donations" as part of its goal to provide "top 
quality expressway services". With around 4,000 kilometres (2,485 miles) of 
national highways in South Korea by 2010, and over 76,000 kilometres 
(47,200 miles) of paved roads, KT&G stands to gain much mileage from this 
captive market. 
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Appendix F South Korea: KT&G prepares for FCTC with charity 
drive 
Tobacco Control, 2008,17(6): 371-371 
Sungkyu Lee, Chris Holden 
London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, UK 
Note: South Koi ca: one of the cars used by KT&G's corporate social responsibility 
programme. 
As the South Korean government was due to begin considering 
legislation to implement the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
(FCTC) in August, Korea Tomorrow & Global (KT&G, formerly Korean 
Tobacco & Ginseng) began manoeuvring to protect its dominant market 
position from stronger regulation. Since the opening of the South Korean 
market in 1988 and KT&G's privatization in 2003, the company has struggled 
to maintain its share of the market, now at 70%, from foreign competitors. In 
the process, corporate social responsibility has become a key part of its 
strategy. 
Under the Tobacco Business Act, enacted in 1989, tobacco companies 
are restricted from advertising in the broadcast media and some print media, as 
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well as prohibited from marketing specifically to young people under 19 years 
old and females. Advertising of cigarette brands and promotional activities are 
only permitted at retail outlets, and in certain magazines, and so corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) activities have become an increasingly important 
way of both promoting the company and winning the hearts and minds of the 
South Korean public. 
KT&G launched its CSR programme in 2003 with the creation of the 
KT&G Social Welfare Foundation. The foundation announced that it would 
spend more than US$200million by 2010. Three examples illustrate how the 
foundation has used CSR to circumvent marketing restrictions, whilst 
simultaneously legitimizing the company. 
The first is the donation of 100 cars to social welfare organisations 
each year since 2004. The cars clearly bear the KT&G logo and have the same 
colouring as the company's cigarette delivery vehicles. A second is the "Love 
Kimchi" (a traditional Korean side dish made of cabbage) project begun in 
2004 and ostensibly aimed at helping low-income households stock up for 
winter. KT&G pays for the ingredients and recruits volunteers to make kimchi, 
which is then donated to low-income households and older people. The 
volunteers at kimchi-making events wear aprons and hair bands displaying the 
KT&G logo, providing valuable publicity for the company. By meeting poor 
people's needs that are not met by the state, KT&G hopes to win support and 
make it difficult for the government to ban its "socially responsible" 
activities. A third, and perhaps the most pernicious example, is the "Dream in 
Painting" project. This recruits university students, parents and volunteers to 
paint murals on the walls of elementary schools. Three hundred students were 
recruited to participate in the project in May 2007. Although KT&G's logo 
cannot be included in the mural, all participants wear KT&G aprons. 
The increased use of CSR in South Korea illustrates how a national 
tobacco company has responded to greater market competition and the shadow 
of the FCTC by adopting familiar tactics used by transnational tobacco 
companies (TTCs). As with TTCs, tobacco control advocates must remain 
wary of such efforts which circumvent restrictions on marketing and 
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advertising, and gain the company much needed credibility at a time when 
stronger regulation looms. 
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Appendix G FCTC provision from Article 6 to Article 17 
" 
" Article 6 
" Price and tax measures to reduce the demand for tobacco 
o The Parties recognize that price and tax measures are an 
effective and important means of reducing tobacco consumption 
by various segments of the population, in particular young 
persons. 
o Without prejudice to the sovereign right of the Parties to 
determine and establish their taxation policies, each Party 
should take account of its national health objectives concerning 
tobacco control and adopt or maintain, as appropriate, measures 
which may include: (a) implementing tax policies and, where 
appropriate, price policies, on tobacco products so as to 
contribute to the health objectives aimed at reducing tobacco 
consumption; and (b) prohibiting or restricting, as appropriate, 
sales to and/or importations by international travellers of tax- 
and duty-free tobacco products. 3. The Parties shall provide 
rates of taxation for tobacco products and trends in tobacco 
consumption in their periodic reports to the Conference of the 
Parties, in accordance with Article 21. 
" Article 7 
" Non price measures to reduce the demand for tobacco 
" The Parties recognize that comprehensive non-price measures are an 
effective and important means of reducing tobacco consumption. Each 
Party shall adopt and implement effective legislative, executive, 
administrative or other measures necessary to implement its obligations 
pursuant to Articles 8 to 13 and shall cooperate, as appropriate, with 
each other directly or through competent international bodies with a 
view to their implementation. The Conference of the Parties shall 
propose appropriate guidelines for the implementation of the provisions 
of these Articles. 
" Article 8 
" Protection from exposure to tobacco smoke 
" Parties recognize that scientific evidence has unequivocally established 
that 
" exposure to tobacco smoke causes death, disease and disability. 
" Each Party shall adopt and implement in areas of existing national 
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jurisdiction as determined by national law and actively promote at other 
jurisdictional levels the adoption and implementation of effective 
legislative, executive, administrative and/or other measures, providing 
for protection from exposure to tobacco smoke in indoor workplaces, 
public transport, indoor public places and, as appropriate, other public 
places. 
" Article 9 
" Regulation of the contents of tobacco products 
" The Conference of the Parties, in consultation with competent 
international bodies, shall propose guidelines for testing and measuring 
the contents and emissions of tobacco products, and for the regulation 
of these contents and emissions. Each Party shall, where approved by 
competent national authorities, adopt and implement effective 
legislative, executive and administrative or other measures for such 
testing and measuring, and for such regulation. 
" Article 10 
" Regulation of tobacco product disclosures 
" Each Party shall, in accordance with its national law, adopt and 
implement effective legislative, executive, administrative or other 
measures requiring manufacturers and importers of tobacco products to 
disclose to governmental authorities information about the contents and 
emissions of tobacco products. Each Party shall further adopt and 
implement effective measures for public disclosure of information 
about the toxic constituents of the tobacco products and the emissions 
that they may produce. 
" Article 11 
" Packaging and labelling of tobacco products 
" Each Party shall, within a period of three years after entry into force of 
this Convention for that Party, adopt and implement, in accordance 
with its national law, effective measures to ensure that: (a) tobacco 
product packaging and labelling do not promote a tobacco product by 
any means that are false, misleading, deceptive or likely to create an 
erroneous impression about its characteristics, health effects, hazards or 
emissions, including any term, descriptor, trademark, figurative or any 
other sign that directly or indirectly creates the false impression that a 
particular tobacco product is less harmful than other tobacco products. 
These may include terms such as "low tar", "light", "ultra-light", or 
"mild"; and (b) each unit packet and package of tobacco products and 
any outside packaging and labelling of such products also carry health 
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warnings describing the harmful effects of tobacco use, and may 
include other appropriate messages. These warnings and messages: (i) 
shall be approved by the competent national authority, (ii) shall be 
rotating, 
" (iii) shall be large, clear, visible and legible, (iv) should be 50% or 
more of the principal display areas but shall be no less than 30% of the 
principal display areas, (v) may be in the form of or include pictures or 
pictograms. 
" Each unit packet and package of tobacco products and any outside 
packaging and labelling of such products shall, in addition to the 
warnings specified in paragraph 1(b) of this Article, contain 
information on relevant constituents and emissions of tobacco products 
as defined by national authorities. 
" Each Party shall require that the warnings and other textual information 
specified in paragraphs 1(b) and paragraph 2 of this Article will appear 
on each unit packet and package of tobacco products and any outside 
packaging and labelling of such products in its principal language or 
languages. 
" For the purposes of this Article, the term "outside packaging and 
labelling" in relation to tobacco products applies to any packaging and 
labelling used in the retail sale of the product. 
" Article 12 
" Education, communication, training and public awareness 
" Each Party shall promote and strengthen public awareness of tobacco 
control issues, using all available communication tools, as appropriate. 
Towards this end, each Party shall adopt and implement effective 
legislative, executive, administrative or other measures to promote: (a) 
broad access to effective and comprehensive educational and public 
awareness programmes on the health risks including the addictive 
characteristics of tobacco consumption and exposure to tobacco smoke; 
(b) public awareness about the health risks of tobacco consumption and 
exposure to tobacco smoke, and about the benefits of the cessation of 
tobacco use and tobacco-free lifestyles as specified in Article 14.2; (c) 
public access, in accordance with national law, to a wide range of 
information on the tobacco industry as relevant to the objective of this 
Convention; (d) effective and appropriate training or sensitization and 
awareness programmes on tobacco control addressed to persons such as 
health workers, community workers, social workers, media 
professionals, educators, decision-makers, administrators and other 
concerned persons; (e) awareness and participation of public and 
private agencies and nongovernmental organizations not affiliated with 
the tobacco industry in developing and implementing intersectoral 
programmes and strategies for tobacco control; and (f) public 
awareness of and access to information regarding the adverse health, 
economic, and environmental consequences of tobacco production and 
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consumption. 
" Article 13 
" Tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship 
" Parties recognize that a comprehensive ban on advertising, promotion 
and sponsorship would reduce the consumption of tobacco products. 
" Each Party shall, in accordance with its constitution or constitutional 
principles, undertake a comprehensive ban of all tobacco advertising, 
promotion and sponsorship. This shall include, subject to the legal 
environment and technical means available to that Party, a 
comprehensive ban on cross-border advertising, promotion and 
sponsorship originating from its territory. In this respect, within the 
period of five years after entry into force of this Convention for that 
Party, each Party shall undertake appropriate legislative, executive, 
administrative and/or other measures and report accordingly in 
conformity with Article 21. 
"A Party that is not in a position to undertake a comprehensive ban due 
to its constitution or constitutional principles shall apply restrictions on 
all tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship. This shall include, 
subject to the legal environment and technical means available to that 
Party, restrictions or a comprehensive ban on advertising, promotion 
and sponsorship originating from its territory with cross-border effects. 
In this respect, each Party shall undertake appropriate legislative, 
executive, administrative and/or other measures and report accordingly 
in conformity with Article 21. 
" As a minimum, and in accordance with its constitution or constitutional 
principles, each Party shall: 
o prohibit all forms of tobacco advertising, promotion and 
sponsorship that 
" promote a tobacco product by any means that are false, misleading or 
deceptive or likely to create an erroneous impression about its 
characteristics, health effects, hazards or emissions; (b) require that 
health or other appropriate warnings or messages accompany all 
tobacco advertising and, as appropriate, promotion and sponsorship; (c) 
restrict the use of direct or indirect incentives that encourage the 
purchase of tobacco products by the public; (d) require, if it does not 
have a comprehensive ban, the disclosure to relevant governmental 
authorities of expenditures by the tobacco industry on advertising, 
promotion and sponsorship not yet prohibited. Those authorities may 
decide to make those figures available, subject to national law, to the 
public and to the Conference of the Parties, pursuant to Article 21; (e) 
undertake a comprehensive ban or, in the case of a Party that is not in a 
position to undertake a comprehensive ban due to its constitution or 
constitutional principles, restrict tobacco advertising, promotion and 
sponsorship on radio, television, print media and, as appropriate, other 
media, such as the internet, within a period of five years; and (t) 
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prohibit, or in the case of a Party that is not in a position to prohibit due 
to its constitution or constitutional principles restrict, tobacco 
sponsorship of international events, activities and/or participants 
therein. 
" Parties are encouraged to implement measures beyond the obligations 
set out in paragraph 4. 
" Parties shall cooperate in the development of technologies and other 
means necessary to facilitate the elimination of cross-border 
advertising. 
" Parties which have a ban on certain forms of tobacco advertising, 
promotion and sponsorship have the sovereign right to ban those forms 
of cross-border tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship 
entering their territory and to impose equal penalties as those applicable 
to domestic advertising, promotion and sponsorship originating from 
their territory in accordance with their national law. This paragraph 
does not endorse or approve of any particular penalty. 
" Parties shall consider the elaboration of a protocol setting out 
appropriate measures that require international collaboration for a 
comprehensive ban on cross-border advertising, promotion and 
sponsorship. 
" Article 14 
" Demand reduction measures concerning tobacco dependence and 
cessation 
" Each Party shall develop and disseminate appropriate, comprehensive 
and integrated guidelines based on scientific evidence and best 
practices, taking into account national circumstances and priorities, and 
shall take effective measures to promote cessation of tobacco use and 
adequate treatment for tobacco dependence. 
" Towards this end, each Party shall endeavour to: (a) design and implement effective programmes aimed at promoting the cessation of 
tobacco use, in such locations as educational institutions, health care facilities, workplaces and sporting environments; (b) include diagnosis 
and treatment of tobacco dependence and counselling services on 
cessation of tobacco use in national health and education programmes, 
plans and strategies, with the participation of health workers, 
community workers and social workers as appropriate; (c) establish in health care facilities and rehabilitation centres programmes for 
diagnosing, counselling, preventing and treating tobacco dependence; 
and (d) collaborate with other Parties to facilitate accessibility and 
affordability for treatment of tobacco dependence including 
pharmaceutical products pursuant to Article 22. Such products and their 
constituents may include medicines, products used to administer 
medicines and diagnostics when appropriate. 
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9 Article 15 
9 Illicit trade in tobacco products 
" The Parties recognize that the elimination of all forms of illicit trade in 
tobacco products, including smuggling, illicit manufacturing and 
counterfeiting, and the development and implementation of related 
national law, in addition to subregional, regional and global 
agreements, are essential components of tobacco control. 
" Each Party shall adopt and implement effective legislative, executive, 
administrative or other measures to ensure that all unit packets and 
packages of tobacco products and any outside packaging of such 
products are marked to assist Parties in determining the origin of 
tobacco products, and in accordance with national law and relevant 
bilateral or multilateral agreements, assist Parties in determining the 
point of diversion and monitor, document and control the movement of 
tobacco products and their legal status. In addition, each Party shall: (a) 
require that unit packets and packages of tobacco products for retail and 
wholesale use that are sold on its domestic market carry the statement: 
"Sales only allowed in (insert name of the country, subnational, 
regional or federal unit) " or carry any other effective marking 
indicating the final destination or which would assist authorities in 
determining whether the product is legally for sale on the domestic 
market; and (b) consider, as appropriate, developing a practical tracking 
and tracing regime that would further secure the distribution system 
and assist in the investigation of illicit 
" trade. 
" Each Party shall require that the packaging information or marking 
specified in paragraph 2 of this Article shall be presented in legible 
form and/or appear in its principal language or languages. 
" With a view to eliminating illicit trade in tobacco products, each Party 
shall: 
o monitor and collect data on cross-border trade in tobacco 
products, including illicit trade, and exchange information 
among customs, tax and other authorities, as appropriate, and in 
accordance with national law and relevant applicable bilateral 
or multilateral agreements; (b) enact or strengthen legislation, 
with appropriate penalties and remedies, against illicit trade in 
tobacco products, including counterfeit and contraband 
cigarettes; (c) take appropriate steps to ensure that all 
confiscated manufacturing equipment, counterfeit and 
contraband cigarettes and other tobacco products are destroyed, 
using environmentally-friendly methods where feasible, or 
disposed of in accordance with national law; (d) adopt and 
implement measures to monitor, document and control the 
storage and distribution of tobacco products held or moving 
under suspension of taxes or duties within its jurisdiction; and 
" (e) adopt measures as appropriate to enable the confiscation of 
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proceeds derived from the illicit trade in tobacco products. 
" Information collected pursuant to subparagraphs 4(a) and 4(d) of this 
Article shall, as appropriate, be provided in aggregate form by the 
Parties in their periodic reports to the Conference of the Parties, in 
accordance with Article 21. 
" The Parties shall, as appropriate and in accordance with national law, 
promote cooperation between national agencies, as well as relevant 
regional and international intergovernmental organizations as it relates 
to investigations, prosecutions and proceedings, with a view to 
eliminating illicit trade in tobacco products. Special emphasis shall be 
placed on cooperation at regional and subregional levels to combat 
illicit trade of tobacco products. 
" Each Party shall endeavour to adopt and implement further measures 
including licensing, where appropriate, to control or regulate the 
production and distribution of tobacco products in order to prevent 
illicit trade. 
9 Article 16 
" Sales to and by minors 
" Each Party shall adopt and implement effective legislative, executive, 
administrative or other measures at the appropriate government level to 
prohibit the sales of tobacco products to persons under the age set by 
domestic law, national law or eighteen. These measures may include: 
(a) requiring that all sellers of tobacco products place a clear and 
prominent indicator inside their point of sale about the prohibition of 
tobacco sales to minors and, in case of doubt, request that each tobacco 
purchaser provide appropriate evidence of 
" having reached full legal age; (b) banning the sale of tobacco products 
in any manner by which they are directly accessible, such as store 
shelves; (c) prohibiting the manufacture and sale of sweets, snacks, 
toys or any other objects in the form of tobacco products which appeal 
to minors; and 
" (d) ensuring that tobacco vending machines under its jurisdiction are 
not accessible to minors and do not promote the sale of tobacco 
products to minors. 
" Each Party shall prohibit or promote the prohibition of the distribution 
of free tobacco products to the public and especially minors. 
" Each Party shall endeavour to prohibit the sale of cigarettes 
individually or in small packets which increase the affordability of such 
products to minors. 
" The Parties recognize that in order to increase their effectiveness, 
measures to prevent tobacco product sales to minors should, where 
appropriate, be implemented in conjunction with other provisions 
contained in this Convention. 
" When signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to the 
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Convention or at any time thereafter, a Party may, by means of a 
binding written declaration, indicate its commitment to prohibit the 
introduction of tobacco vending machines within its jurisdiction or, as 
appropriate, to a total ban on tobacco vending machines. The 
declaration made pursuant to this Article shall be circulated by the 
Depositary to all Parties to the Convention. 
" Each Party shall adopt and implement effective legislative, executive, 
administrative or other measures, including penalties against sellers and 
distributors, in order to ensure compliance with the obligations 
contained in paragraphs 1-5 of this Article. 
" Each Party should, as appropriate, adopt and implement effective 
legislative, executive, administrative or other measures to prohibit the 
sales of tobacco products by persons under the age set by domestic law, 
national law or eighteen. 
" Article 17 
" Provision of support for economically viable alternative activities 
" Parties shall, in cooperation with each other and with competent 
international and regional intergovernmental organizations, promote, as 
appropriate, economically viable alternatives for tobacco workers, 
growers and, as the case may be, individual sellers. 
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